ISSUES IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Proceedings of the Inaugural Workshop
of the Forum for Social Studies
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Edited by
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Preface

The Forum for Social Studies (FSS), the first independent policy research institution, or think tank, in the country held its inaugural workshop on 18 September 1998 at the Red Cross Conference Centre here in Addis Ababa. The Management Committee of FSS, the executive body of the organization, decided the workshop should focus on the broad subject of rural development in recognition of the importance of the rural economy and society to the development effort of the country. The workshop was organized on relatively short notice and with limited funds, which the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung kindly provided and which were just enough to cover the cost of the workshop. FSS began life with no resources but the enthusiastic moral and intellectual support of its members and associates. The Management Committee had virtually no experience raising funds from donors or well wishers, and hence, while there were ambitious plans and programs drawn up for the organization, there were no funds to translate them into reality.

The workshop was the first major activity of the organization, and by all accounts it was quite successful. H. E. Ato Mekonnen Manyazewal, Vice Minister of Economic Development and Cooperation, delivered the opening address prepared by H. E. Ato Girma Birru, Minister of Economic Development and Cooperation, who was scheduled to open the workshop but was unable to do so due to urgent demands on his time. The address was very encouraging and supportive. H. E. Ato Asrat Bulbula, Commissioner of Science and Technology, whose office provided FSS material support, closed the workshop. The paper on science and technology was kindly offered to the workshop by the Science and Technology Commission. The invited guests participated actively in the discussion following the presentation of each paper, raising important issues, offering valuable insights and making pertinent criticisms. At the end of the workshop, participants offered a number of recommendations to enable FSS to plan

and undertake a more effective program of policy research and public debate.

Each paper was reviewed by FSS staff and suggestions for revisions were provided to each author soon after the workshop was over; the authors made the necessary revisions and submitted their final drafts for publication. One of the papers that stimulated a lively discussion was Gebru Mersha's "Privatization of Rural Land: To Protect Whose Security?" Unfortunately, the author was not able to deliver a revised version of the paper, for which reason we have not been able to include it in this volume. The delay in publishing the proceedings was mainly due to shortage of funds and lack of support staff. Be that as it may, we think the papers are still as significant now as they were when first presented.

Editor

Welcoming Address by Prof. Bahru Zewde, Chairman of the Board, Forum for Social Studies.

Your Excellency Ato Mekonnen Manyazewal, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation!

Your Excellency Ato Asrat Bulbula, Commissioner of Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission!

Participants of this Inaugural Workshop!

Invited Guests!

On behalf of the Board of the Forum for Social Studies, its Executive Committee and its general membership, I welcome you all to this inaugural workshop.

This workshop has a dual purpose. On the one hand, it is meant to focus attention on a fundamental problem of our society, i.e. the issue of rural development. With the help of presentations by scholars and researchers with proven expertise in their respective fields, the workshop will explore the problem in its multiple facets: gender, land tenure, rural institutions, resettlement, fertility, indigenous knowledge systems and the role of science and technology.

On the other hand, it is also intended to launch the novel experiment in independent research embodied by the Forum for Social Studies. After years of effort to set it up and get it legally recognized, the FSS today comes out into the open to chart its destiny, a destiny that is full of promises and challenges. While a number of us have made our modest contributions to make this day a reality, particular credit goes to Zenebework Tadesse and Dessalegn Rahmato, who conceived the idea and pushed it ahead with zeal and perseverance.

We Ethiopians have a rich tradition of scholarship going back to at least a millennium. The literate culture that has prevailed through much of highland Ethiopia has given rise to a fascinating body of documentation that has engaged the attention of so many scholars, foreign as well as national. Even if that scholarly tradition of our ancestors had been overly weighted towards textual analysis, the habit of thorough and dedicated application that they demonstrated is a trait that is indispensable to any scholarly investigation.

That ancient tradition of research has been picked up and broadened by Ethiopia's contemporary scholars, who have had the benefit of academic training at the highest levels. The torch lit by our ancestors has not been extinguished. Our University and the various colleges of the country, be they affiliated to it or not, have to their credit an impressive body of scholarship spanning decades and covering various areas of research. As a number of us grew and continue to work in that framework, we are all too aware of those achievements.

Yet, we are also aware of the limitations. Foremost among those is the burden of Institution (with a capital 'I'). While some form of institutionalization is unavoidable, yet the whole purpose of research is defeated if it is shackled by it. In this respect, the fate of contemporary researchers, who are constantly reminded of their subservience to lay institutions, has been only marginally different from that of our ancestors who remained eternally beholden to the ecclesiastical ones.

It is our hope that FSS will make a difference. We hope it will make a difference in at least four respects:

First, we hope that it will chart a new path of interdisciplinary research - research that combines the rigor of economic theory, the depth of historical research and the pertinence of development analysis; research that pools together the intellectual resources of the country to address the fundamental problems of our society in an integrated manner.

Secondly, we hope that FSS will grow into an institution, with a small 'i' - an organization where research controls bureaucracy rather than the other way round, a place where researchers will worry more about whether they will make significant breakthroughs and less about the axe of the finance office hovering over their heads.

Thirdly, we hope that FSS will conduct and administer research that is as relevant as it is profound. The intent is clear. As one can see from the Forum's brochure, the priority areas charted have great social relevance. They include, among others, poverty, food security, environmental change, gender, and indigenous knowledge. What remains is to convert intent into reality.

Finally, we hope the Forum will open a new chapter in the dissemination of research. We hope it will help cure the curse of what some of us have come to characterize as "Abyssinian diffidence" - diffidence that has confined many a valuable research paper or monograph to dusty shelves or folders while the foreign pundits have dominated the scene.

In particular we hope that, through the medium of FSS, we will solve the problem of insulation that has bedevilled academic research in our country. In this respect, I am always struck by how much we, the current scholars of Ethiopia, lag behind our illustrious predecessors of the early twentieth century, people like Blattengeta Heruy, Gabra-Heywat Baykadañ and Afawarq Gabra-Iyyasus, who communicated so effectively with the public through their multiple publications.

So I conclude by repeating that the future holds great promise. But it also abounds in challenges. I hope that this workshop and our joint reflections at the end of it will help clarify those challenges.

Once again, I welcome you all to this gathering.

I now call upon His Excellency Ato Makonnen Manyazewal, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation, to open the workshop with an address.

Thank you for your attention.

Opening Address
by H. E. Ato Girma Birru Minister of MEDaC

Delivered on his behalf
by H. E. Ato Mekonnen Manyazewal,
Vice Minister of MEDaC

Mr. Chair Person!

Members of the Forum for Social Studies

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I am delighted and feel honored to address the opening of the Inaugural Workshop of the Forum. I would also like to congratulate you on the official marking of the birth of the Forum for Social Studies as an independent research institution concerned with the socio-economic development issues of Ethiopia. It is certainly a new and positive initiative worth all the appreciation and support it can get. In the course of this Inaugural Workshop you have important issues to tackle on your agenda; namely, "Issues in Rural Development in Ethiopia."

I would like to commend the Forum for the effort it has been making from its very inception by holding discussions on current and important issues, thereby contributing, in one way or another, to the policy-making process of the country.

The overriding objective of the Government is to attain a relatively fast, broad-based and equitable economic development with macro-economic stability. A rapid increase in agricultural output, driven by the improvement of the productivity of small-holder farmers, rural development programs to upgrade and expand infrastructural and social services, and agricultural development-led industrialization, is the foundation of economic development and poverty eradication in Ethiopia.

Toward this end, a new economic policy was put in place in the early days of the transition period, which was subsequently translated into a series of concrete economic reform programs.

The economic reform measures have helped in creating a stable macro-economic policy environment, a conducive legal and institutional framework for reviving and enhancing the private sector as well as in instituting markets for factors of production.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Recognizing that the basic problem of the economy is structural in nature, the Government has mapped out the Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization strategy. To bring about the transformation of Ethiopia is unthinkable without the transformation of small-holder agriculture. The ADLI strategy is, therefore, based on using agricultural development as a primary stimulus for generating increased output, providing employment and income for the people, and serving as a spring board for the development of the other sectors.

On the basis of the overall development strategy as well as the sectoral policies and strategies, critical sector-investment programs have been designed and are being implemented in the areas of education and training, health, road construction and food security.

At this point let me raise an important issue in the economic development of Ethiopia - the issue of domestic capacity building for economic policy and management. Generating sound policies, strategies and programs and managing them require the existence of a critical mass of domestic capacity. Such capacity is essential for the strong sense of ownership of policy and the development process, which is the *modus operandi* of the Government. There is no better way to foster such a sense of ownership than to generate

and manage the appropriate policies through the building of research, policy-design and analytical capacity.

In Ethiopia, such domestic capacity as envisaged leaves much to be desired. In recognition of the lack in this respect, the Government has taken a number of measures to build and strengthen domestic capacity for economic management. One such measure is the on-going civil service reform program designed to improve the functioning of the public sector - its capacity to deliver effective and efficient development management. Another measure is the strengthening of the higher education component of the Five-Year Education Sector Development Program.

In this respect, as a response to immediate needs and, also, to build local capacity for the future requirements of the national economy, it has been found necessary to expand and strengthen the capacities of selected existing programs in higher education.

Accordingly, four engineering colleges, three medical schools and two education faculties will be upgraded, while two new health faculties and three education faculties will be established in the course of the sector's development program. Law, accounting, management and economics are also given due consideration for expansion.

Certainly, domestic capacity building is not limited to the public sector, though that, too, is critical, but it encompasses the non-public sector as well.

Independent policy research centers will play an important role in policy formulation, complementing the in-house capacities within the public sector.

The emergence of credible research institutions on development issues, such as the Forum for Social Studies, is a welcome development that needs to be encouraged, as such

institutions are viewed to be part of the country's domestic capacity building process.

From this perspective, the formation of the Forum for Social Studies has come at an important and opportune moment. Such independent research organizations as the Forum, unfettered by the demands of day-to-day operations and economic management, are of great importance to policy makers, since they can provide policy options based on technically rigorous and professionally credible analyses.

I have come to know that the main objective of the Forum is to undertake in-depth research on issues of development and social change in Ethiopia, and that this Forum is the country's first independent 'think tank'. Moreover, it will utilize the wide and rich experience of various Ethiopian specialists, civil servants and professionals, who are now in retirement or out of public service, so that their knowledge is not wasted due to lack of such opportunities. I, therefore, feel that the Forum has the right perspective and is worthy of encouragement and support.

Ethiopia may not have a critical mass of trained professionals in the various disciplines, but the few she has are generally devoted to putting their skills to use for the advancement of the country's economic development. Due to the absence, heretofore, of such organizations as the FSS, when these professionals leave the civil service on retirement, the critical capacities the country needs are wasted.

A number of professionals leave the civil service in their fifties, precisely at the time they have acquired wisdom through years of practical service. The FSS provides good opportunities to such professionals for putting their skills to use in the analysis of issues of the day.

I have also noted that the Forum's priority areas of research - food security, poverty and poverty alleviation, economic development policy, social development, among others - are in line with the development programs of the

country, thereby indicating the relevance of the research the Forum intends to undertake.

The Forum, I understand, also intends to provide consultancy service, which is certainly going to strengthen the country's domestic consulting capacity.

Dear Members of the Forum!

To establish such an organization and carry the label of an independent research institution is a necessary, but not sufficient enough condition for the long-term growth of the Forum. It is the quality of its research outputs, i.e. their objectivity, their non-partisan stance, their constructiveness, their practical relevance and the professional ethic with which the researches are handled, that will help the Forum establish itself as a center of excellence and a credible institution worthy of its name. This is the road that I think will ensure the Forum's long-term sustainability.

I know a number of the founding fathers, people with high personal and professional integrity, highly committed to the struggle to bring about equality and broad-based socio-economic development to the Ethiopian people in general, and the rural population in particular. It will not be difficult for them to effectively and efficiently face the challenging task the Forum has set for itself.

Let me, then, take this opportunity to once again congratulate the Forum and wish it good luck in its mission to contribute to the tackling of the development challenges facing the country. The Forum's emergence on the development agenda is a plus for Ethiopia's domestic capacity building in the area of economic policy design and management.

Finally, I would like to thank you all for giving me your attention and the opportunity to make this opening address to the Inaugural Workshop organized to launch the Forum for Social Studies.

Introducing The Forum For Social Studies

(Address at the Inaugural Workshop of FSS, 18 September 1998)

Dessalegn Rahmato
Manager

Your Excellencies!

Distinguished Guests!

Ladies and Gentlemen!

On behalf of the Management Committee of the *Forum for Social Studies*, I would like to welcome you to this Inaugural Workshop. The theme of the discussion of this one-day workshop is Issues in Rural Development, a subject which, I am sure, everybody here will recognize as central and pertinent. This Workshop is the first of what will be a long series of public debates that we hope to organize in the months and years ahead. We shall return to the subject of Rural Development again and again in the public forums we will hold in the future, since this country is predominantly rural, and the development process cannot afford to ignore the rural community and the rural economy. The Workshop has been organized with a shoestring budget and in a relatively short period of time. We thought it would be appropriate to inaugurate our institution at the beginning of the new Ethiopia year, and this did not give us sufficient time to plan a wide diversity of presentations. The papers that will be discussed today have been prepared at short notice, thanks to the good-will and dedication of the authors. I would, therefore, like to take this opportunity to thank them all for their efforts.

It was in early 1995 that the idea of establishing an independent research institution began to be discussed among friends and colleagues, and it has since taken over three years for those tentative discussions to become a reality. The Forum finally obtained its certificate of registration from the Ministry

of Justice in March of this year. We are at present operating without any funds, and if it had not been for the determination of the members and friends of the organization, we would not have been able to make any progress at all. We are, however, optimistic that we shall overcome these initial difficulties in the months ahead.

Many of you here today have seen our brochure describing our objectives and plans for the future, and there is no need to repeat what has already been stated. I would like, however, to stress a few points which, I believe, indicate more clearly the main motivations behind our decision to establish this institution.

The Forum for Social Studies is unique in several respects. To begin with, it is the *first independent think tank* in this country. Its main mandate is to undertake inter-disciplinary and innovative research on development issues and to provide a public forum for the discussion of such issues and the policies that are planned, or have been drawn up, to address them. The problem of development is the most pressing problem facing any government in this country, and it is, therefore, important that the subject is debated as broadly as possible. Second, we are concerned with research and public discussion not for their own sake but as a means to extending the democratic process. We believe that public policy, especially one relating to development issues, should not be left to policy makers alone but must be part of the public debate. This is the only way that the public and civil society can be involved in policy choices and the decision-making process. The greater the public's participation in the development dialogue the more diverse will be the policy options available to decision-makers.

Thirdly, we believe independent research institutions can play an important role in the development process. Independent institutions like the Forum for Social Studies are better equipped to take a fresh look at development problems and suggest new and dynamic approaches to solve them. At present, the government has no other source of advice to turn to

except its own expert staff. This has two disadvantages: (a) the government will only be able to talk to itself, with the harmful implications this involves; (b) policy makers will have limited access to new and innovative ideas. We feel, therefore, that the government should seek, and have access to, independent opinion; without such opinion, its development programs will be impoverished.

Fourthly, we think it is important to promote public awareness of the development challenges facing this country. In the final analysis, the development effort will have to be a *joint* undertaking, a *partnership* between civil society and the state, between popular initiatives and government programs. We feel the Forum can play a significant role in promoting this partnership.

Fifth, we recognize that records, documents and publications, particularly those prepared by government agencies, must be collected and made accessible to researchers and the reading public. It is sad but true that many important documents and records produced during the previous two governments have either been lost or are difficult to get hold of. This means that government planners, decision-makers and researchers are often unable to review and benefit from the experiences of the past. In recognition of this, we have placed emphasis on the establishment of a documentation unit within the organization to collect and preserve for future use documents, records, maps, films, and pictorial material that are relevant and useful to development studies.

Sixth, yet another concern has been what we call the inter-generational transfer of knowledge and experience. There are a considerable number of Ethiopians with extensive knowledge and experience acquired through long years of public service or in a professional career. Many of these people are now either retired or out of public service. We think it is important that such rich and varied experience is not lost but passed on to the younger generation. The Forum will have a variety of programs to enable this transfer of knowledge and to encourage young

and promising researchers to acquire the necessary skills.

These in brief were some of the main considerations behind the decision to establish the Forum.

In terms of research management, we hope to adopt a flexible, innovative and a more cost-saving approach. The Forum is a membership organization; many of its members have extended experience and a wide variety of specializations. Research will thus be managed and carried out by the members themselves. We are now engaged in a membership drive, but we have already been able to attract sociologists, economists, geographers, demographers, policy analysts, specialists in development administration, agronomists, ecologists, gender specialists, and historians. Over one-third of our members at present are women, but we hope that in the very near future the gender balance will be more even. In this connection, I would like to note that we plan to integrate gender issues in all our research undertakings.

In conclusion I would like to thank all of you for coming here to attend this Inaugural Workshop. I hope you will find the papers that will be presented today stimulating and useful, and that each one of you will be able to participate fully in all the deliberations.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung for its financial support and the Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission, but particularly its Commissioner, H. E. Ato Asrat Bulbula, for the encouragement and material support they provided to our organization.

Finally, may I take this occasion to pay my respects to the memory of two colleagues and friends of our organization who passed away recently. First, Ato Solomon Gebre, a member of the Department of Sociology at Addis Ababa University and a specialist in urban studies, was one of the founders of the Forum. Second, Dr. Eshetu Cholé, the noted economist, gave us his support and encouragement, and would have served as a

member of our international board of advisors. The loss of these two colleagues will be keenly felt by our organization.

Let me thank H. E. Ato Mekonnen Manyazewal and H. E. Ato Asrat Bulbula for taking their valuable time to be with us today.

Thank you.

Revisiting Rural Development in Ethiopia
Through A Gender Lens

Zenebework Tadesse
Forum for Social Studies

Contextual Background

In the last three decades, faced with a complex, extremely diverse and rapidly changing reality, approaches to rural development have gone through many twists and turns. At the global level, a major critique of mainstream rural development, and one which has gained a considerable momentum, is what started as 'women and development' and has presently been modified to 'gender analysis'. The shift form 'women' to 'gender' is indicative of changes in theoretical perspectives. In general 'women and development' or WID was premised on the assumption that development has neglected women and it thus appealed to governments and donors to redress the situation. Having extensively documented the multiple activities carried out by women, the arduousness of these activities, the resources at the labor saving devises and credit for income generating activities, the WID literature and lobby called for more education and employment.

Until the late 1960s, rural development was premised on economic growth models, which were expected to 'trickle down' to the poor farmers. It was believed that men and women were equal beneficiaries of development projects and programs. The handful of women's projects was restricted to social welfare concerns, such as nutritional education and home economics. These policies, known as 'the welfare approach', identified women solely as wives and mothers. By 1970, the critique to the trickle down approach to poverty alleviation became firmly established, and new approaches to development began to emerge. For instance, the short-lived 'basic-needs-approach' to development emphasized the need for health,

education, sanitation and secure livelihoods.

The 1970s and 80s witnessed a sea of change in theoretical debates in the field of development. As for gender analysis, the noteworthy changes included a shift from perceiving women as a unitary and historical category and generalization about women and their interests to a conceptualization of gender as a social construct. Many of the characteristics that had been considered the result of inherent biological differences and, as such natural, universal and unchanging, were the product of social relations. In other words gender differences were historically and culturally specific, and what it means to be a man and women varies over time and place. Once such variation is investigated if desired political programs can be instituted to alter gender difference.

It was at this time that Esther Boserup's book entitled *Women's Role in Economic Development* was released. Contrary to the prevailing myth, the book demonstrated the differential impact of development on men and women. One of the major contributions of the book was its illustration of the variation in female agricultural participation across continents and countries. Of equal importance is Boserup's demonstration of how the gender division of labor in agriculture has been modified by changes in such factors as type of cultivation systems and forms of property as well as the introduction of new crops and technology. It argued that agricultural innovations adversely affected women and most development programs tended to place women at a disadvantage vis-à-vis men. Another highlight of the book was its emphasis on the specificity of the gender division of labor in Sub-Saharan Africa, which it classified as the 'Female Farming System'. In this system, women played a pre-eminent role in food production.

In the belt of 'classical patriarchy', stretching from North Africa across the Middle East and Northern Asia, it is men who have the major responsibility for household food provisioning. However, this does not mean that women are absent from

agricultural production, but that "women's labor contribution is subsumed under male controlled processes" (Razavi & Miller, 1995:10). Highland Ethiopia, with its plough-based agriculture would be classified in this category, while, the lowlands based on hoe-cultivation approximate that which Boserup classified as "Female Farming System'.

Coming as it did in the early 1970s, a period of "considerable ferment and change, with the emergence of new ideas, new actors, and new policy approaches" (Sen, 1994:65), Boserup's work and the Untied Nations Decade for Women 1975-1985 fueled an avalanche of literature documenting women's role in production and reproduction. This work, which is known under the rubric of 'women in development' (WID), tried to establish women's issues as a serious development concern and advocated for an equal share of development resources for women. Contrary to earlier assumptions of women as 'house wives', WID advocates demonstrated that women participated actively in production, reproduction and community managing work and called on the state to provide political and economic autonomy by reducing inequality with men.

This form of advocacy, which became known as the 'equity approach', and best exemplified by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), provided for women's rights to receive training, equal access to credit and marketing facilities as well as equal treatment in agrarian reform. There were others who emphasized the importance of changing the gender division of labor and the need to properly value women's unpaid labor (Young, 1993: 131). The equity approach, which translated into a call for redistribution of power, was not well received by development agencies who were not willing to "tamper with unknown and unfamiliar social variables" (Buvinic, 1983:26).

The equity approach was as short-lived as the basic-needs-approach within mainstream development paradigm as the world economic crisis led to a return to economic growth

models via structural adjustment. In this model the state was no longer viewed as the primary engine of growth, and hence its functions were to be minimized. Contrary to expectations of increased state support for 'women's issues', austerity programs led to drastic declines in real government expenditures on the social sectors. The subsequent increase in poverty further aggravated gender disparities. Cuts in social expenditure resulted in shifting the costs of welfare from the state to the 'household'. In reality this has meant relying on women's ability to take on an increasing burden of unpaid work.

The disarray in mainstream development policy was matched by new and divergent approaches in the field of women and development. The WID framework itself has never been homogenous. But by 1980, it has been subjected to numerous criticisms. A major criticism was directed at the use of an undifferentiated population of women. The focus was then shifted to 'gender', that is, to relationships between men and women. Accordingly, the unit of analysis has changed from an emphasis on the individual woman and the household to socially distinct groups of women and men and the relations between them. In a global environment where 'talking economics' has become preeminent, in some circles 'gender' has been rendered less political, that is, 'unthreatening and accessible' (Razavi & Miller, 1995:15). In this technocratic approach to gender, the gender division of labor is primarily conceptualized as a relationship of separation. In other words, the approach shies away from addressing the process of what Kabeer has termed 'social connectedness' (Kabeer, 1992: 14), or those intra-household power dimensions of gender relations that Amartya Sen conceptualized as 'cooperative conflicts' (1984).

Emphasis on the difference between men and women without providing an account of the relations between them fails to explain the process of social change and conflict. Likewise, while it is erroneous to assume a unity of interest between all household members, this should not be taken to mean a total separation of interests between them. Social relations analyses

highlight the need to take account of the ensemble of relations governing the process of production and reproduction, distribution and consumption. As gender cross-cuts with other forms of social differentiation, such as age, class and ethnicity, there are both similarities and differences among women. Social relations are embedded in a wide range of institutions through which social groups acquire their livelihood: the household, the community, the market and the state (Kabeer, 1994). Gender subordination is constructed by the rules and practices of these various institutions and cannot be fully understood by a focus on households alone.

How then is the process of more equitable power sharing to be achieved? Gender efficiency advocates put more weight on changing conceptual frameworks by policy planners and policy makers. The first point emphasized by those who put emphasis on social relations is that redistributing resources between the genders will involve conflict. But as gender relations involve both conflict and collaboration, "men and women are engaged in a constant process of negotiation and re-negotiation. The priority of those interested in improving women's status, therefore, must be to provide women with greater bargaining power within this process" (Razavi & Miller, 1995: 31). Women's relative autonomy will have to be self-generated. "All that a gender-transformative policy can do is to provide women with enabling resources which will allow them to control their own lives, to determine what kinds of gender relations they would like to live within and to devise the strategies and alliances to help them get there (Kabeer, 1994: 97). The enabling resources would have to be created by the state and a diverse civil society.

By 1990, the main stream development debate had shifted towards a search for development models that are able to address human development and social equity. Unlike prior concerns with human capital, human development embraced a broad definition that includes the formation of a wide range of 'capabilities', such as improved health, education and skills and the use people make of their acquired capabilities for production

purposes, or being active in cultural and political affairs and leisure. In this framework, capabilities include autonomy, civil and political liberty, self-respect and the ability to participate in decisions that affect one's life. Economic growth becomes a means to an end in human development. Hence, there is no need for a trade-off between economic growth and equality. The major lesson learnt from three decades of the development experience is that social inequality and discrimination, such as those exemplified by unequal gender relations, have long term costs for a country and the well-being of its people.

Gender Profile of Rural Development in Ethiopia

Out of an estimated population of 58,652,158 slightly over 50 million people reside in the rural areas. A glimpse at social indicators, such as life expectancy, literacy, child and maternal mortality or access to health, water and sanitation, seems to indicate that rural development has not been a priority of government policy. In fact what could safely be said about Ethiopia's development to date is that there has been extremely inadequate attention to social investment, particularly in the rural sector.

In 1996 some of the social indicators were estimated as follows:

Total pop. Growth rate: (%)	3.2
Total fertility rate	7.00
Access to basic care: (%)	46
Births with trained attendants:(%)	8
Contraceptive prevalence:	3 (modern method)
Maternal Mortality ratio:	1400
Under 5 mortality:	198 (M) 178 (F)
Life expectancy	48.4 (M) 51.6 (F)
Illiterate (>15 years)(%):	55 (M) 75 (F)
Primary enrollment (gross)	27 (M) 19 (F)
Secondary enrollment (gross)	12 (M) 11 (F)

Source: UNFPA (1997) *The State of World Population 1997*. New York

In agriculture, subsistence production, which is by far the dominant sector, began to attract some attention only in the 1960s. Influenced by the success of the Green Revolution, the Ministry of Agriculture, with substantive support from multi-lateral and bilateral donor agencies, launched regional agricultural development projects in a handful of high-potential agricultural areas of the country.

These included the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit, which was set up in 1967 with support from the Swedish International Development Agency(SIDA), the Wolayita Agricultural Development Unit (WADU), which was set up in 1970 with support from the World Bank and the ADA District Development Project (ADDP), which was launched in 1972-1973 with support from USAID. Of these, the most well known and more comprehensive project was CADU. Its major activities included agricultural research, the dissemination of improved seeds and fertilizer, improved livestock husbandry, provision of credit and marketing services. The activities also included the construction of feeder-roads, water supply, afforestation, women's project and training of project personnel.

In the first two phases of its existence, which lasted from 1967- 1975, the project's highly publicized success included identification of high yielding wheat varieties, better animal husbandry practices, credit and input delivery program which enabled smallholder households to substantially increase the production of staple grain and dairy products. Located in a region of high population density, the second package programme, WADU, put special emphasis on population resettlement in addition to the development and diffusion of yield-increasing inputs, provision of credit and marketing of agricultural produce. While there was a marked increase in yield and in the volume of marketable crops, the reorganization of settlement plots and the facilitation of new households were far short of the original plan. ADDP, located in a district with a very close proximity to the capital city and covering an area well endowed for the production of *teff*, provided a similar service of providing inputs, credit and marketing services. In the rest of the country, there were

minimum package programs consisting of input delivery and related services. Agricultural research institutions completely neglected women's role in agriculture, environmental management or their role in storage and food processing.

Furthermore, there were other services, such as health, education and other types of infrastructure scattered through most rural areas. But most rural areas are faced with a dearth of all these facilities. The handful of facilities that exist are either located long distances from home or not equipped to handle women's specific needs. For example, what the extremely high maternal mortality tells us is that most rural women lack access to pre-natal, trained birth attendants and postnatal medical care. Heavy workload, poor nutrition and lack of access to clinics exacerbate the other health concerns of rural women. Heavy workload of women continues to be one of the major factors holding back the school enrolment and achievement of rural girls. As a result, rural women continue to be victims of the vicious circle of early marriage, illiteracy, high fertility, poor health status, low life expectancy and grinding poverty.

Gender Bias in Package programs

The first indication of gender bias in these early package programs is the absence of information on women in these three areas in the documents written about the projects. I can only, therefore, speak of my own experience as an employee of CADU. In this well funded and comprehensive project, the 'women's unit' within the Social Development Section was a peripheral project. The numerous publications of CADU on socio-economic issues or agronomy hardly mentioned women. There was no information on women's role in food or cash crop production, harvesting, storage, animal husbandry or marketing. It was assumed that women only performed reproductive tasks. Hence, the home economists provided them with training in traditional home-based activities, such as child-care and home management, particularly 'good nutrition.'

The project did not have a research component. Hence, in addition to the absence of information on women's role in production and marketing, there was no information on the gender division of labor in household work, time use, and access to resources and decision making. When women did not turn up for their training on time, or did not implement what they were taught in terms of better child care or nutrition, it was blamed on the ignorance of rural women. The home economists have to teach at least three classes in very scattered villages. These women would walk, ride horses a very long distance and arrive for their early morning class only to find an empty room or, at best, one or two women. The home economist is only worried about being late for her next class and being blamed by her male supervisor for failing to be on time for her various assignments. The rural woman, for her part, has to accomplish a multitude of tasks, such as feeding her husband before he takes off to the field, fetching water, feeding the children and animals and preparing lunch prior to coming to class.

The project failed to provide women with access to the full range of skills that would in turn have accelerated the hoped for rural development. It was only much later that income generating was tagged on to the rest of the project, but even this only focused on traditional skills, such as spinning, which fetched very little income. Women could not implement what they learnt about 'good nutrition' or child care because they did not have the time or the control of the other necessary resources. The event I am describing took place in the early 70s, and it could be explained away by the lack of gender awareness that prevailed at the time. But these observations have been corroborated by a study conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture (1992). Having stated that "women, especially housewives, are deprived of access to agriculture extension services rendered by MOAPED", the report confirms that extension services provided to women mostly focus on home economics and included the use of improved stoves, family planning, sanitation and nutrition. In fact, even family planning only started after the regime became aware of the extremely rapid population growth that was revealed by the first National

Census of 1984. More specifically, family planning meant the attempt by female extension agents to promote contraceptive use by women in the absence of other support required for the protection of women's reproductive health and without much effort to create an awareness in the wider society of the benefits of voluntary family planning. Likewise, the launching of pilot projects promoting improved stoves in a handful of places was a response to the alarming rate of environmental degradation. In other words, these piecemeal responses were indicative of the absence of policies and measures that ensured that poor rural women have access to safe, affordable and easily available forms of energy. In turn such measures would have relieved women from the backbreaking and time-consuming task of fetching fuel as well as reducing the negative impact on their health, which results both from the search for fuel and its use in poor households. Regrettably, and in spite of accelerated state rhetoric about concerns for the well-being or rural women, these realities are still with us today. In my field visits during the last four years, I have been confronted with the same types of 'women's projects', some of which have only been repackaged as 'gender programmes'.

In a recent review, Amartya Sen highlighted three distinct but related types of inequities suffered by women:

- Material deprivation, deep-seated and far-reaching gender inequalities, which affect the economic lives of women, in the real world;
- Political disempowerment, the *de facto* (and often *de jure*) derogation of women's authority in public and private decision-making processes, which reinforces material deprivation;
- Theoretical degradation, the neglect or distortion of women's position and contribution in the world of theory, including economic theory. (Sen, A. 1995:51).

Rural development in Ethiopia has thus far failed to address any of these major inequities suffered by women. But it would be erroneous and one-sided if one were to portray only

the plight of rural women. Rural development never was a priority of any of the last three regimes if measured by the level of actual state investment. Between 1974-1991, a highly repressive military dictatorship focused on winning a costly civil war at any cost; rural development was subjected to a series of failed experiments: collectivisation, villagization and resettlement. While all these top-down developments led to dislocation of the population, loss of lives, disillusionment and deepening poverty which affected all the concerned population, these processes were much more deleterious for women because of their prior deprivations and disempowerment.

At a time, when most of the world's women were engaged in new types and a multitude of networks through which they shared new and dynamic ideas regarding changing gender relations and gained self confidence, most Ethiopian women, especially poor rural women, were focused on mere survival of their household. Unable to organize independently, they were subjected to the ever growing demands of the Revolutionary Ethiopian Women's Association (REWA), a subordinate arm of the Workers Party of Ethiopia. REWA demanded monetary and labor contributions from women, which was then mostly geared towards supporting the organisational hierarchy and the war effort. Unlike other countries where a considerable amount of detailed studies of changing gender relations have been produced in the last two decades, there is very little research-based information on the reproductive, productive and community work of rural women in the various agro-ecologies of the country. There is only one book- length study of one rural area (Pankhurst, H. 1992). The other valuable but shorter area- or subject- specific studies have not been widely discussed because of the absence of frequent gender forums, and they certainly do not seem to have influenced rural development policy or subsequent research (Poluha, 1980; 1987; Zewdie & Junge, 1990; Dessalegn, 1993).

The source of a persistent gender bias in rural development in Ethiopia is the narrow conceptualization of agricultural production. Most accounts of agricultural Production tend to focus mostly on performance of tasks

associated with ploughing and planting. Given the nature of mixed farming, accounts of agricultural production ought to include both crop and animal production. Such an approach would help us understand the gender division of labor and to accurately measure women's participation in agriculture. In areas of plough-cultivation, there is a cultural taboo against women ploughing and sowing. With the exception of these two tasks, however, women participate in every aspect of farm production: weeding, harvesting and post-harvest activities. Similar to the widely documented experience of other African countries, hoe-based cultivation depended on extensive female labor input into all aspects of cultivation. Women also play a significant role in animal husbandry in all rural areas, and especially in pastoral areas of the country.

Existing records underestimate, or completely ignore, women's considerable participation in the mixed farming system. For example, both the 1984 and 1994 population and housing censuses are based on a highly gender-biased conception of "economically active" population which undervalues women's economic activities. There seems to have been no debate on the way in which the concept of economic activity has been defined and interpreted, or the way in which questions about economic activity have been posed prior to the two censuses or in the period following these two major national events. As a result, we have been denied the opportunity to understand the social and economic implications of the prevailing gender division of labor in this country. Moreover, the limited attention to time use (Zewdie Junge, 1990) continues to limit our understanding of the male and female share of total labor hours spent by household members on specific economic activities. Rural development projects aimed at increased productivity and income become viable when they are based on these types of accurate data.

Furthermore, as rural households can no longer sustain their livelihood through agricultural activities alone, men, women and children in rural households engage in a variety of off-farm activities all throughout the year. Here, too, women's contribution to the total household income is not negligible. In

addition to the absence of accurate estimates of women's contribution to rural livelihoods, rural development programs have failed to draw lessons for further diversification of the rural economy.

The Gendered Nature of Land Rights

For rural women, the major indicator of their material deprivation can be traced to their lack of access to land, the most significant livelihood-sustaining asset. This is further aggravated by their lack of access to education and training and, much more broadly, due to lack of access to valuable information. The clarion call of the broad-based political uprising that erupted throughout Ethiopia in 1974 was 'Land to the Tiller'. Just as the package programs promised to substantially increase agricultural production and improve the standard of living of the rural population, the land reform promised to put an end to the archaic imperial agrarian system and 'usher a process of social and economic justice'. The enthusiastic and broad-based support that the reform received soon died down as "subsequent policies and practices transformed what was potentially a positive measure to an instrument of rural impoverishment" (Dessalegn R., 1997). For most women the reform exacerbated both their material deprivation and their political disempowerment.

A gender-aware reading of the land reform proclamation clearly reveals the biased assumptions about women's needs, roles and capabilities in the framing of the policy. Although the Proclamation stated that "without differentiation of the sexes, any person who is willing to personally cultivate land shall be allocated land," in most cases, the implementation was discriminatory towards women. Initially, land was distributed by family size and registered under the male head of household. In using the household as the unit of allocation, the policy assumed that households were uniform and it failed to take account of the intra-household distributional relations. Secondly, the policy assumed that the gender division of labor in agriculture was immutable and classified women with persons who, due to illness or age, could not personally

cultivate their holdings. In other words, the reform failed to challenge the cultural taboo against women ploughing and sowing and, hence, reaffirmed the beliefs, practices and contracts which governed the relations between women and men.

Consequently, most women failed to obtain possessory right to land. The situation was much worse for women in polygamous unions, divorced women and those who came of age after the initial land apportionment. Given the predominant practice of early marriage in most rural areas, divorce is frequent and the rate of divorce has accelerated due to the numerous socio-economic changes. Women in polygamous marriages were also negatively affected, as men tended to register just one wife. Although female-headed households are allocated land, this is often of minimal size. Moreover, to the extent that they depended on male labor for a significant proportion of farm labor, women have very limited role in deciding land use priorities as well as in the control of the produce.

Beyond these obvious constraints, there were other factors which severely limited women's right to land. Land was distributed to peasants who were organized in peasant associations and who were entitled to land only as residents of the Kebele. Very often, women who married outside their community 'lost' the share of land allocated to them in their parental homes. Similarly, divorced women lost their share of land if they left (as often they had to) their marital household. However, the degree to which women gained some land rights or were dispossessed depended on the pre-reform practice of female inheritance to land or the absence thereof (Dessalegn. R., 1993; Pankhurst, 1992). In other words, in areas where the practice of women's inheritance right existed, it tended to strengthen women's claim to their share of land in cases of divorce or on returning to their natal village. Another critical factor was the willingness of the peasant Association leaders and judicial tribunals to accommodate the possibility of women acquiring rights to land following marital break down.

In a context of a rapid population growth rate and land supply limitation, the anticipated land distribution by family size could not be sustained. In the 1980s landlessness became a glaring reality. Land shortage, increasing poverty and general social dislocation generated a process of increased marital instability and began to transform the rights and duties inherent in marriage and divorce procedures often to the detriment of women. However, the existing literature on problems of access to land mostly refers to 'landless male adults'. The size and gravity of female landlessness remains unexplored.

The reform was accompanied by the establishment of new rural institutions and subsequent reforms such as villagization, resettlement schemes and collectivization. Each of these processes had a differential impact on men and women. In general terms women were far more disadvantaged, but in spite of the monumental difficulties, the various processes of dislocation also loosened some of the cultural taboos and offered women a limited space for developing new identities.

New Rural Institutions

In terms of institutional development, the most important rural institution was the Peasant Association (PA). In addition to the management and implementation of the land reform policy, the PAs controlled the life of the community, as they had judicial tribunals which were mandated to adjudicate cases involving land disputes and legal cases. With the exception of female-headed households, most women were excluded from membership in these institutions, as only heads of households are registered as members.

By 1990, it was estimated that women were only 12 per cent of the Peasant Association membership, mostly female-heads of households or those engaged in small businesses. However, by the early 1990s, female membership in PAs was estimated to be between 20-25 per cent. This growth is most likely due to the death and destabilization caused by the civil war, resettlement and other calamities. Moreover, there is no evidence

that this increase in membership translated into active participation. Similarly, women made up only 7.5 per cent in producer co-operatives. Hence, most women were and absent from those arenas where most matters of interest to the community were decided.

A Promising but Inadequate Reform

One of the major opponents of the military regime was the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Since its inception in 1976, the TPLF has experimented with various forms of land reform and the formation of new rural institutions in the areas under its control. A noteworthy feature of the evolving land distribution system under TPLF was the granting of usufructuary rights over land to individuals in a household and not the household as a unit. Up until 1987, a married status was a prerequisite for the acquisition of land rights. The Land Law which was promulgated in 1987 abolished this pre-condition and land was granted to females and males with minimum age of 15 and 22, respectively, irrespective of their marital status and the assets of their parents.

Unfortunately, this form of land distribution and the attempt to abolish early marriage was not accompanied by challenges to the rigid gender division of labor in agricultural production, but particularly the cultural taboos against women ploughing and sowing. Although women joined the liberation army and performed what were considered exclusively 'male tasks', including ploughing, the end of the war has meant a return to pre-war beliefs and practices as far as the gender division of labor in agriculture is concerned. In other words, although women have possessory right to a small piece of land, they depend on male labor for the cultivation of the land (Chairi G. P., 1996; C.I.P.L.D.P., 1997). The extension programme discriminates against women "because they do not usually cultivate land by themselves" (Chairi, 1996:48). And yet, the case study of one Woreda goes on to note that "Although statistically marginal, agricultural wage labor represents an important source of income, especially for women. Of that 7%,

female laborers account for 70%, out of which 86% come from female-headed households." Unfortunately, the author does not tell us which agricultural tasks are performed by female wage labourers. But he goes on to note that "14 % of the urban sample households with a small plot of land near the house are almost exclusively cultivated by women with maize, and in a few cases, with vegetables" (Chairi, G. P. 1996:30).

Another study confirms Chairi's findings regarding women becoming daily labourers on other agricultural lands, on soil and water conservation, afforestation or construction projects. But the study further notes that women's work on construction projects usually consists of carrying heavy loads of gravel or stone, without the aid of pack animals, carts or equipment. It goes to note that "though women appreciate the value of the projects and participate fully, their housework and children remain unattended to when they work outside their homes. Women's health suffers from a combination of household and other work, poverty and malnutrition, and a lack of health facilities. Related health problems include fatigue, weakness, abortion and backaches (WAT, 1996:23). We deliberated on this area, simply to indicate the complexities of bringing about changes in gender relations.

Land Policy Since 1991

Following the demise of the military government in 1991, a new Transitional Government was established which lasted until late 1994. Under the new dispensation, Ethiopia became a 'democratic' Federal State with 10 'Regional National States' based on ethnicity. On coming to power, the present government promised that the land issue, which has become perhaps the most contentious political issue in Ethiopia, would be resolved through a National Referendum, but soon abandoned the idea. The issue was dealt with first in the new Constitution and subsequently through land redistribution in Amhara region.

The new Constitution retained state ownership of rural and urban land as well as of all natural resources. As far as women's land rights are concerned, the Constitution states that

women "have equal rights with men with respect to access, use, administration and transfer of land. They shall also enjoy equal treatment in the inheritance of property." Further, the Constitution provides for other wide-ranging social, economic and political rights. Women have also been promised rights and services in other policy documents such as the National Women's Policy, the population, health and educational policies. The critical challenge is the mode of implementation of such seemingly egalitarian provisions and policies. Four years after the reform, there is no evidence of special effort to make women aware of these constitutional rights and gender-sensitive policies and, more importantly, to implement these provisions.

In March 1977, the Rural Land Redistribution Proclamation of the Amhara National State was promulgated. Article 9 of the Proclamation provides for the distribution of land equally to both men and women. However, the distribution was limited to single women involved in income generating activities for their livelihood and has thus far omitted other categories of women, such as widows, divorcees and single adult women who are still dependent on their parents and other family members (Original W., 1997). In his case study of one Kebele, Yigremew found that not all the women who applied got land, and those who did get land got a smaller plots than the men (1997:11).

Beyond the absence of special measures to advance the interests of rural women, the issue of gender equality in the unfolding process of land redistribution was overshadowed by the overall ethos of the implementation process. It appears that the redistribution had a strong punitive element, as it excluded those it deemed beneficiaries of land and other positions of power during the previous two regimes. Hence, women whose husbands were members of the previous 'bureaucracy' and women who themselves were members of the various committees during the military regime were excluded from the new redistribution. Given this highly charged context, there was little space for focusing on the need for specific attention to the inequalities suffered by rural women.

Subsequently, the Federal Government of Ethiopia has issued a new Proclamation known as The Federal Rural Land Administration Proclamation, which makes provisions for the enactment of a land administration law by each Regional Council which would ensure "free assignment of holding rights both to peasants and nomads, without differentiation of the sexes." With the exception of the aforementioned region, to date, this Proclamation which was issued on July 7, 1997 has not yet been implemented.

It is crucial to note that the gap between stated legal and policy goals and implementation is indicative of the broader problem of developing a rule of law in Ethiopia. Until this larger legal framework is seriously addressed, it is unlikely that we will witness the development of law as a source of enforceable economic and social rights and an adequate economic and structural support for implementing gender sensitive laws in the foreseeable future in this country. This problem is further aggravated by the absence of a vibrant autonomous civil sector that advocates women's rights and, more broadly, for the implementation of laws and policies. At present we only have a glimpse of an independent women's movement. For example the Women's Lawyers Association has, during the short time of its existence, begun to make a dent in defending women's legal rights and to advocate for legal reforms and to create public awareness of the plight of women.

But gender - transformative policies, such as the provision of independent right of land, would require a multiple and simultaneous points of intervention. Students of rights in land underscore the diversity of forms that the rights can take (Agarwal, 1994; Latarria-Cornhiel, 1995). Land rights can stem from state transfer, as in the case of Ethiopia, especially since the 1974 land reform. They can stem from inheritance, or community membership, as in the *rist* system of Northern Ethiopia prior to the land reform. Land rights may also stem from tenancy arrangements and purchase.

More importantly, land rights are "claims that are legally and socially recognized and enforceable by an external legitimized authority, be it a village-level institution or some higher level judicial or executive body of the state" (Agarwal, 1994). In the case of women's land rights, it becomes imperative to examine the difference between the legal recognition of rights and the social recognition and the enforcement of those rights. The major lesson from seemingly gender-sensitive laws and policies, both here in Ethiopia and elsewhere, is that a woman may have legal rights on paper but it is meaningless unless it is enforced and socially recognized.

Another important aspects of land rights is its temporal and locational dimension. Land rights may be hereditary or accrue only for a person's lifetime or for a lesser period, and they may be conditional on the person residing where the land is located. Since the land reform, in Ethiopia, the locational dimension has become critical, especially for women, as they very often lose even the minimal right they might have on leaving their natal village at marriage or following a marital breakdown.

Moreover, to fully appreciate women's land rights it is imperative to distinguish between access to land and control of rights to land. For example, women can have access to the plot of her brothers or other kin but she cannot claim it as a right. Control of land has multiple meanings, such as the ability to decide how the land is to be used or how its produce is to be disposed of or whether it can be leased out or bequeathed (Agarwal, 1994).

Gender and Governance

There cannot be a blueprint of a gender-equitable land reform, as this would legitimately take a variety of forms (Lastaria- Cornhiel: 1995). The important principle is to grant women effective rights that are not just prescribed by law but implemented in practice. Independent rights in land would provide women access to economic and social resources for survival in their own right and provide them with something to

fall back on in cases of marital breakdown and domestic violence. Likewise, with such rights, women will be able to implement their own land right priorities, e.g., engage in horticulture instead of cereals and control the produce from the land. A gender-equitable land reform requires the establishment of structures of governance and local institutions which promote women's active participation in decision-making and structures of management so as to challenge long-standing institutional power relations. Making women aware of new land laws and reforming customary laws that discriminate against women is another essential component of ensuring women's land rights (Sunde, 1997).

For example, promoting laws which guarantee equality in inheritance and which recognize women's rights to administer property independent of their husbands and other male kin is another essential component of a successful reform, while at the same time it serves as mechanism which will create the social legitimacy of women's claim to land through fostering changes in deeply entrenched social attitudes. To be truly effective, such a reform also necessitates the adoption of special measures to advance the interests of rural women, such as access to credit, information and technical knowledge and markets. Women will have to be fully aware of their legal rights and be literate. Moreover, they will have to have increased access to government officials who administer land-related matters and also have economic and physical access to the legal machinery, lawyers and law courts. It is also imperative that women have a fall-back position, that is, access to economic and social resources for survival outside the support system of contending claimants.

Most land reform programs – the 1975 land reform in Ethiopia and the recent land redistribution in Amhara region – use the household as a unit of allocation, as it is often assumed that the household is an undifferentiated unit where the members of the household pool and share resources equally. Such an approach fails to pay adequate attention to the nature of power relations within the household and the wider social and political environment which mediate women's and men's effective access to resources. Critics of such an approach have demonstrated that

household forms vary and are often sites of 'co-operative conflicts' and, hence, should not be analyzed from a set of a priori assumptions. Moreover, a comprehensive appreciation of the dynamics of households requires an analysis of the complex relations that extend beyond the households and should include consideration of the community, the market and the state. Understanding the gender component of land reform policies and their implementation requires an analysis of power relations at each of these different sites of intra-household relations.

Concluding Remarks

The Ethiopian rural landscape is composed of micro land holdings, deepening poverty and growing attempts to diversify livelihood strategies by men, women, girls and boys. A gender-transformative rural development program is one that builds on these self-generated initiatives. In some policy circles there is a tendency to isolate and pay some attention to female-headed households. While most female-headed households are indeed poor, especially those who have no grown up sons, it would not be accurate to generalize and over gloss the plight of women in male-headed households who have very limited decision-making on household assets.

A Multiplicity of Interventions

Women's access to land or the benefit they could draw from land, even in cases where they have limited rights, is severely limited due to the gender-division of labor, but particularly the cultural taboos against women ploughing and sowing. A way out of this impasse has been recommended by Dessalegn (1993), who suggests a suitable alternative to the existing plough if women are to become independent agriculturists. He also recommends the urgent need for 'appropriate transport', that is, technologies that have the potential of carrying goods to and from the market as well as carrying water and fuel. Such interventions, he argues, will be able to perform domestic labour-saving functions as well as enhance women's income-generating activities. These are indeed necessary measures.

The Need for Gender Disaggregated Data

However, such interventions will have to be accompanied by awareness creation regarding the crucial contributions that women make to rural livelihoods and to the national economy. This type of awareness creation will have to be based on gender disaggregation of the entire rural livelihood strategy: crop production, animal husbandry, off-farm employment, social networks, 'housework' - including child care.

What we know from the handful of time use surveys is that the time intensity and duration of women's labor input differs considerably from those of their husbands in that women's labor input is much higher. This is partly due to the overall underdevelopment of the country, which has been further exacerbated by environmental degradation. Without concerted efforts to reduce women's time burden, development efforts such as poverty eradication, food security, reducing child and maternal mortality, family planning and environmental rehabilitation are unlikely to succeed.

Building on Beneficial Social Change

While the gender division of labor has remained highly rigid in agricultural production, it is interesting to note that the rigidity is clearly shifting in terms of production of new crops, especially vegetables, and public works. The ever-shrinking land holding and the recurrent drought have forced women to search for alternative livelihood strategies. For example, as a response to the recurrent droughts and famine, the government, multilateral organisations and NGOs have introduced food-for-work programmes consisting of the provision of relief in exchange for people's labor in constructing roads, planting trees, building wells and environmental conservation projects. A growing number of women enthusiastically participate in these various forms of public work and earn cash or food. While these experiences pose a challenge to the rigid gender division of labor, the absence of a commitment to build women's technical expertise and management capabilities has tended to limit

women's role as well as the benefits these projects can make towards sustainable development. At the household level, the contribution of women to household income from these new type of activity or the more traditional activities continues to be undervalued.

Rural development agencies, both of the state and NGOs, focus almost exclusively on women's practical needs and maintaining, or slightly ameliorating, women's existing skills, such as weaving and sowing, with a focus on home management skills and improved child care. There is no attempt to provide technical agricultural knowledge, new skills, information, financing and markets. Most income-generating activities lack the in-built mechanism that builds women's ability to carry out sustainable income-generating activities, independent of NGO or government agencies, and one that ensures that eventually a sustainable productive asset is formed for the project community.

Continuity of Past Practices?

There are efforts by local party/state structures to organize women into what appear to be savings and credit associations. Given the legacy of the Revolutionary Ethiopian Women Association (REWA) of the military regime, these efforts have not generated any enthusiasm on the part of women, and we have witnessed signs of coercion in spite of emphasis placed by Women's Affairs Offices in Woreda Councils on the voluntary nature of these emerging associations.

Most rural areas lack adequate schooling and training facilities, and those that do exist are often located far from most rural households. This reality, the prevailing gender ideology that perceives women only as housewives, together with women's heavy workload, constrains girls' schooling and educational attainment. Overall educational attainment is low, but it is much lower for girls, implying an intergenerational transfer of gender disadvantages and poverty.

Promising Signs

The emergence of Associations, such as the Ethiopian Women's Lawyers Association, marks a significant progress in the struggle for women's rights. While access for most women to the public world is still mediated by men, more and more women are making a self-conscious appearance in public arenas like Kebele justice courts, and even Woreda courts, on their own behalf. However, given the immensity of the problem, there is a need for many more autonomous associations and groups that are committed to promoting women's active participation in challenging power relations within households and the state.

The experiences of Ethiopia and other countries indicate that for women to be truly beneficiaries of new laws, policies and programs, these to have to be explicitly committed to gender equality and include mechanisms of enforcement, be accompanied by adequate resources and concerted efforts at raising public awareness.

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Rural Organizations and Rural Development in Ethiopia

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1. Introduction

Diverse forms of rural organizations, both state-initiated and local and indigenous, are a *sine qua non* for sustainable rural development. A major constraint of rural development in Ethiopia has been the absence of adequate institutional structures through which rural people can articulate their needs, protect their interests, manage resources and have access to services. Indigenous institutions such as *mahiber, idir, iqub, debo* and elders' councils are flexible, dynamic and complex organizations providing socio-religious, economic and quasi-legal services. These autonomous organizations have been totally neglected by policy-makers and researchers. The focus of government policy and research has been on state-initiated and state-controlled rural organizations, such as Peasant Associations and cooperatives, most of which have been grossly mismanaged and, therefore, discredited by the rural people. Given an enabling political and legal environment and the will to strengthen rural organizations, indigenous organizations are the most promising institutions for sustainable rural development. Hence, it is high time that policy-makers, administrators and students of rural development paid particular attention to these institutions. This paper is an attempt to examine the role rural organizations can play in Ethiopia's rural development efforts, to assess our past experience and present conditions in dealing with such institutions, and to draw lessons which will help in our future efforts.

2. Rural Organizations in Ethiopia

Ethiopia badly needs a concerted effort in rural development, which in turn requires rural organizations. However, Ethiopia's experience in establishing and maintaining such institutions has not been given enough attention. There are a number of important rural institutions which play vital roles in the lives of the people. The indigenous ones, like *mahiber, iddir, iqub, and debo*, are autonomous membership organizations. Since the 1960s, new, modern types of rural organizations such as cooperatives and peasant associations have been introduced.

2.1. Indigenous /Traditional Rural Organizations[1]

It is appropriate that traditional rural institutions are subjects for consideration by academics, researchers, and policy makers for the following reasons. First, the rural communities are currently without any properly functioning institutions, such as cooperatives and peasant associations. Although these institutions were not initially established on the initiatives of their members, and later on became unpopular, they had been providing some important services to the communities. Second, there is a growing interest among NGOs and other development agencies in working with these institutions. Experience in other parts of the world shows that this measure requires caution. The intervention can have serious, and at times unintended, consequences (see Esman and Uphoof 1984). So, all possible efforts should be made to acquire sufficient knowledge on the subject. Third, given the situation of rural organizations and the nature of the interventions by NGOs and other development agencies, it is important to be aware of what the relationship between the government and those indigenous rural

[1] Uphoof and Esman (1984) noted that the difference between 'traditional' and 'modern' organizations is their degree of formalization, the former being more informal, and the latter more formal. To avoid the difficulty of classification, they used the terms 'existing' and 'new' In this paper the terms 'indigenous/traditional' and 'modern/government-initiated are used for lack of better terms.

organizations had been in the past and would likely be in the future.

Ethiopian rural society is endowed with a variety of important traditional institutions. These institutions have different purposes, functions, and memberships. Some are religious and/or self-help associations; these include *mahiber, senbeté,* and *iddir*. Others such as *debo, wonfel*, and *jigé* are labor-sharing; still others, like *iqub*, have economic functions. Elders' councils focus more on maintaining harmonious social relationships among members of the community. As these organizations are dynamic, diverse and complex, they need closer study and understanding. Some inherently rural ones like *mahiber* have diversified a lot in terms of their functions, structure and management.

Through their local organizations, rural people mobilize their resources, share benefits and alleviate risks. For example, members of a *mahiber* help each other both on cultural occasions, such as weddings, which require allocation of relatively large resources, and during incidents like death or temporary incapacitation by accident or disaster. The organizations serve as a forum where the rural communities meet and discuss problems and opportunities. Elders' councils are the best institutions for facilitating negotiations, addressing grievances and applying social pressure as a disciplinary mechanism. They also serve as a quasi-legal institution through which contracts and agreements are made. If one browses through a wooden box, or any other bag-like container of a respected local elder, one will find that these are archives. Most of these very valuable documents do not belong to the holder. They deal with issues over which he was playing the role of a facilitator, mediator or even arbitrator as a member of an elders' council.

The organizations also contribute a lot to maintaining order in their communities. Had it not been for such institutions in rural areas, where incidents of power struggle are not rare, in such a fragile political environment the Ethiopian rural

communities would have been victims of all kinds of social evils. These rural organizations are important mechanisms of interaction between the state and the rural people. These days, government officials use them as an important channel of communication.

Rural people also mobilize resources through their organizations. Very good examples of the outcome of such resource mobilization are those magnificent and costly religious buildings constructed and maintained by the rural communities of small villages. (I have found that individual peasants contribute as much as one thousand *birr* for such purposes.) Rural local organizations like *mahiber* and *senbeté* are also very important and efficient in managing natural and other resources. For example, they allocate, maintain, and protect communal grazing land, forests, water points, etc.

A study made in Bugna Woreda, North Wollo (Yeshiwas, *et al.*, 1995) shows that *kirés* (*iddir*s) are common in rural villages. These *kirés*, in addition to their traditional functions associated with burial services, mobilize resources through contributions and fines. The money thus obtained can also be used in the form of loans, with or without interest. Loan services are provided on a rotation basis, with priority given to the most needy. Repayment is ensured through the available reinforcement mechanisms.

The kirés are also engaged in the task of natural resource management, particularly protection of forests, grasslands, and water resources. For some of these activities, even guards are employed and paid from contributions made by members.

However, the question to be raised is, can these indigenous rural organizations be partners in the development efforts made by outsiders? This researcher would like to answer this question affirmatively. Of course, in orthodox development thinking, these institutions are characterized as traditional, non-development oriented, conservative, elite-dominated, and non-participatory. There are a lot of examples of such views.

Esman and Uphoof (1984) have commented as follows:

> Existing [traditional] organizations are too readily ignored in most project planning, usually on the presumption that, since the existing situation is deficient, it must be totally changed. Too often, little is known in detail about the prevailing situation. This applies particularly to local groups; if recognized at all, they are likely to be viewed in stereotyped terms by outsiders (p. 241).

One of the principal reasons often given for avoiding existing LOs [local organizations] is that their leadership, drawn from elite strata, may be unrepresentative, domineering, and exploitative (p. 244).

> We do not accept the categorical conclusion . . . that "participatory projects require a modern organization" (p.245).

It seems that such views, if not prevalent, still exist among some NGOs working in Ethiopia. The following case illustrates such views.[2]

Box 1. "Most indigenous organizations are elitist and conservative . . ."

Within Ethiopia, there is limited experience in the area of participatory development. . . . Many funding agencies have been actively financing indigenous partners to be able to produce more effective development impacts in their communities. However, most of these efforts have miserably failed to produce the intended impact for one or a combination of the following reasons: 1. Most indigenous organizations (*Iddir, Ikub, Mahber*, etc.) are elitist and conservative in their nature. 2. Indigenous organizations were not given the space in defining and managing their own agenda. 3. Most of the attention has focused on improving administrative and financial management rather than on democracy, civil society, and human rights. 4. There was lack of clear understanding as to what constituted community participation

[2] Lealem Berhanu (1988: 14-15) working for Furra Development Center, Sidama.

Box 1, cont'd

and empowerment. Thus the challenge facing funding or local development agencies is to ensure that the necessary instruments are in place to facilitate democratic, representative, transparent and result-oriented organizations. These organizations can provide real link with the local community for those agencies interested in change. But are we interested in change? Why do we look at elitist structures rather than more dynamic structures which have been at force for change in other parts of the world? In light of the above argument, a key element of SDC2 activities is the establishment of Kebele Development Committees.

Ironically, the problems mentioned above might have been real causes of failure. Apparently, those traditional organizations were made scapegoats for the failure of the agencies.

However, as can be understood from the following report, there are a number of NGOs that work with such traditional organizations and which hold a completely contrasting view.

Box 2. "The experience of 26 NGOs confirmed that community based organizations can serve as development intermediaries."

The results of the study showed that there is growing interest by NGOs to use CBOs [community based organizations] like *eddir, equb, debo* as channels of development intervention to alleviate poverty and ensure sustainable livelihood. A range of activities such as saving and credit, agricultural input supply, natural resource conservation, and health care are being channeled through CBOs. Furthermore, the study demonstrated that there is a trend of success in working with CBOs because of their credibility and voluntary formati They are instrumental in interpreting indigenous and locationspecific knowledge with less effort and cost.... The experience of 26 NGOs confirmed that CBOs can serve as development intermediaries between NGOs or GOs [government organizations] and the community at large.on to exert social pressure on their members. They have an accountable leadership to satisfy collective needs and

Box 2, cont'd.

mobilize resources. The NGOs... have carried out a range of activities with CBOs to address poverty. These include: saving and credit scheme, spring protection and sanitation schemes natural resource conservation and health care services particularly prevention of [transmittable] diseases, health education and MCH programmes (Bekalu 1997 pp.1,8)

Other researchers disagreed with the general misconceptions regarding CBO membership and function by pointing out that CBOs are not confined to social and cultural activities. CBOs have the capacity to organize and manage regular saving and loan facilities, with priorities to the vulnerable. They can be utilized for emergencies, social security,and production. New responsibilities do not appear either to overburden CBOs or to distract them from their original purposes (Yeshiwas *et al.* 1995: pp. 25-26).

There are ample examples demonstrating that indigenous organizations could be valuable partners in development. Esman and Uphoof (1984) noted that traditional organizations represent valuable social capital; they are dynamic, not static. Their leadership, even elite ones, can also be opportunities, as they are very familiar to the people, while externally introduced organizations may not be understood by the members and will not engender commitment. They also noted that "pump-priming" of new organizations based primarily on outside resources seldom results in effective and sustainable organizations, while indigenous ones have proved successful in these aspects. It is true that indigenous organizations may not be appropriate for all kinds of development tasks. But the most important thing to do is to seriously study and understand them first. Dessalegn (1991) has noted the merits of indigenous organizations which include their flexibility, familiarity, practicality and their being based on real needs, interests and knowledge of the rural people. In the Ethiopian case, two illustrations can demonstrate the dynamism and flexibility of traditional organizations:

Box 3. Traditional organizations are dynamic and flexible (urban example)

In the 1960s, two government agencies, the Municipality of Addis Ababa and the Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs, and some other development agencies took the initiative to promote Iddirs towards playing developmental roles. Seminars were organized on the role of iddirs in urban community development. A coordinating committee was established where sixteen iddirs from Ras Desta Sefer were brought together and represented. The first urban development center was created and it soon embarked on the activities of adult literacy, women's educational program, recreational activities, kindergarten, schooling for children, weaving, dyeing, and other vocational training. More activities were planned by the coordinating committee and financial resources were mobilized including from external sources; 2,500 birr was collected and a kindergarten built, and 15,758.33 birr was used to build a school. By 1972 some 147,603 birr was mobilized for additional social and economic development activities.

At the same time in Teklehymanot area, a confederation of 125 iddirs with a membership of 12, 131 people contributed 60,000 birr and built a school for community use. These satisfactory performance of iddirs in development motivated the Ministry to replicate the endeavor in provinces outside the capital and by 1972 there were thirteen urban development centers established throughout the country in collaboration with sixteen iddirs established in the same way as those in Addis Ababa. [Summarized from Kebebew (1978: 15-29)].

A more recent and rural example also shows that these institutions are even undergoing major changes on their own initiative and without any assistance from outside.

Box 4. Traditional organizations are dynamic and flexible (rural example)

In 1997, while I was doing field research in Gojjam, I had a chance to visit an indigenous peasant organization known as Mariam Mahiber. It is said to be established in 1910 E.C. (1917/18). Members told me that in the 1970s its members were something like less than 30 elders and what they were doing was to meet together at the Mariam Church and have a kind of modest feast and discussions. The leadership consisted of one mussie (a kind of chairperson). There was no financial contribution in any form and it was a totally voluntary organization for the elders living in that Kebele.

But what I found in 1997 was a totally new big institution. I observed that then it had more than 300 household members, both male and female. There was membership fee and fine which enabled the mahiber to have some seed money. It had elaborate leadership structure - one mussie, one assistant to the mussie, one secretary and one treasurer. They had a book where accounts and other activities were recorded. It was no more a simple mahiber where people got together once in a month, but embraced a lot of functions: it served as a burial society (iddir) - which was not found in the surrounding rural area one or two decades ago - and even better services - not only assistance (material, and other) was given during funeral activities but the cost for all those extended religious services thereafter was also borne by the mahiber; it provided credit services for those who were very needy members; it was a forum where villagers discussed their problems and shared their views; it served to settle disputes and to address grievances. Member peasants said to me that it meant everything to them. It is important to note that the villagers had abandoned other smaller mahibers and sembetes to establish and develop this stronger and multi-purpose association. Moreover, many of these functions are new to such kind of organizations.

While it is important to understand that these institutions are dynamic and flexible, their small size and their informality should also not be viewed as problems. Both are effective attributes contributing to their resilience. The size, nature of organizational structure and leadership style are appropriate to the tasks they have been performing. A small size does not attract much attention, which is sometimes important. Moreover, they have demonstrated, as in the case of Addis

Ababa *iddirs* and Mariam *Mahiber* mentioned above, that they are flexible and respond in both respects. Although there are tasks for which indigenous organizations are not suitable, it is also necessary to design those development projects in such a way that they fit into the existing structure. Experiences throughout the world have shown that the 'blue print approach' does not work much in rural development (Hulme 1995; Korten 1980; Chambers 1987, 1983; WB 1989).

While informality may be an advantage to traditional rural organizations, there is some discomfort within some NGOs involved in rural development that rural organizations are not registered and have no legal personality (see, for instance, Bekalu, 1997). Of course, registration is one requirement for having a legal personality, and it helps in the establishment of legal relationships, such as entering into legal contracts, opening bank accounts, etc. However, it is important to note that being formal and big attracts attention from different angles, some of which are not desirable. Registration will unavoidably lead to government interference, which may be a threat to the interests of the organizations. Past experience in terms of government linkages (such as control and assistance), particularly with cooperatives, was debilitating rather than facilitating (see, Yigremew 1996). Registration results in suffocation of institutions with cumbersome rules and regulations, organizational structure, payments and other dealings with officials. We do not even have adequate administrative mechanisms to register them. For instance, Dessalegn (1990) noted that by 1986 only 10 % of producers' cooperatives were registered in the country, and the requirements to fulfil for such registration were extremely technical and complicated. Formality may even make rural organizations victims of officialdom and subordination.

The political and legal environment pertaining to indigenous rural organizations should also be given attention. To a large extent, the policies of Ethiopian governments towards these institutions seem to be what Esman and Uphoof (1984:38) called 'pragmatic politics'. Governments know that

attempts to repress and control all local organizations, some of them with deep and long standing roots, will deplete their coercive resources and their legitimacy. So, except when local organizations threaten the regime, the prudent policy has been to live-and-let-live. This researcher has made the general observation that traditional organizations like *mahiber* and *iddir* are functioning with little difficulty from the government in comparison with other kinds of association (see also Bekalu 1997, Yeshiwas *et al.* 1995).

Although the requirements of the 1960 Civil Code on registration of associations (Arts. 404-482) and a number of concomitant conditions have to be met, it is known that they have not been enforced even in cities. Of course, this acquiescence of the government may be partly attributed to the fact that these traditional institutions are engaged in those activities where the government is not involved or not interested.

However, this does not mean that there are no government surveillance and interventions. For instance, Kebebew (1978:20) reports an incident that happened during the Derg regime:

> The legal status and activities of the ethnic iddirs have been affected as a result of the involvement of an iddir in subversive political activities. A general, who was the president of the Mecha Tulama Mahiber, was accused of having advanced political motives through the mahiber. . .
>
> This incident precipitated governmental actions of serious consequences as far as the formation and expansion of iddirs and private organizations were concerned. The government not only disbanded the Mecha Tulama association but also strongly suppressed other associations of similar nature. Even other iddirs were required to register with the Security Department and their constitutions were to include phrases similar to the following: "This iddir will not interfere with any government policy or will not pursue any political objective. . . ."

Another report (Bekalu 1987:1) has concluded as follows:

> The study has also shown that, in spite of the pivotal role that CBOs [community-based organizations] can play in the development process of the country, there is little enabling political and legal environment to back up the potential contribution of CBOs. In most cases, CBOs are not perceived as legitimate social entities and [are] sometimes perceived as a threat to the function of the formal government structure.

This researcher has also observed in the Amhara Region, for instance, that during the 1997 rural land redistribution, there was a negative attitude expressed by government officials towards traditional rural organizations like *iddir*. These organizations were viewed as forums for anti-government elements labeled as 'feudal remnants' and 'birokrats'; their activities were hence under constant surveillance. It is this researcher's view that Ethiopian traditional rural organizations are effective and valuable organizations to their members, to the community, and to the nation at large. The problem is lack of proper understanding. Their resilience, despite such precarious situation in rural life, proves this fact. The problem is one of differences between the views and attitudes of their members as against outsiders: to the members, the majority of whom are poor peasants, the services they get from their organizations are very valuable.

The criticism that traditional organizations are not development-oriented does not hold much. When communal life is endangered, the peasants are preoccupied with their survival, not development. The fact that their organizations are oriented more towards social and cultural activities is not a result of their being conservative. Who assists the rural people in meeting their social obligations, such as weddings, funerals and other religious occasions, during disasters and accidents like loss of property, sickness, etc. It is also very important to bear in mind what De Swaan (quoted in Wuyts et al., 1992:13) has noted: "The problem of the poor is to stay alive: the problem of poverty is a problem for the rich."

In addition, a number of these institutions have demonstrated their dynamic nature, including their involvement in development activities. So the evaluation of these organizations should be based on the purpose they are established for, not on criteria imposed by 'outsiders'. It seems that the misunderstanding concerning these organizations resulted from a situation that Chambers (1995) called "two realities". So it is important that all the necessary effort is made first, to understand this precious heritage and second, to exploit all its potential for survival and development. Two things should be noted here: first, what these organizations are doing is something important; it is part of development, and it should, therefore, be encouraged; second, projects can be designed in such a way that they fit into these organizations' structures and schemes - as they are or with some modifications, or they can play a complementary role without abandoning their primary objectives.

2.2. Modern/Government-Sponsored Rural Organizations

By modern/government-sponsored rural organizations is meant here simply agricultural cooperatives and peasant associations that were recently introduced to rural areas by governments or other development agencies. These have not been part of the traditional organizational endeavor of the Ethiopian peasantry but were introduced by governments with the purpose of implementing the policies of government and other development agencies.

Peasant Associations (PAs) and agricultural cooperatives, particularly agricultural service cooperatives (ASCs), were the most ubiquitous and the most government - sponsored phenomena in rural Ethiopia, particularly since the 1974 revolution. They were established with the specific aim of carrying out the regime's policies.

2.2.1. Peasant Associations

Peasant Associations (PAs) were introduced by the Derg government as one of the radical measures of its rural land reform efforts. The 1975 Public Ownership of Rural Land Proclamation No. 31/1975 provided for the establishment of PAs at the *Kebele, Woreda* and *Awraja* administrative levels. The rationale was that such a radical agrarian reform had made indispensable the active participation of the peasantry, who were deemed to be primary beneficiaries of such a change. Distribution of land, administration and conservation of public property, rendering judicial services, establishment of different cooperatives, building of schools, clinics and similar institutions were among the primary functions assigned to PAs. Subsequent legislations extended both the powers, functions and organizational levels of PAs. For instance, by late 1975, the PAs were granted legal personality, powers to safeguard and administer themselves as well as the duty of establishing defense squads. By 1976, they were assigned the responsibility of rural tax collection, and by 1977, a policy was adopted to provide for the organization of PAs at the national level. By 1975/76, there were 15,989 PAs, with 4,550,918 members, established throughout the country. Four years later, by 1979/90, the figure had increased to 23,506 PAs embracing 7,049, 209 members (Yigremew 1990).

At the beginning, PAs were democratic, local organizations, with a general assembly as their supreme body. Of course, PAs were not membership organizations in the true sense of the term. Membership was area-based, and their functions were governmental rather than associational. In addition, they had no real decision-making power. So they were neither the instruments of local government nor membership organizations. They functioned as field agents and, hence, they were a kind of local administrative units. Although they were locally effective in mobilizing peasants and successfully implementing the land reform, the system could not let them develop as genuine peasant institutions.

What happened was that, gradually they lost their democratic features, their representative character, and the hope of becoming agents for peasant emancipation. The military government took total control of these institutions and turned them into an extension of the bureaucracy of the political party. Elections for leadership were carefully prescribed and irregular, and candidates were hand-picked. The criterion for being elected became political affiliation, and leaders were made accountable to the political cadres rather than their electorate. They were effectively incorporated into the political system. Wide-spread corruption and embezzlement as well as abuse of power became common within the PA leadership. Members lost hope and interest and they became indifferent.

Kirsh *et al.* (1989:161-62) expressed such loss of hope of peasant emancipation through PAs as "missed opportunity." They also noted the following:

> The land reform has resulted in a far-reaching re-organization of the Ethiopian Peasantry. At first, it was hoped that the peasant associations might develop into genuine autonomous grass-roots organizations. Had they been given the chance, they might well have done so. But this would only have been possible in a "soft" state, where the government was unable to control the rural areas. All hopes of such development were shattered when the hard-liners within the government took over and started to establish a Stalinist form of rule which the political cadre misleadingly describe as "democratic centralism." As a result, the mass organizations ceased to be forums of participation of the people in the country's political, economic, social and cultural life, and became instead a local-level government instrument, which could be influenced and exploited by the political cadre.

They also stated that Ethiopian peasant associations were politicized and bureaucratized. As soon as the government had subdued opposition groups, the situation of PAs deteriorated, and their leaders were replaced. PAs were integrated into the administrative and control network of the government. They lost their autonomy, were reformed and manipulated, and

finally lost their functions as pressure groups or representatives of the rural population.

Dessalegn (1984:78) characterized the PA as "Janus faced, with a dual role and a dual personality: as mass organization, it is entrusted with representation of the interests of the peasantry, and appears as an independent body; as the link in the administrative chain, it is integrated in the machinery of local government and appears as an arm of the state apparatus." However, the most serious causes of the alienation of PAs from member peasants were their involvement in the implementation of the government's unpopular policies very much resented by the peasants: delivery of grain quota, resettlement and villagization programs, obligatory military recruitment and collection of various contributions.

All of the above problems contributed to the loss of credibility of PAs in the eyes of the peasantry. By the time the military government was overthrown, PAs were already unpopular and unwanted among the rural communities. Eventually they became extinct, along with other similar structures, when the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took power and disbanded, announcing over the radio that they were creations of the Derg and its political party. So their abuse and consequent abolition was really a "missed opportunity" in that they were the first attempts at forming representative, democratic and grass-roots peasant organizations with all the important developmental, administrative and political functions.

From the disbanding of PAs in 1991 until the 1995 elections and the subsequent establishment of *Kebele* administration as the lowest tier of the formal administrative and political structure, the rural society had been administered by a number of ad-hoc committees. During the political turbulence peasants had been administering their community through their usual traditional mechanisms. Whenever there was a power vacuum, the rural people organized themselves and elected elders and reputable members of the society with some

kind of administrative experience who were tactful enough to effectively keep order and security in their villages.

It is important to note in passing what is happening to other kinds of organizations in the rural areas. I have been inquiring about and observing the case of those rural organizations like youth, women, and farmers associations which were once in vogue. I have been informed by some *Woreda* officials, cadres and peasants that the new officials are attempting to re-establish these associations. The young people between their late 20s and early 30s constitute the bulk of politicians and government officials. School dropouts are among those who have been channels of communication between the *Woreda* administration and rural *kebeles*. They also play the roles of administrator and adjudicator. Most of them consider such services as a requirement for getting employment, and this is considered a price to pay in the face of severe unemployment and poverty. There is an attempt to exploit such a situation and organize the youth under a political party. However this is still an 'underground' work and no official youth association has been established in area where the research was conducted.

There is also an attempt to persuade rural women to form women's associations. The old tactic of promising to provide credit, grain mills, etc. is used to attract the target groups. But I was informed by political cadres, administrators and the women themselves that the previous bitter experience of endless meetings, committee duties, contributions (labor or other resources) and all other political and governmental activities is still fresh in the memories of the rural women. Hence they avoid as much as possible such meetings with political cadres and it seems it will take some time to recruit them. There is also a plan for forming elderly farmers' organizations (*ye abatoch dirijit*), where adult men are to be organized separately. However, this is just an idea and I have not come across any attempt to implement it.

Currently, there is no indication that the government has an intention to adopt a policy towards the establishment of genuine and representative peasant organizations. It is very important to acknowledge that peasants, like other sections of the society, have the right to establish their own organizations. These organizations will serve to protect the interests of their members the same way other interest associations, labor unions and professional associations do. They should also be structured with different tiers, from primary to national, so that they can be strong pressure groups in advancing the interests of the peasants. An FAO sponsored study on rural organizations in Ethiopia has recommended that primary peasant organizations and service cooperatives be the main rural organizations to be established. It has been further recommended that peasant organizations should not carry government administrative functions, such as tax collection, as in the past, but should be responsible for land management, environmental and resource protection, and for facilitating development activity in their communities (Dessalegn 1992).

2.2.2. Agricultural Service Cooperatives (ASCs)

Ethiopia has been experimenting with agricultural cooperatives since the 1960s. However, it was after the 1974 revolution that these institutions became the most preferred forms of institution for rural development. These institutions were addressed by the military government in its 1975 rural land reform policy. The land reform law laid down the basis for the development of the whole society through cooperative work, and the stated functions of PAs included the establishment of cooperative societies.

However, it was after the government adopted a socialist line of development and embarked on the policy of socialist transformation of agriculture that it intensified its efforts towards the establishment of cooperatives. It was argued that such transformation of agriculture required large-scale mechanized forms of production, with collective ownership and state farms as the means to do so.

By late 1975 (Proclamation No. 71/1975) details of the functions of agricultural service cooperatives were provided for the first time. They were assigned the tasks of providing crop production services, marketing the agricultural products of members, providing loans at reasonable interest rates, supplying consumer goods, providing socialist philosophy and cooperative work to enhance the political consciousness of the peasantry and to establish producers' cooperatives.

It is important to note at this point that a closer examination of the case showed that the ultimate objective of the government was to establish collective farms but not cooperatives.[3] This was to be achieved step by step by moving from ASCs to agricultural producers cooperatives (APCs), and then to collectives. So more attention was given to APCs. Neither the rationale for their formation nor their practical services were found sufficient enough to maintain APCs. So all were abandoned by the peasants when opportunities to do so made themselves available. So the focus here is on ASCs.

By the year 1975/76 there were 308 ASCs with 275,724 members and a capital of 2,704,031. By 1990, however, the figure increased to 3,233 ASCs with 3,571,738 members and a capital of 210,652,879 birr. The ASCs provided some services to their members with the objective of avoiding the middle-men and capitalist exploitation of peasants. Accordingly, they distributed consumer goods and other commodities to their members. For instance, during the period 1982/83 to 1989/90, on the average, ASCs purchased and distributed commodities worth birr 110.6 million annually. In 1990 alone, 1,238 ASCs distributed 826,942 quintals of fertilizer to member PAs. By 1984, there were 177 clinics, 269 schools, and 1747 flourmills established and run by ASCs. By 1990, the ASCs had 2504 warehouses and employed 10,067 workers to run these establishments. They also had assets worth 210,652,879 birr (Yigremew 1996). Another report shows that by 1991, there

[3] For the differences between 'co-operatives' and 'collectives and about the analysis of the case, see Yigremew Adal, 1996.

were 4,159 SCs organized by 18,200 PAs with 4.5 million members and a capital of 211 million birr. During the late 1980s, SCs distributed about 80,000 tons of fertilizer and 40,000 tons of seeds and purchased 100 million birr worth of consumer goods annually. They established 3,036 stores, 230 coffee processing facilities, 1,500 flour mills, 435 primary schools, and 246 clinics (Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project 1993?:3-4).

Alemayehu (1993) noted that ASCs played the following roles: a) linking the state and the peasantry through provision of credit and new technology, by serving as a channel for distributing basic goods to the rural population, and as optional sites for extension agents; b) increasing access to marketing and social services for the dispersed rural population - through their retail shops, milling services, schools, purchasing of outputs, etc.; c) equitable distribution of basic goods to farm households - they contributed to price stabilization and to an equitable rationing of basic goods in rural areas; d) promoting rural employment - they served as important centers for job opportunity in rural areas; e) developing marketing and social infrastructure in rural areas, such as warehouses, retail shops, grain mills, schools, kindergartens, clinics and others.

These and other services were very vital to the Ethiopian peasantry in particular, and to rural development in general. In such a poor country with a predominantly peasant economy, highly underdeveloped infrastructure, and very limited government capacity, cooperatives could have been very valuable options. To some extent, ASCs were the means for self-help, protecting the interests of the rural poor, enhancing their administrative and technical capabilities, and effecting resource mobilization. They also served as forums for acquiring experience in collective work and as important intermediary channels between government and the dispersed rural people. So they could have been the most affordable agents of sustainable development.

However, Ethiopia's experience with these valuable rural organizations is another missed opportunity like the PAs. ASCs lacked the necessary conditions to be effective grass-roots organizations which can play an important role in promoting development. They were beset by a number of problems. They were created by government fiat and not based on the consent of the peasants. They lacked the necessary autonomy and were dominated by government rules and orders. They were used to carry out unpopular government functions like collection of grain quota and obligatory contributions. Government and party control created a corrupt and unscrupulous leadership which was not accountable to the majority of the membership and responsive to the demands and needs of the ordinary peasants. They had an anomalous structure with a cumbersome leadership and a number of committees, but with no higher level organ to assist them. They lacked the necessary linkage with the government.

In general ASCs were created and used by the government to implement its unpopular policies. They were transient and instrumental institutions used to achieve the objective of collectivization. In this way, they lost all their power to decide and to act; they became field agents of the government and were used to extract resources from the peasantry. So there was no genuine cooperative movement in Ethiopia, and the so-called 'failure of cooperatives' was rather a failure of such high-handed government policies.

The ASCs became unpopular among their members, and peasants lost interest in them. Eventually they became moribund, as the government switched from its policy of agrarian socialism to that of mixed economy in 1990. As they were created and manipulated by the government as agents of change towards socialism, they were also thought no more useful when that objective was dropped. Consequently, when the peasants were given the freedom to decide on the fate of cooperatives, they almost totally dismantled APCs. Peasants appreciated the value of ASCs and they needed them as long as they served their interests and were their own organizations.

ASCs were not automatically dismantled by their members like APCs. The new government's disbandment of all popular organizations regarded as creations of the previous government contributed to the neglect and destruction of ASCs.

The new Ethiopian government and its party have made positive policy statements on cooperatives. For instance, the EPRDF's Development, Peace and Democracy Program (1987 E.C.) acknowledges the decisive role of peasant organizations in rural development activities. The most important organizations mentioned as requiring special attention are cooperatives, women's associations, and *Kebele* peasant associations. In 1994 the Transitional Government enacted its first agricultural cooperative law. In this law the government stated its intention of getting rid of government intervention so as to enable cooperatives to play their roles properly in the free market economic system. In 1989 E.C. (1996/97) a draft cooperative law was prepared by the federal government. In this law it has been proposed to bring all kinds of cooperatives under a single administrative agency - a commission at the federal level, and bureaus at regional levels.

Cooperatives were also to be organized at primary, union, regional and federal levels. However, at the federal level no progress has been made since then while regional governments have been taking some measures within their own respective domains. For example, Tigray, Oromia and Southern Ethiopia Regions have already promulgated laws on the establishment of governmental agencies responsible for such cooperatives. In the Southern Ethiopian Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region, a huge project work is underway.[4] In all cases, the regional bureaus are directly accountable to Executive Committees of the respective Regional Councils and Presidents of regional governments, but no line ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture, have been entrusted with managing

[4] This may indicate that co-operatives are needed to facilitate cash crop production and marketing, as this is of great interest bothto the government and international agencies, such as the World Bank.

co-operative affairs as used to be the case with the previous regime. At the federal level, a supervisory unit has been established under the Prime Minister's Office, while in the Ministry of Agriculture the cooperative unit has been demoted to a lower level and is not active currently.

The government media often report about these cooperatives. For instance, it was reported by officials responsible for cooperative affairs in the Prime Minister's Office (August 1998) that, in just three regions-Tigray, Amhara, and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples regions - there were 3,555 farmers cooperatives with 4 million members and 300,000,000 birr capital.[5] But the reports also noted that there was no government agency at the federal level which was responsible for cooperative affairs, and this had a negative influence on the development of cooperatives. They added that the government was currently preparing to bridge this gap.

It may be necessary, however, to cite a first-hand information about what is going on in the field. In 1997, in the Amhara Region, where this researcher was doing a two-month field research, particularly in two *woredas* in West Gojjam (Jabi Tehnan and Kuwarit), the following was observed. There was an Office for Supervision of the Peasant Cooperatives Affairs established in 1996. The agency had its offices at the zone and Woreda levels also. At the regional level the agency had five employees-a head, three cooperative professionals, and one secretary. At the zonal level there were three people-one head and two technical personnel, while at the Woreda level there were two, one head and one auditor.

It was reported that in the Region all APCs were dismantled during the 1991 political turbulence and 180 out of 1200 ASCs were also abolished. In 1997, out of the existing 1021 ASCs only 44 (4.3%) were reorganized as per Proclamation No. 85/1994 of the Transitional Government.

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[5] See *Abiyotawi Democracy*, an organ of the ruling party (EPRDF), 9th Year, Number 258, *Nehassie* 7-13, 1990.

However, these figures can be misleading. A good deal of the ASCs in the two Words that the researcher visited were not functioning. Many of them have been looted, and their money embezzled by those unscrupulous committee members. The following table shows this fact. There were 13 ASCs in Jabi Tehnan Woreda until 1991. While two of them had been totally destroyed and forgotten the rest were found in the following condition.

Table 1. Conditions of ASCs in Jabi Tehnan Woreda in 1993.

#	ASC	Office	Ware-houses	Flour Mills
1	Birr Sheleko	No	No	No
2	Mankusa	No	No	No
3	Abasem	No	No	No
4	Gureray Wonz	No	No	No
5	Yelmdar	No	No	No
6	Kolla Aklat	No	No	No
7	Lematen Mesk	Yes	Yes	Yes
8	Addis Amba	Yes	Yes	Yes
9	Gedam Wuha	No	No	No
10	Teyim Wonz	Yes	Yes	Yes
11	Tabech Mesk	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: Jabi Tehnan Woreda Agricultural Office, 1993 Report.

As the table shows, out of the eleven ASCs in the Woreda only four had the necessary facilities. And these were the SCs reported as having been reorganized after 1994. The report also shows that among those four SCs with such assets, important documents and some movable properties of Lematen Mesk and Addis Ababa had been looted and had not been fully recovered. The rest of the SCs had been totally looted. Two SCs had already been destroyed and forgotten. According to an official from the Woreda cooperative office, this was because of the fact that they owed no debt to any government agency and so the government had no interest in reactivating them. The implication, interestingly, is that one of the reasons for reactivating ASCs is to get back the government's money.

Furthermore, these ASCs were highly indebted. For instance, out of those 11 SCs, 9 of them had the following outstanding debt in March 1993.

Table 2. Debt owed by ASCs

#	SC	Amount of Debt (birr)
1	Mankussa	75,209.10
2	Abasem	57,510.82
3	Gureray Wonz	8,244.22
4	Addis Amba	35,811.45
5	Kolla Aklat	44,497.05
6	Lematen Mesk	21,090.71
7	Teyim Wonz	24,949.67
8	Tabech Mesk	18,848.46
9	Yelmdar	26,917.57
	Total	**312,974.97**

Source: Jabi Tehnan Woreda Agricultural Office, 1993 Report.

The loan was given by different governmental and non-governmental agencies and used for different purposes, such as purchasing oxen, grain mills, agricultural inputs and the like. In addition, another chronic problem of ASCs was misappropriation of funds, which has been the main cause for their unpopularity and loss of members' confidence in them. Just as before, no one is currently responsible for protecting these institutions. For those self-centred committee members, SCs have been a very good source of wealth. When they embezzled funds, no one took them to court or took any other measure against them. This practice is still rampant. The following table shows the extent of such misappropriation until the year 1995/96.

Table 3. Money embezzled from ASCs in Jabi Tehnan Woreda

#	SC	Money Misappropriated in 1995/96 alone (Birr)	Total Amount Misappropriated until 1995/96 (Birr)
1	Lematen Mesk	2,551.66	63,689.83
2	Teyim Wonz	2,438.85	65,700.96
3	Addis Amba	9,799.30	49,802.49
4	Tabech Mesk	455.45	7,369.24
5	Guedam Wuha	-	13,519.13
6	Gureray Wonz	10,568.68	30,358.33
7	Birr Sheleko	1,910.87	20,390.27
8	Yelmdar	697.50	28,776.42
9	Mankusa	9,604.61	18,535.70

Source: Jabi Tehnan Woreda Agricultural Office 1995/96 Audit Report.

All the culprits were committee members, mostly treasurers and purchasers. Most of them were reportedly living in the same Kebele and doing well with the money they embezzled. The situation is not better in Kuwarit Woreda either. The 1997 audit report of 11 SCs shows that a total of 226,567.26 birr had been misappropriated up to that date. The SCs also had an outstanding debt of 83,250 Birr. They are now moribund, and only their previous head counts are reported. Among the five service cooperatives I visited in the two Words, only one (Lematen Mesk) is in good condition and operates a grain mill.

Currently, ASCs have a lot of problems: lack of the necessary facilities and assets, rampant corruption and heavy debts. These are not the only problems crippling ASCs. There is a lack of proper legal framework and working guideline, and institutional set-up at the federal, regional and Woreda levels is inadequate. Other problems facing the ASCs include: undue government interference and control of their activities; elections; administration of assets; serious organizational problems resulting from maintaining the previous membership

of peasant associations, although this has been totally changed.[6]

Peasants would have benefited from ASCs, particularly in the distribution of inputs like fertilizer. Such services have become too costly and too bureaucratic for the peasants. For instance, I found that in 1997, in the whole of Jab Tehnan and Kuwarit Words, the major share of distributing fertilizer is done by Ambassel Trading Co. in collaboration with the Amhara Savings and Credit Institution. Unfortunately this credit institution charges the peasants a 12.5% interest rate when they pay back the credit within 10 months. Access to credit is through groups consisting of 10 to 30 peasants who have to be vetted by the Kebele administration. Some people complain that there is some kind of discrimination in selecting the group members.

In view of all the above problems, the figures reported in the media are inaccurate. In the final analysis, the most critical questions determining the fate of SCs are two: first, people are persistently demanding the recovery of their embezzled money; second, if the first question is not answered, who will supply the necessary amount of assets (capital & other) ɔ SCs to enable them to resume their services? Currently, both questions seem to be very difficult to answer. Recovery of cooperatives' assets and money has been attempted through committee work, but with no success. Given the new economic policy, the bad record of SCs in repaying loans and the government's lack of concern, free access to credit and other necessary assets does not seem to be forthcoming.

Without addressing these two critical questions, neither the political rhetoric nor the usual false promises will persuade peasants to revive ASCs. For example, in Southern Ethiopia,

[6] See Yigremew, 1999. The boundary of peasant associations were changed when they were replaced by Kebele administrations. For instance, in Kuwarit and Jabi Tehnan Woredas, a Kebele administration has almost twice the area of the previous peasant association. In Jabi Tehnan Woreda 64 Pas have been changed to form 33 Kebele administrations. Only one ASC in each of the two Woredas has remained with its previous territory.

142 SCs were surveyed and asked to indicate their development programs. All requested for a working capital; 58 requested for flour mills; 106 demanded loans for inputs; 96 demanded loans for oxen.[7] Peasants are well aware of the government's interest in securing the services of the cooperatives without showing as much concern about their problems. So, the co-operation of the peasants, as well as their confidence in this respect, seems to have been somewhat eroded.

Conclusion

As things stand now, traditional rural organizations seem to be the only real local organizational structures available to the peasants. Independent and genuine peasant associations do not seem to be on the agenda of the government, and ASCs are not yet fully activated. Of course, peasants lack many things. They have no organization representing their interests; no supply of commodities on time and at fair prices; no warehouses and credit facilities; no infrustructural services; no proper channel linking the government and other agencies with the peasantry; and, more importantly, no good experience in such valuable institutions like cooperative societies. All these are losses to the government as well.

Past official promises were not borne out by the concrete experiences of peasants: instrumentality of peasant organizations to control the peasantry; exploitation of peasants by way of offering lower prices for their produces; direct misappropriation of their resources by corrupt officials; obligatory contributions; peasant oppression through physical attack, humiliation, imprisonment; obligatory military recruitment, etc. All these have been working against peasants' enthusiasm for cooperation as well as development in general.

Currently, it appears that no appropriate effort is made to redress these shortcomings. The rural poor of the country are found trapped in a situation that Chambers (1983) called

[7] See Souther Region Co-operatives Development and Credit Project (1993).

'deprivation trap': i.e., clusters of disadvantage - poverty (lack of necessary assets), physical weakness, isolation, vulnerability, and powerlessness. Any effort to improve this situation requires local organizations. Currently, the Ethiopian government has a rural-based, agricultural development strategy (Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization [ADLI]). The government's economic policy stresses the need to extend assistance for rehabilitating peasant farmers, expanding construction of rural roads, expanding the distribution and use of improved agricultural inputs, and increasing extension services.

Both ADLI and other goals of rural development require well-functioning local organizations to supplement the government's efforts. This can be demonstrated by making reference to some important issues. Currently, there is no adequate provision of services in rural areas, which include health, education, credit, marketing, input supply, etc. For example, there are no adequate rural credit services to assist the poor farmers in their efforts to improve their livelihood. Some efforts such as those made in the Amhara Region by the Amhara Savings and Credit Institutions are very expensive for peasants (12.5 % annual interest for fertilizer purchase), monopolistic (excludes participation of other private institutions), and bureaucratic (carried out through the formal bureaucratic channels).

It is very important that attention also be given to develop an agricultural technology suitable for the peasants. There was an effort to strengthen a huge tractor factory while we imported sickles. Peasants still use those traditional implements that have been in use for centuries. More attention is given to dairy farming than to the improvement of oxen-traction power; no proper attention is given to forage production. In the countryside donkeys do not carry water, and oxen and horses do not pool carts. Even in the current extension program, many people are expressing their apprehension that, while agricultural inputs are getting more and more expensive, output prices remain very low, particularly for the peasants who have no

marketing services. Paying due attention to this situation is important for the sustainability of the extension program.

The government has also embarked on the structural adjustment program, which is well known for increasing the vulnerability of the rural poor. In the absence of a well-developed private sector, the government's quick retreat from the provision of important services and support to the peasants will aggravate rural vulnerability. All the money coming from outside sources in the form of loans and assistance to facilitate the adjustment will not be available after a given period of time. More importantly, as experience shows, structural adjustment program will increase governments' need for more external resources when the time for debt-servicing comes. With all the external resources and involvement, our rural development activities have also focused totally on projects. Experience shows that rural development projects in developing countries have commonly failed mainly for lack of proper institutional development and sustainabilty.

All these imply that rural organizations are necessary if our rural development efforts are to be more comprehensive, well-directed, and sustainable. It is, therefore, important that government and other development agencies like NGOs as well as researchers give more attention to the strengthening of existing rural organizations and the establishment of new ones. The effort should start with a proper understanding of the role of rural organizations.

1.1. What is Fertility?

'Fertility' is defined as the number of children born to women. In high-fertility countries, most women have several children, whereas in low-fertility countries, most women have few children. Ethiopia, as we shall see later, is a country with high fertility (as well as high mortality) rates. Such countries are said to have not gone through the stages of *demographic transition,*[8] a term which refers to a transition from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates.

Fertility consists of biological and social factors. The biological factor has to do with the physical capacity to reproduce - usually referred to by demographers as *fecundity*. The social factor, which is largely influenced by the environment, refers to whether children will be born and if so, how many - given, of course, the capacity to reproduce.

The following discussion is based on the social factors of fertility in Ethiopia, since the term 'fertility' in this case is used to describe, as Weeks (1992) puts it, the reproductive performance or the actual birth of children, rather than the mere capacity to do so.

1.2. Measuring Population Growth in Ethiopia[9]

Ethiopia's population is expected to reach 63 million by the year 2000, almost twice as much as it was in 1975, and it is projected to reach 94.5 million in 2015 and 129 million by 2030. Back in 1950, the country's population was just over 21

[8] The demographic transition is divided roughly into three stages. In the first stage both birth and death rates are high. The second stage is the transition from high to low birth and death rates; during this stage the death rate drops before the birth rates, resulting in rapid population growth. In the third stage, the death rate is at its lowest and the birth rate continues to decline to the point where the population eventually declines.

[9] The three basic components of population change are births, deaths, and net immigration. Since data on immigration are not available (or insignificant) in Ethiopia, the following discussion is based on the difference between births and deaths, i.e. natural increase.

million. Hence, every 25 years, the population seems to double in size, clearly showing that there is indeed a rapid population growth in the country.

The reason for this lies in the difference between *crude birth rate* (CBR) and *crude death rate* (CDR). Crude birth rate refers to the number of live births in a year divided by the mid-year population and multiplied by 1,000 to eliminate the decimal point.[10] It is also an indicator of the proportion of the female population in the child-bearing age group (15-49). In any case, Ethiopia's history of CBR shows a decline from 52 in 1955 to 49 in 1975, and to an estimated 44 in the year 2000. The 1994 Census projections show that the CBR will keep on declining to an average of 36.9 for the period 2005-2015; to 30.1 for the period 2015-2020; and to 24.6 for the period between 2025 and 2030 (Table 1).

Crude death rate is the total number of deaths in a year divided by the average total population in that year and multiplied by 1,000. Ethiopia's CDR declined from 31 in 1950 to 23 in 1975 and to an estimated 15 in the year 2000, a reflection of improved health facilities and services in the country over the last few decades. Projections show further decline to an average of 12.6 during 2000-2005; 8.0 during 2015-2020; and 6.2 for the period between 2025 and 2030 (Table 1).

[10] The CBR ignores the age structure of the population which can greatly affect how many live births can be expected in a given year. However, as we shall see later, it is one of the two variables (the other one is Crude Birth Rate) readily available to calculate population growth.

Table 1: Projected Average Crude Birth Rate (CBR), Crude Death Rate (CDR)and Population Growth Rate (PGR): Ethiopia Five-Year Averages, 1995-2000 to 2025-2030

Year	CBR	CDR	FGR
1995-2000	44.7	14.96	2.92
2000-2005	39.90	12.60	2.73
2005-2010	36.89	10.75	2.62
2010-2015	33.62	9.22	2.44
2015-2020	30.58	8.03	2.26
2020-2025	27.51	7.04	2.05
2025-2030	24.63	6.20	1.85

Source: 1994 Census of Ethiopia

The trends of the CBRs and CDRs in Ethiopia show some decline in birth rates and a much bigger decline is death rates, respectively. If we subtract CDR from CBR, we will able to measure the rate at which the country's population has been growing or declining. Thus in 1955, at a birth rate of 52 per 1,000 and death rate of 31 per 1,000, *the natural increase* (i.e. the population growth rate) in Ethiopia was 21 per 1,000 or 2.1 percent per year. Similarly, in the year 2000, the natural increase is estimated to be 2.9 per cent per year. Hence, although the CBRs and CDRs have been decreasing, the country's population as well as the rate of growth have been steadily increasing over the years (for reasons discussed later) and are likely to continue to do so for a long time to come.

Another way of measuring population growth in a country is to look at the *total fertility rate* (TFR), which is an estimate of the average number of children born to each woman during her reproductive years,[11] assuming that current birth rates remain constant. Ethiopia's TFR, although one of the highest in the world, has declined from 7.1 in 1950 to 6.8 in 1975, and to an estimated 6.3 in the year 2000. Projections show that TFR will further decline to an average of 6.52 for the 1995-2000 period;

[11]Unlike the CBR (and CDR) the TFR takes into account differences in age structure and, hence, could be used to compare two countries.

to 4.82 for the 2010-2015 period; and to 3.32 for the 2025-2030 period .

In spite of the continuing decline in birth rates and TFR, the actual population size of the country has been increasing by over 20 million every decade, and it will continue to do so. In other words, the country faces a net increase of 2 million people every year for a long time to come. This amounts to a doubling of the population every year!

Hence, Ethiopia seems to be in the second stage of the demographic transition, where the birth rates and death rates are dropping the latter drops at a relatively faster rate than the former, thereby resulting in rapid population growth. The question is: why aren't the birth rates dropping as fast as the death rates, and how long will the country stay in this state of affairs? The answer seems to lie in the dynamics of the main determinants of fertility in the country; namely, age at first marriage, contraceptive use and child mortality.

2. The Determinants of Fertility in Ethiopia

Rapid population growth could be checked by fertility control, which, in turn, can be controlled at any one of the three stages of fertility: intercourse, conception and gestation (Weeks, 1992). At the *first* stage of fertility (intercourse) a number of factors (or determinants) affect exposure to intercourse. These are: age at first union; permanent celibacy; amount of reproductive period spent after or between unions; coital frequency; voluntary and involuntary abstinence.

At the *second* stage of fertility (conception) the factors that affect exposure to conception include fecundity[12], infecundity by voluntary and involuntary causes (such as sterilization), and use or non-use of contraceptive(s). At the *third* stage of fertility (gestation) factors that affect a successful birth are foetal mortality from voluntary or involuntary causes.

[12] Fecundity refers to the physical ability to reproduce.

The following discussion briefly describes the state of three main determinants of fertility [13] (one from each stage of fertility control discussed above) in the Ethiopian situation: (1) age at first sexual union; (2) contraceptive use; and (3) child mortality.

2.1 Age at First Sexual Union

For most women in Ethiopia, age of first entry into sexual union is essentially age at first marriage, since sexual unions almost entirely take place within a legitimate framework (i.e. within marriage) and marriage is universal in the country, particularly in rural areas.

According to the 1990 National Family and Fertility Survey (FFS90), 34 percent of all married women indicated that their age at first marriage was 14 or less; 41 percent indicated between ages 15 and 17; and 12 percent indicated between ages 18 and 19. In other words, 87 percent of all married women got married the first time while they were still teenagers. The mean age at first marriage was 15.6.

Clearly, Ethiopian women (and men) go through their first marriage at a very early age, thereby increasing their duration within the reproductive years of 15 to 49 and, in the process, increasing, their chances of having many children.

2.2 Contraceptive Use

The most recent comprehensive report so far on contraceptive knowledge, practice, intention of future use and on unmet need[14] in Ethiopia is the FFS90.[15] According to this

[13] The remaining determinants of fertility are important too. However, either data are not readily available (e.g. abortion) or they are not so relevant in the Ethiopian situation (e.g. sterility).

[14] Unmet need for family planning refers to the situation where women who (1) are currently married and, hence, exposed to the risk of pregnancy; (2) are not using any form of contraception; and (3) do not want any more children or want to wait at least two years before having another child.

survey, only 7.5 percent of the married women aged 15 to 49 reported ever using any one method of contraception.

The survey also shows: (i) only 4.8 per cent of all currently married, non-pregnant women aged 15-49 years were current users of contraception; (ii) only 26 per cent of women who heard about a family-planning method, but never used it, intend to use it in the future. A major indication in the survey is that contraception use did not necessarily increase with age, although it did increase with education, as we shall see later.

A study by Johnson and Thomas (1994), which is based on the FFS90, projected contraceptive commodity consumption for Ethiopia between 1993 and the year 2000 under different scenarios.[16] Looking at the more realistic medium growth projection scenario, the study showed that the number of users almost doubled from 310,300 in 1994 to 599,000 CYPs[17] in year 2000. Although, on the surface, these figures may indicate improvement in the number of users, in reality they are a reflection of the increase in the number of women in reproductive years.

2.3 Child Mortality

In what may appear to be a rather strange scenario, high child mortality in rural Ethiopia has been contributing to high fertility. Studies have documented that child mortality positively affects fertility through a number of channels. One of them is that, a mother who has experienced a child loss is likely to have another one to *replace* the deceased. A study by Aklilu

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[15] Although this survey (which is the first and the last so far) does not really have national geographic coverage, it provides a reasonable picture of contraceptive use in the country.

[16] The growth rates used in these projections were set after considering past trends, expectations of what the national program hopes to achieve, and discussions with the Ministry of Health, FGAE, and DKT/PSI.

[17] CYPs refer to the estimated protection provided by family planning services during a one-year period, based upon the volume of all contraceptives sold or distributed free of charge to clients during that period.

and Gebre-Egziabher (1995), conducted in an urban setting, showed that 68 percent of the mothers who had experienced child loss replaced the deceased within a year's time. It could be expected that the replacement rate in a rural setting would be higher.

Although infant (less than 12 months) and child (less than 5 years) mortality rates (IMR and U5MR, respectively) are decreasing in Ethiopia, accompanied by increasing life expectancy (LE), they are still among the highest in the world. In 1994, 108 per 1,000 children born alive died before they reached age one and 159 died before they reached age 5. In year 2000, the figures are estimated to decline to 94 and 140, respectively. The 1994 Census projects that the IMR and CMR will decline to 42 and 52, respectively, by the year 2030 (Table 2). Looking at the projected number of people born the same year, however, the decline in infant and child mortality does not seem to have the expected negative effect on fertility and, hence, on population growth.

Table 2: Projected Average Life Expectancy (LE), Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) and Under-5 Mortality Rate (U5MR): Ethiopia Five-Year Averages, 1995-2000 to 2025-2030

Year	Life Expectancy (LE)		IMR	U5MR
	Male	Female		
1995-2000	50.60	52.92	100.95	161.14
2000-2005	53.10	55.42	96.79	140.70
2005-2010	55.60	57.92	84.58	120.39
2010-2015	58.10	60.42	72.74	101.60
2015-2020	60.61	62.92	61.03	84.11
2020-2025	63.10	65.42	50.55	67.71
2025-2030	65.60	67.92	42.42	52.08

Source: 1994 Census of Ethiopia

To sum up, in Ethiopia, the cumulative effect of early age at first marriage, low rate of contraceptive use, and the positive effect of child mortality on fertility will be continued rapid

population growth. The following section will examine each one of these factors and determine whether they are likely to change in such a way as to contribute to a significant decline in fertility in the country in the foreseeable future.

3. Will Fertility Decline in Ethiopia?

In absolute terms, the answer may be 'yes'. In relation to the decline in mortality, however, the answer must be 'not rally.' The question of fertility decline in Ethiopia, therefore, is essentially a question of whether the three main determinants of fertility discussed above will change in any significant way. Let us look at them one by one.

3.1 Will Marriage be Delayed?

In Ethiopia, as we have seen earlier, average age at first marriage for females is 16 and the average number of children born to a single woman is 7, and marriage is almost universal. In general, the younger a woman marries the more children she is likely to have. Hence, an effective way to postpone child-bearing is to postpone engaging in sexual activity - in the Ethiopian context, that means delaying marriage. The question is whether that will happen in Ethiopia in the short-run. There are two related factors that could delay marriage: (i) change in attitude; (ii) the influence of education.

(i) Change in Attitude

Table 3 shows the attitude of the FFS90 participants about 'the ideal age at first marriage'. In the 1990's Ethiopian women still believed that the ideal age at first marriage for girls is 16.[18] Granted that there are a number of other factors (such as access to land) that affect age at first marriage. But the fact that people still believe that women should marry at such an early age

[18] The same participants indicated that the ideal age at first marriage for males is 21.2.

indicates very clearly that there still remains a lot of work to do to change the attitude of people about early marriage.

It is also interesting to note that the attitude about early marriage does not change with much increase in age of women, as the table below shows. In fact, it appears that the younger the woman the higher the mean ideal age at first marriage. This, if it is a trend, may spell good news.

Table 3: Mean Ideal Age at First Marriage by Age Group of FFS90 Respondents

Age Group	Female	Male
Less than 20	16.7	21.3
20-24	16.0	21.1
25-29	15.9	21.2
30-34	15.8	21.3
35-39	15.9	21.1
40-44	16.0	21.3
45-49	16.1	21.2

Source: TGEa, 1993.

(ii) Impact of Education

Generally, education has its effect on the main factors that determine fertility. Among other things, it delays age at first marriage and increases the use of contraception and birth spacing. Hence, there is a definite inverse relationship between education and the number of children born.

Table 4 shows the opinion of the FFS90 respondents about 'ideal age at first marriage' by educational attainment. It is very clear that the ideal age at first marriage (both for females and males) increases with educational attainment, thereby indicating that people with higher education prefer a relatively delayed marriage. Although in the FFS90 the latest ideal age at first marriage for women was only 22.8, it nevertheless signals the influence of education on age at first marriage. It is also

interesting to note that, for men, the latest ideal age was stated as 30.5, a difference of 7.7 years from that indicated for women.

Table 4: Mean Ideal Age at First Marriage by Educational Level of FFS90 Participates

Educational Attainment	Female	Male
Iliterate	15.7	20.7
Literacy Program	16.2	22.1
No-formal Education	16.4	22.8
Primary	17.0	22.4
Junior Secondary	18.6	23.9
Senior Secondary	20.5	26.2
University/Higher	22.8	30.5

Source: FFS90, 1990.

However, in Ethiopia, on the average, 76.1 percent of the school age children are not enrolled in school. The situation is even worse at junior and secondary schools, where 85.5 and 91.9 percent, respectively, are not enrolled (Table 5). How then would the adverse effect of education on fertility (through delaying marriage) be realised in the country?

It is very clear, on the contrary, that marriage in Ethiopia will not be delayed as a result of change in attitude about early marriage, or due to the influences of education, given the level of educational attainment described above.

Table 5: Per Cent of Un-Enroled Children by Educational Level.

Educational Level	Boy	Girls	Total
Primary (1-6)	56.8	74.4	65.4
Primary (1-8)	62.9	77.2	69.9
Junior Secondary (7-8)	84.0	87.1	85.5
Senior Secondary	90.8	93.0	91.9
Overall	**70.6**	**81.8**	**76.1**

Source: FDRE, 1997

3.2 Will Contraceptive Use Increase?

Table 6 shows the demographic projections for continuing acceptors of contraceptives in Ethiopia between 1997 and the year 2002.[19] According to this table, by 2000, just over 2 million clients will be using some kind of contraception, most of them pills, traditional methods, injections and condoms, in that order. Assuming that 45 percent of the estimated female population of 35 million for the year 2000 (US, 1994) are in their reproductive years and 71.8% (FFS90) of these are married, we have about 11 million women with the potential to use contraceptives. The projections, however, show that only 2.07 million women (or less than 20 per cent of the potential users) would be using some kind of contraceptives in year 2000. The remaining 9 million will not.

Table 6: Demographic Projections of Continuing Acceptors

Educational Level	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Condom (Thousand)	49.82	61.72	75.26	90.49	107.46	126.30
Female Sterilization	36.45	41.33	46.46	51.80	57.37	63.15
Injection (Thousands)	127.59	165.34	209.07	259.02	315.51	378.89
IUCD (Thousands)	36.45	41.33	46.46	51.80	57.37	63.15
Norplant (Thousands)	3.65	6.61	10.22	14.51	19.50	25.26
Pills (Thousands)	719.36	804.65	892.02	980.80	1070.84	1161.92
Traditional (Thousands)	481.19	529.08	576.10	621.64	665.45	707.26
Foam (Thousands)	3645	3307	2788	2072	1147	0
Total	**1458.16**	**1653.37**	**1858.37**	**2072.12**	**2294.64**	**2525.91**

Source: Kinzett *et al.* (1997)

[19] The demographic projections of continuing acceptors and of commodities required are based on the 1994 census data, on age structure and on FFS90 1990 data regarding proximate determinants.

The same projections also provide information on contraceptive commodities required in Ethiopia between 1997 and 2002 (Table 7). According to the projections, in year 2000 the 2.07 million acceptors (indicated in Table 6) would require 13.6 million condoms, 1.2 million doses of injection, 12.7 million cycles of pills, and more. As to whether this requirement will be met by the country's financial, material and human capacities is a big question.

Table 7:Demographic Projections of Commodities Required

Commodities	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Condom (Millions, pieces)	7.47	9.26	11.29	13.57	16.12	18.94
Female Sterilization (Procedures)	5341	5676	5994	6322	6661	6999
Injection (Thousands, doses)	574.15	744.02	940.80	1165.57	1419.81	1704.99
IUCD (Thousands, devices)	16.24	18.00	19.82	21.70	23.66	25.61
Norplant (Thousands)	4.29	6.01	8.01	10.28	12.86	15.43
Pills (Millions, cycles)	9.35	10.46	11.60	12.75	13.92	15.10
Foam (Thousands, tubes)	21.87	19.84	16.73	12.43	6.88	0.00

Source: Kinzett *et al.* (1997)

Although the number of contraceptive users (as well as the amount of contraceptive commodities used) has been increasing over the years, by year 2000 as much as 80 per cent (or 9 million) of the potential clients will not be using them for various reasons. Assuming that half of them are not using any form of contraception, but do not want any more children and

are exposed to the risk of pregnancy, we have about 4.5 million married women with unmet need for contraception use. Hence, while contraceptive use seems to be increasing, it is not anywhere close to affecting fertility negatively in any significant way.

3.3. Will Infant and Child Mortality Decline?

As indicated earlier, child mortality positively affects fertility. We have also seen that, although infant and child mortality rates in Ethiopia have declined considerably since 1995, they are still among the highest in the world. By the year 2000 it is estimated that about 9 per cent of all those born alive will die before they observe their first birthday; and about 16 percent before they reach age five.

This being the case, let us briefly look at the causes of infant and child mortality in Ethiopia. A study by Desta (1993) shows that 33 per cent of infants and 20 per cent of children die due to acute respiratory infections (ARIs). [20] The study also shows that 33 per cent of infants and 32 per cent of children die due to diarrhoeal diseases. Although these two causes of infant and child deaths are easily preventable, they account for up to 75 per cent of all infant and child deaths in the country. Why?

The main and obvious reason is shortage of health-care personnel and health-care facilities. Add to this the low health care expenditures in the country,[21] and one has a clear picture of the problem. According to estimates of the Ethiopian Ministry of Health, in 1990 only 46 per cent of the population of the country lived within an hour's distance from a modern health care center.[22] Use of formal maternal health services, therefore, is very low: only 14 per cent of all births were attended by

[20] ARIs include measles and pertussis, but the most serious ARI disease is Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI), mostly pneumonia.

[21] Ethiopia's total health expenditure in 1990 was 3.8 per cent of the gross domestic product.

[22] The corresponding percentage for sub-Sahara Africa, low-income countries and developing countries were 60, 66, and 83, respectively.

trained health personnel and 40 per cent of women received prenatal care. Adequacy of care, however, is another question. Similarly, vaccination coverage, by 12 month of age, for all vaccines remained below 40 per cent; and in some cases it was as low as 22 per cent (measles) and 13 per cent (TT2+) (UN, 1994).

Ethiopia also faces severe shortage of health care personnel. In 1994, there were more than 33,000 inhabitants per physician and 13,890 inhabitants per nurse (UNDP 1994).[23] Regarding health facilities, in most parts of Ethiopia, there was an average of 8,000 inhabitants per bed, while in the capital, Addis Ababa, the ratio was 700 inhabitants to 1 bed.

Hence, although some improvements are being seen in recent years, indicators of health service utilisation in Ethiopia, particularly of public sector services, remain extremely low. As a result, infant and child mortality rates in the country are unlikely to decrease in any significant way in the future. Hence, the positive effects of mortality on fertility is likely to continue - for some time to come, at any rate.

4. Conclusion

In Ethiopia, as we have seen above, the three main determinants of fertility are age at first marriage, contraceptive use and child mortality. Age at first marriage, which remains as low as 16, is unlikely to change, for reasons already stated, as a result of change in attitude and/or the influence of education. Contraceptive use, which is a mere 4.8 per cent for current users, is unlikely to increase because of the population's as well as the government's limited financial and human resources. Infant and child mortality rates, which are as high as 108 and 175, respectively, are unlikely to decrease due to shortage in medical personnel and health facilities.

[23] The corresponding values for sub-Sahara Africa, low-income countries and developing countries were 14,290 and 2605; 12,500 and 3,130; and 3,355 and 1,545, respectively.

Given these sad conditions in the country, the conclusion of this paper is that fertility in Ethiopia will not decline in any significant way - at least not in the near future. Hence, the negative effects of rapid population growth on rural development will continue unabated for sometime to come. This, unfortunately, is true in spite of the objectives and strategies of the 6-year old National Population Policy of Ethiopia (NPPE), which includes the following three specific objectives (Tiger, 1993):

- Reducing the current total fertility rate of 7.7 children per woman to approximately 4.0 by the year 2015;
- Increasing the prevalence rate of contraceptive use from the current 4 per cent to 44 per cent by the year 2015; and
- Reducing maternal, infant and child morbidity and mortality rates as well as promoting the level of the general welfare of the population.

The general implementation strategy of the NPPE has three main aspects: (1) strengthening information, education and communication (IEC); (2) increasing community-based distribution of contraceptives (CBD); and (3) reducing mother and child morbidity and mortality rates.

4.1 The IEC Strategy

In relation to the IEC strategy on population and family planning, a number of questions may be raised. To begin with, how much can IEC filter down to the majority rural population in Ethiopia, where educational enrolment, not to speak of facilities, is as low as 24 per cent? A recent study by Beyene *et al.* (1997) acknowledges that IEC in Ethiopia, especially that conducted by the Family Guidance Association of Ethiopia (FGAE), has increasingly become important. But it also points out that IEC materials are old and lack socio-cultural, religious, age and gender sensitivity.

IEC strategies include communication, dissemination and exposure. 'Communication' refers to the messages (in this case,

family planning programs) that are packaged for use by potential clients (the target population); 'dissemination' refers to the external transmission or distribution of the communications via a given media; 'exposure' refers to the clients' recall of seeing or hearing messages disseminated by the family planning program.

Hence, IEC strategies, in order to succeed, require: (1) the capacity to generate 'quality' material; (2) the human, material and financial resources for 'getting the message out'; and (3) a target population which, having heard specific messages, not only likes them but also is able to correctly understand and apply them. Very little is written or said on these in Ethiopia. Looking at the capacity and exposure issues in the country (some of them mentioned earlier), the IEC strategy, as one of the venues adopted to reduce fertility, has a long way to go.

4.2 The CBD Approach

With regard to increasing contraceptive prevalence rate from the current 4 percent to 44 percent in 2015, the NPPE relies on clinic-based and community-based distribution (CBD) of family planning services. However, the CBD approach, while it could be useful in a country like Ethiopia, where there are multiple ethnic groups and geographically isolated regions, fails to address a significant target group which is contributing to the country's high fertility rate: the adolescent population (Howard and Aklilu, 1997). Special adolescent services are not available in most of the public sector services. Hence, there are no outreach centers or pro-active efforts made to seek the youth and to provide them with the required services. In addition, the CBD workers often include a large proportion of males, a situation that can become a barrier to family planning acceptance.

In reality, the low contraceptive prevalence rate and high level of unmet need for family planning services in Ethiopia result from: (1) limited availability of and access to family planning products and services; (2) limited alternative delivery

approaches for adolescents; and (3) limited resource of skilled providers (Howard and Aklilu, 1997). Cultural and religious barriers, including male opposition to changing existing practices, are also factors to reckon with.

In addition to this, the contraceptive logistics system of the Ministry of Health is also criticised by many. According to a recent report by Beyene *et al.* (1977), the Ministry's current logistics system is plagued by stock-outs, expired supplies, rationing, inefficiencies in transport and inadequacies in warehousing. The report also indicates that "one of the prime causes of the problems encountered is the incomplete recording system and reporting of essential logistics data. Consequently, contraceptives are issued to lower levels with insufficient knowledge of the quantity or mix of contraceptives and brands needed" (Beyene et al., 1997. p 23).

This being the case, it is unlikely that contraceptive prevalence rate will increase ten-fold from the current rate in just 17 years! For a realistic increase in contraceptive rates, special adolescence services (which are lacking today) need to be available in the public sector services. Outreach centers need to be created and pro-active efforts made to reach the youth through the media and by going to places where the youth congregate to socialize.

Moreover, efforts should be made to create awareness among the youth of the benefits of delaying marriage, protecting themselves from unwanted pregnancies and diseases, and making accessible and available contraceptive products with proper use information. Most of these are lacking in both the National Office of Populations (NOP) and the Ministry of Health (MOH) strategies.

4.3 Reducing Mother and Child Morbidity and Mortality

Although reducing maternal, infant and child morbidity and mortality is stated as one of the objectives of the NPPE, not much is stated about how this could be achieved. In any case,

looking at the levels of prenatal and postnatal care, the inadequacy of sanitation measures and access to safe water, it is unlikely that maternal, infant and child mortality will decline significantly in the foreseeable future.

Maternal mortality and morbidity in Ethiopia arise from complications associated with illegal and unsafe abortions, communicable diseases, malnutrition, pregnancy and childbirth. Women of reproductive age also die from the effects of too early, too frequent and too closely spaced pregnancy and childbirth. In spite of this, the health service coverage in antenatal care is estimated at 20.7 percent of expectant mothers (MOH, 1995). This represents a very low rate of coverage by any standard.

Infant and child mortality and morbidity in Ethiopia are caused by easily preventable diseases such as ARI and diarrhoea, as stated earlier. Inadequate sanitation measures and limited access to safe water are the major causes of these diseases. Diarrhoeal disease, which could kill due to dehydration, typically results from contaminated drinking water or food. In 1985, only 9 per cent of the rural population in Ethiopia had access to safe water. This proportion grew to 11 per cent in 1988 and to 17 per cent in 1991 (WHO/UNICEF, 1993). Access to adequate sanitation among the rural population of the country was just 7 per cent in 1988, and remained the same in 1991.

When we sum up all the indicators, the determinants of fertility in Ethiopia are unlikely to change in such a way as to affect fertility negatively and reduce the rapid population growth. Hence, the degradation of natural resources, fragmentation of land, food insecurity and landlessness will continue unabated. For those who are genuinely concerned about these effects, it is time to look at some basic and fundamental factors (in addition to delayed marriages and use of contraceptives) that could avert rapid population growth in the long-run.

In the absence of effective IEC and/or CBD, as argued above, one might want to look at the dynamics of production and production relations in the country. For instance, the relationship between access to farm land and rapid population growth is a good place to start. One short look at the current land tenure system of the country, and one finds out that a newly formed household in one peasant association (where there is no more land) cannot obtain a piece of farmland in a neighbouring peasant association - unless, of course, some kind of social arrangements are made, and these are hard to come by.

But studies might show that access to farm land is strongly (and negatively) related to age at first marriage and, hence, to the number of children born. They might also show that access to farm land brings about the 'economic confidence' among the peasantry to use contraceptives. Hence, one needs to know when a peasant is secure enough to marry. While this requires extensive research, it promises to be a useful approach to understanding the root causes of rapid population growth in the country.

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Integrating Indigenous and Modern Agricultural Technologies in the Drought-Prone Areas of Ethiopia

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Introduction

'Indigenous agricultural practices' refers to the practices, skills and techniques that were developed by farmers over generations as opposed to the global agricultural technologies generated by the modern network of research institutes in the last hundred years. Indigenous practices are dynamic in the sense that they are continuously adapted to changing circumstances and environmental conditions as they are passed from one generation to the next. Because they are dynamic, indigenous practices can be easily adapted to unpredictable environmental changes. These traditional agricultural practices are productive and stable, and they can, therefore, maintain a considerable degree of sustainability, provided that they are not faced with a high population pressure (Radclift, 1987). The American Society of Agronomy (1988), cited in White *et al.* (1994:232), defines sustainable agriculture as "one that, over the long term, (i) enhances environmental quality and the resource base on which agriculture depends, (ii) provides for basic human food and fiber needs, (iii) is economically viable, and (iv) enhances the quality of life for farmers and society as a whole." Indigenous practices have a considerable degree of sustainability because they have been developed in line with the laws of natural ecological systems (e.g. crop diversity, self-reliance, stability, etc.) and within the limits of the farmer's acquired or inherited culture and knowledge. Thus, integration of indigenous agricultural practices with newly introduced technologies increases the sustainability of modern agricultural management systems.

In this paper I will try to establish the need for such integration in the drought-prone areas of northern Ethiopia (Welo, Tigray, North Shewa and Gondar). I will illustrate my points using the South-Welo Zone as a case study. First, I will assess the environmental conditions of the zone and try to identify the major constraints to crop production. This is followed by identification of the strengths and limitations of both the indigenous practices and the modern technologies and an explanation of how the two systems can be integrated to develop a more sustainable agricultural management system.

The South-Welo Zone: Description of the Area

South Welo is a zone characterized by dissected topography, rugged terrain and highly variable climate. On the highlands where rain-fed crop cultivation is the norm, altitude ranges from about 1500 meters to slightly above 3500 meters above sea level, with corresponding hot and semi-arid to cold sub-humid climate. Mean annual temperature decreases from about 20°C at elevations of about 1650 m (as in Bati town) to about 16°C at about 2550 m (as in Desse) and falls to less than 10°C at elevations of above 3200 meters (Belay, 1995). Annual rainfall records range from 850 mm in Bati town (1650 m a.s.l.) to 1200 mm in Boru Meda (2750 m a.s.l.). Rainfall is expected to be above 1200 mm at altitudes of above 3000 m. This temperature and rainfall variability has caused the differentiation of the highlands into belts with distinct agro-climatic zones, traditionally recognized as *kolla*, *woina dega* and *dega* (Table 1). The rainfall extends over 5 to 7 months in the *dega* and *woina dega* zones and 4 to 5 months in the *kolla* zone. In all cases it is bimodal, with the little rains (*belg*) lasting from March to May and the big rains (*meher*) lasting from June to October.

The rainfall regimes are generally characterized by wide annual variations. For example, annual rainfall recorded over 10 years (1983-1993) in Maybar (*dega* zone), 14 km SSE of Desse, ranged from 721 mm in 1984 to 1489 mm in 1993 – i.e. 60 and 121 per cent of the mean annual value, respectively (Table 3).

Hence, considerable year-to-year rainfall variation is one of the typical characteristics of the zone, and as a result there is serious uncertainty among farmers as to the amount and timing of rainfall each year. Variability generally increases with decreasing rainfall and, hence, it is expected to be much larger in the *kolla* zone compared to the *dega* and *woina dega* zones.

Table 1. Agroclimatic zones of northern Ethiopia

Characteristics	Agro-climatic zone			
	Kolla	Woina dega	Dega	Wurch
Altitude (m)	1500-1800	1800-2400	2400-3500	>3500
Temp. (°C)	18-20	15-18	10-15	<10
Rainfall (mm)	300-900	500-1500	700-1700	>900
Dominant Crops	sorghum, maize	*teff*, maize, wheat	barley, wheat	barley

Source: Adapted from Amare (1984).

Table 2. Average annual precipitation (mm) for Bati, Hayk, and Maybar meteorological stations

Station	Alt. (m)	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	Annual
Bati	1600	41	47	39	83	50	19	192	216	85	31	23	26	852
Hayk	2050	39	66	111	111	74	30	285	284	111	47	24	23	1205
Maybar	2500	38	70	96	113	103	28	233	288	141	51	20	42	1221

Source: Adapted from SCRP (1996)

Note: X refers to percentages calculated against the mean annual rainfall. Note also that records were not conducted properly in 1990/91 because of political problems in the area.

Table 4. Percentage of land by depth in selected catchments of South Welo.

Year	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1992	1993	Mean
P	1432	1122	721	1093	1465	915	1347	1407	1118	1489	1211
X(%)	118	93	60	90	121	76	111	116	92	123	100

Note: Depth classes are defined according to *Guidelines for Soil Profile Description* (FAO, 1990).

South Welo constitutes one of the densely settled areas of Ethiopia. The population density is particularly very high when considered in relation to the subsistence agriculture, low level of technology and very low levels of soil productivity. This has led to severe demographic pressure and subsequent destruction of the vegetation and degradation of the soil resources of the area. According to some estimates, more than 75 percent of the soils in the Welo highlands have depths of less than 30 cm (Hurni, 1993, 1988). My study, conducted in representative sub-catchments of South Welo, suggests that, of the total land area about 38 % has soil depth of less than 30 cm while 43% is less than 50 cm (Belay, 1998b). The natural forest in South Welo is also completely removed. Estimates indicate that the area currently covered by natural forests is only 11,368 ha, and this accounts for only 0.5 percent of the zone. The average holding of cultivated land is estimated at 0.63 ha per family (Department of Planning, 1993). Currently, all the land suitable for rain-fed crop cultivation has been converted to farmlands and hence further increase in cultivated land is not feasible.

Agriculture in South Welo involves subsistence production of a variety of crops and of livestock. Double cropping is widely practiced in the *dega* and *woina dega* zones while multiple-cropping is more intensively practiced in the *kolla* zone. However, crop yield is kept very low because of a number of factors. Data collected in Maybar suggest average yield of 22.0, 15.3, 18.6 and 10.4 qt/ha for maize, barley, horse beans and *teff*, respectively (SCRP, 1996). Yields of lentils and sorghum are estimated at 4 and 10 qt/ha, respectively (Department of Planning, 1993).

Major Constraints to Crop Production in South Welo

One hardly needs to emphasize that there is an urgent need for increased food production in Ethiopia in general, and the drought-prone areas in particular. However, because most of the arable land in these areas is currently under cultivation, crop production can be boosted only through intensification. There is considerable scope for increasing crop yield using traditional

technologies (World Bank 1990; Brune, 1994). However, it should be emphasized that more sustainable yield improvement can be realized where it is possible to develop improved and socially acceptable measures against the major constraints to crop production.

As in all drought-prone areas, the first and foremost environmental constraint limiting crop production in the South-Welo zone is the high inter-annual variability in rainfall. Three types of rainfall variability are generally recognized here: (a) the rains may start very late; (b) they may end early in the season; and/or (c) there may be extended dry spells between the rains (for similarities with other tropical areas, see Ruthenberg, 1980). In general, years of abnormally low annual rainfall have disastrous consequences on the crops. Between 1970 and 1990 alone, Welo had experienced four major drought years that were followed by severe famine (Dessalegn, 1994).

The major soil-related problems currently confronting subsistence agriculture are those related to the physical conditions of the soils -- shallow depth, poor drainage, etc. and its chemical conditions -- organic matter degradation, nutrient depletion, etc. Among the physical conditions, soil depth is the most crucial, as it very much controls the volume of soil that the growing plants exploit for both moisture and nutrients. The soil organic matter is also critical in that it exerts strong control on both the physical and chemical conditions of the soils. Organic matter influences the structure, porosity, moisture retention and infiltration capacity of the soils. It also exerts strong influence on the reserve, supply and storage of nutrients. Accelerated soil and runoff loss are also factors that limit crop production, particularly on the slopes. The other constraint to food production is the low yield potential of the indigenous crops. Rodents, birds and pests also constrain crop production. According to some estimates, farmers lose about 10 to 15 percent of their production to pests and rodents. The most common pests in some of the *awrajas* are identified as bollworm, armyworm and various stalk borers (Dessalegn, 1991).

Indigenous Practices Against Production Constraints

Indigenous Strategies Against the Risk of Drought: As elsewhere in the tropics, subsistence farmers in South Welo adopt three major cropping strategies to reduce the risk of drought. First, they tend to plant late, waiting until they make sure the rains are here to stay. Second, they cultivate drought-resistant but low-yielding crops. Third, they avoid high cost inputs such as fertilizers and high yield varieties (for similarities with other tropical areas, see Ruthenberg, 1980).

Indigenous Crop Management Practices: Peasant farmers in South Welo practice refined systems of seed selection, storage and propagation, and cultivate a wide variety of crops. The diversification of crop production is a strategy adopted not only to supply the household requirements but also to spread risk. Almost each one of the crops has cultivars that are adapted to the variable environmental conditions. Farmers keep as many cultivars as possible in store so that they can vary their seeding plans according to changes in the weather (Dessalegn, 1991). They keep fast-growing but low-yielding varieties for the drier years and slow-maturing but low-yielding ones for the wetter years. They also vary cultivars depending on the soil conditions (Belay, 1998a). For example, among the local cultivars of sorghum, *mokake*, *rayo*, *jigrite*, *dawe*, etc. are fast-growing but low-yielding varieties cultivated on shallow soils. On the other hand, *jiru* and *tengele* are slow growing but high-yielding and, hence, planted in deeper soils such as the *walka* and *boda*, i.e. soils with high water-holding capacities. These adaptations to the wide varieties of environmental conditions are very important to the farmers, as they provide them with security against various forms of environmental hazards.

Indigenous Soil Fertility Management Practices: The traditional fertility management system of Welo employs two strategies to manage the organic matter and chemical fertility of cultivated soils: crop rotation/mixing and organic manuring. Rotational/mixed cropping, in which legumes are integrated, are primarily employed to raise the soil's nitrogen content, while

organic manure is added to improve both the physical and chemical fertility of the soils.

'Traditional rotational cropping' is a system by which fertility restoration is attained by alternating different types of crops on the same cultivated field. The practice is particularly effective in maintaining the nitrogen status of the soils where leguminous plants are included in the rotation. Legumes are very effective in restoring nitrogen because of the activities of the nitrogen-fixing bacteria *(rhizobium spp.)* in their root nodules. Studies conducted in other parts of the world have also established that crop rotation has the added advantage of controlling the spread of weeds. It is also reported that crop rotation disrupts insect cycles and reduces frequency of pest incidence (Karlen and Sharpley, 1994; Forcella and Burnside, 1994).

The practice of crop rotation is not common in the kolla zones. Here the most important crop, sorghum, is cultivated mixed with other crops such as sesame, nigger seed, haricot beans and maize. In these zones mixed cropping is applied to increase the variety and quantity of food produced in the short growing season. The practice allows for a fuller use of light, nutrients and water; reduces the incidence of disease and insects; reduces erosion; enables higher returns per hectare; and requires less labor per unit output (Ruthenberg, 1980). It also allows for variety of crops, regenerates soil fertility and reduces the risk of total crop failure. To fit modern management systems, which are normally crop specific, mixed cropping can be easily modified into inter-cropping (i.e. cultivation of two or more crops in proximate but different rows).

Manure is applied as raw-*figh* or composted-*figh*, mostly on fields close to the homesteads. The primary purpose of manuring is to increase the soil organic matter and improve not only the chemical properties (fertility, nutrient storage capacity, etc.) but also the physical conditions (structure, porosity, infiltration capacity etc.) as well as the water holding capacity. Farmers point out that composted-*figh* is much superior to raw-

figh, and that they apply the latter simply because of the huge labor required to transport the traditional compost to the cultivated fields. It is to be noted that compost has "the property of being able to hold an amount of water equivalent to three times its weight" (James, 1991, p. 130). In fact, farmers argue that uncomposted manure aggravates moisture deficiency in drier seasons, especially when applied on the shallower soils. The also point out that once organic manure is applied to a field its residual effect lasts for about five years.

Seasonal fallowing is also frequently practiced in the dega and woina dega zones to improve both the chemical and physical conditions of the shallow soils. The practice usually involves cultivation of crops such as barley, followed by a seasonal fallow. Fallowing not only enables maintenance of humus due to its liberal contribution of organic residues, the slow decay of these materials, and their wide C/N ratios (Brady, 1984) but also stores considerable moisture for the crop that follows.

Indigenous Structural Soil Conservation Practices: Farmers also apply different types of soil conservation techniques wherever they perceive the threat of erosion. The indigenous structural soil conservation techniques applied in order to deliberately control erosion are contour-plowing and *weber*. The structural measures are primarily intended to control runoff and soil loss and thereby improve crop yield. The traditional practice of plowing along the contour produces furrows that to some extent store water until it infiltrates into the soil. However, these simple measures are not effective where rains are intensive and the slopes are long and steep. In many places, contour-plowing is supported by the indigenous structural conservation measure, the *weber*, comprising a series of discontinuous bunds and terraces that develop from narrow strips of land left under grass (Belay, 1998a). Normally, *weber* is a semi-permanent structure and is destroyed when it ages after establishing a new one a few meters down-slope. Farmers argue that when *weber* ages it grows to a very large size, loses its productivity and stability, and the combined effects of these

causes a sharp decline in benefits to the farmers. In very mountainous terrain, where the slope is very steep and runoff is extremely heavy, and stones and boulders are abundant, *weber* is replaced by its variant, the *kab* or *kirit*, i.e. traditional stone bunds.

Indigenous agroforestry is also an important component of the traditional farming system, particularly in the *kolla* zone. The trees that are commonly integrated in the cropping system are *Acacia spp.* (*girar*) and *ziziphus spina-christi* (*kurkura*). Both *ziziphus* and the acacia trees are deep-rooted and, hence, are effective in pumping out nutrients from deep inside the soils. *Ziziphus* is primarily kept and managed in the catchment for its fruit, but it also provides firewood, charcoal and fodder (Azene *et al.*, 1993). The acacia trees provide not only firewood but also encourage the biological fixation of nitrogen and improvement of soil fertility. It should be noted that when trees are integrated within cropping systems they also ". . . improve the soil's structure and help maintain high infiltration rates and greater water-holding capacity. As a result less runoff is generated and erosion is better controlled" (Morgan, 1996, p. 128). These trees also conserve soil moisture and control erosion with the help of their considerable canopy.

Indigenous Excess Water Management Practices: Where rainfall is heavier, as in the *dega* and *woina dega* zones, cultivation is also supported by an indigenous excess runoff disposal system (the *boy* system) comprising diversion channels, drainage ditches, and waterways. Diversion channels are constructed up-slope of the cropland to intercept and safely drain runoff that comes from non-arable land. The drainage ditches are shallow (ca. 15 to 25 cm) and narrow (ca. 20 to 30 cm), seasonal furrows that are constructed by simply pressing the plow deep into the soil. They are usually diagonal to the contour (a pattern locally known as *shurube*) although more or less criss-crossing ditches are not uncommon. They are normally constructed about three to five meters apart, depending on the slope (for detailed description of drainage ditches see Million, 1996). Runoff from the diversion channels

and drainage ditches is collected and safely drained into waterways. Natural channels and human and cattle tracks are utilized as waterways in the traditional system. In some cases the excess water is drained onto grazing lands to add to the moisture supply in these areas.

Major Problems of the Indigenous Practices

The main limitations of the indigenous practices arise from the fact that they are too limited in their area coverage or the intensity of their application to significantly contribute to the improvement of production. The limited yield potential of the indigenous crop varieties is also another problem of crop production.

Limited yield potential of traditionally cultivated crops: The traditionally cultivated crops in South Welo have very low genetic potential for high yield. Mostly they are taller and/or have larger leaves and do not, therefore, respond very well to the two elements of agronomic management - dense planting and artificial fertilizers (Wolf, 1987).

Difficulty of extensively applying indigenous soil fertility management practices: It is increasingly becoming difficult for farmers to apply the traditional soil fertility management practices because of the shortage of land. First, expansion of crop cultivation on steep slopes has caused contraction of the grazing land (and livestock population), making it difficult for farmers to obtain sufficient dung for manure. Extensive crop cultivation and the contraction of forests and woodlands have also caused severe shortage of fuel wood, forcing farmers to use even the small amount of dung as fuel for domestic use. Second, rotational cropping is becoming difficult because of the small sizes of farm holdings. Some of the farmers have to produce enough of the main staple food on the small area of land they own, and cannot afford to frequently cultivate the legumes that were traditionally included in the rotation.

Failure of the traditional conservation measures to completely arrest erosion: First, belts of land with very steep slopes and highly vulnerable to erosion are created when the traditional conservation structure, the *weber*, is destroyed and cultivated. Second, the practice of destroying *weber* encourages net down-slope movement of soils. When a *weber* is destroyed the soil is spread down-slope and this ultimately leads to net down-slope movement of large amounts of soil and severe degradation of slopes. Third, *weber* is applied only where farmers perceive erosion as a threat (i.e. where rilling and gullying is common), and, normally, the imperceptible sheet-wash escapes the attention of the farmers. Fourth, the inter-*weber* spacing is too wide and too graded for the respective slope gradients to effectively arrest soil erosion.

The Extension Approach Against Production Constraints

The Modern Strategy

To overcome the constraints to crop production and improve yield in Ethiopia and the South-Welo zone, the 'National Extension Intervention Program' (which became operational in1995) recommends extensive use of:

- improved seeds to raise the yield potential of crops; however, improved varieties are available only for a few crops - maize, sorghum, teff and wheat;
- chemical fertilizers (DAP and urea), pesticides, and herbicides to create a conducive environment for the healthy growth and development of crops;
- extension advice and farm credits. The extension program provides model farmers a 25% down-payment credit to cover the cost of improved seeds and fertilizers along with technical assistance (Habtemariam, 1996).

The cost of the recommended extension package is estimated at about 500-800 Birr per hectare depending on the crop (Takele, 1996). However, such a costly package may not be sustainable when applied in the climatically marginal and

drought-prone areas such as South Welo because of its multifaceted limitations.

Major Problems of the Modern Technologies

The major problem of the extension package is its dependence on high cost external inputs in an environment where the risk of drought is very high (the cost of the input per hectare is too high to be readily adopted by peasant farmers that mostly live below the poverty line). Farmers clearly point out that shortage of rainfall increases the risk of total loss of investment on the modern inputs. The environmental and health hazards that may result from extensive use of chemicals in the long term is also a problem to reckon with.

Another problem arises from the fact that the extension program completely undermines the critical role organic matter, depth, and drainage of soils play in the response of crops to modern inputs. The extension program assumes that productivity can be increased many-fold only through intensive use of chemical fertilizers, herbicides and insecticides. However, researchers have repeatedly noted the fact that productivity improvement cannot be attained where the soil is poorly drained, very shallow, depleted of its organic matter and exposed to accelerated erosion (Mulat, 1996; Sahlemedhin, *et al.*, 1993). The typical features of a large proportion of the cultivated soils of Welo, in particular and the Northern highlands, in general is their shallow depth, very low organic matter, and poor moisture holding capacity. The shallow depth and low organic matter content increase vulnerability to drought by reducing the soil's moisture-holding capacity. The footslopes mostly covered by vertisols are also vulnerable to water-logging when there is too much rain, particularly where the rain is high and evapo-transpiration low as in the *dega* and *woina dega* zones.

Use of the modern package is also constrained by lack of reliable market. For instance, as frequently observed in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, a favorable weather and subsequent higher

crop yield by all the farmers in an area usually results in a sharp drop in the prices of harvested products. Reports indicate that the good harvest of maize and wheat in 1995/96 led to a sharp decline in prices, particularly in the surplus-producing regions of Ethiopia (Mulat, 1996). The attempt on the part of the government to stabilize prices was also not effective because of lack of sufficient funds to purchase the surplus. Under this condition, farmers find it very difficult to predict the economic benefits they may gain from their investment in the inputs.

The other problem of the extension package is its dependence on a narrower genetic base when compared to the traditional systems. The improved varieties have very low resistance to drought, pests and disease-causing organisms, making the farming community more vulnerable to the hazards of environmental stress. The dependence on only a few improved crop varieties - wheat, maize, sorghum and *teff* - may bring about not only loss of insurance the diversity of the traditional crops provides against the very common environmental hazards but also the disappearance of the varieties of crops and their cultivars (loss of bio-diversity). These improved seed varieties also lose their viability and are abandoned by farmers in a matter of a few years because of disease and other problems (Fassil, 1993; Tennassie, 1985; Betru, 1983). For example, about 9 wheat varieties released for use by peasants in Arsi in the late 1960s and early 1970s had to be abandoned because of stripe rust, stem rust and leaf blotch. Similarly, of the 7 varieties of barley released between 1970 and 1979, only one was adopted because of similar problems. Moreover, improved varieties of crops such as sorghum are not only susceptible to bird attack but they also have stalks that are too short to yield the biomass required for fuel or fodder (Mulat, 1996). It should also be noted that the country has not reached a stage where organized supply of improved varieties of crops has been attained, and this strongly limits the sustainability of the extension program.

The other limitation of the extension package is that it ignores the linkage and complementarity of crop cultivation and

livestock production systems. Livestock is traditionally kept to provide not only food but also to support crop cultivation by supplying draught power, pack animals and manure. These animals also provide security against crop failure, as they are easily converted to cash when there is an emergency situation. Cultivated fields are also important sources of fodder for livestock. In fact, according to some estimates, about 60 percent of the feed during the dry seasons comes from the cultivated fields, mainly in the form of cereal straws (Department of Planning, 1993). Thus it is necessary to have rehabilitation and improvement of grazing lands so that crop farming does not lose its healthy linkage with the livestock sector.

The Need for Integration

As noted in the foregoing discussion, both the indigenous practices and the modern techniques have serious limitations, and none of them alone can effectively overcome the constraints to crop production. But they also have features that can be combined and developed into a more sustainable agricultural management package. The farmers benefit much more than they would from either of them alone if they were to combine the strong features of both. Thus there is an urgent need for integration of indigenous practices with the modern extension package to develop more effective and sustainable management systems. Practices such as manuring, mixed cropping, crop rotation, and soil conservation should be refined and integrated with the such modern technologies as using artificial fertilizers. Manure increases the soil organic matter and improves not only the chemical fertility but also the moisture-storing capacity of the soil. Upon decomposition, soil organic matter releases important micro-nutrients that are normally missing in the artificial fertilizers recommended by the extension programs. Improvement of moisture capacity is particularly of great significance to crop production in the drought-prone areas such as South Welo because it reduces the vulnerability of crops to rainfall variation.

When manure is combined with artificial fertilizers it

considerably increases the efficiency of the new technology. Moreover, where manure is added, smaller amounts of artificial fertilizers are required to raise yield, and this effectively reduces the cost of the extension package. A trial conducted in Burkina Faso very well illustrates the complementary effect of organic matter and artificial fertilizers - the three organic practices increased the efficiency of nitrogen application by 20 to 30 percent (Table 5).

Mixed cropping increases the total output per unit area of land and at the same time reduces the damage that may result from diseases and pests. The denser growth also suppresses weeds. At the same time, mixed cropping not only allows varied food supply but it also reduces the vulnerability of crops to environmental stress and the risks of complete crop failure. Where necessary, mixed cropping can be improved to intercropping; it not only helps the farmers attain most of their objectives, but at the same time allows for a more effective use of fertilizers and other modern techniques. Ruthenberg (1986), citing McIntosh (1975), points out that in some Asian countries (e.g. Java) mixed cropping has been effectively replaced by inter-cropping, so that there is better spacing of plants, and each row of plants can be individually weeded, manured and fertilized. The indigenous conservation practices can be improved and integrated with the modern techniques on cultivated slopes not only to control erosion but also to minimize seed and fertilizer loss.

Table 5. Complementary effects of artificial and organic fertilizers on sorghum yield in Burkina Faso

Treatment	Sorghum yield (tons/ha)	
	Without artificial fertilizers	With artificial fertilizers
No organic treatment	1.8	2.8
Sorghum straw[2]	1.6	3.4
Manure[2]	2.4	3.6
Copost[2]	2.5	3.7

[1] *At 60 kg on N/ha;* [2] *All organic materials at rates of 10 tons/ha.*
Source: Wolf (1987)

Table 6. Maize and sorghum yields inside and outside the crown overhang of *acacia albida* in the Hararghe highlands of Ethiopia

Type of Crop	Grain yield (kg/ha)	
	Outside the crown overhang	Inside the crown overhang
Maize	1920 (100)	3390 (177)
Sorghum	1570 (100)	2130 (136)

Source: Poschen (1986) cited in Müller-Sämann, and Kotschi (1994)

The traditional agroforestry practices in the *kolla* zones also improve the fertility and physical conditions of the soils, and they make food production more sustainable. For example, the leaves of the acacia trees, which normally fall at the beginning of the rainy season, supply the soil with large amounts of nutrients and organic matter. Grain yields under the crown overhangs of acacia trees are much higher than those in the open field (Table 6). A stand of 50 to 60 acacia trees per hectare is reported to increase yields by 50-100 percent. Several factors explain these higher yields: "soil organic matter, pH value, microbiological activity and cation exchange capacity as well as supply of macro-nutrients were markedly higher under Acacia albida than on open land" (Müller-Sämann and Kotschi, 1994, p. 151).

Conclusion

Sustainable improvement of food production in the drought-prone areas of Ethiopia cannot be attained following the current extension approaches, as they are not appropriate to the climate, the soil conditions, and the circumstances of the farmers. First, although the improved seeds have the genetic potential for high yields, they have very little capacity to withstand the frequent environmental stress caused, for example, by drought, waterlogging, pests and disease-causing organisms. They are also not very well adapted to shallow and degraded soils. Second, although artificial fertilizers are very effective in selectively mitigating deficiencies of nitrogen and

phosphorus, they contribute little towards the improvement of the organic matter, which plays a critical role in the improvement of the physical conditions and moisture retention capacities of the soils. Third, the erratic rainfall in the Welo highlands makes investment in artificial fertilizers very risky because both too-wet and too-dry conditions may cause sharp declines in yield or even total crop failure. Fourth, as frequently observed in most of Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of Ethiopia, favorable weather and subsequent improvements in yields by all the farmers in an area usually result in a sharp drop in the price of harvested products. As a result, farmers may fail to benefit from the increased yield because of lack of sufficient market.

To be more effective and sustainable in the drought-prone areas of Ethiopia in general, and in the South-Welo zone in particular, agricultural management packages should be low-cost and adaptable to the erratic rainfall, the degraded soils, and the circumstances of peasant farmers. A package that can fulfill these requirements can be designed by improving and integrating the indigenous agricultural practices with the modern package through adaptive technology development programs. The indigenous component increases the social acceptability of the package, as it conforms to the high labor and low capital demands of the subsistence agriculture, the survival and risk avoidance strategies of the peasant farmers, and the cultural and social institutions of the community (DeWalt, 1994). Such integration should be carried out in such a way that technological development leads to the empowerment of the farmers by increasing the local input, particularly the knowledge and skills of the farmers. A management package developed in this way will not only have faster and more widespread acceptance but it will also strongly attract farmers' participation because it creates a sense of peasant ownership and authorship of the management systems (White and Jickling, 1995). It should be noted that the "main purpose of development is to inspire, mobilize and engage the initiatives and resources of the poor for productive efforts" (UNDP, 1991; Brune, 1994).

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Resettlement: A Strategy for Vulnerable Groups?

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Introduction

The aim of this paper is to examine the merits and/or drawbacks of resettlement as a feasible alternative for addressing problems affecting vulnerable groups in Ethiopia. The heavy dependence of several developing economies on the primary sector has rendered rural land settlement increasingly attractive to policy makers and planners as a means of overcoming a host of problems that undermine the basic fabrics of societal life. It is assumed that such problems, expressed in the form of food-insecurity, rural unemployment, land fragmentation and marginality, could be overcome by recourse to resettlement in areas with potential for agricultural production, which is in turn believed to offset disadvantages resulting from concentration of population in localities where intensive farming has been heavily entrenched for a very long period of time. Such seemingly plausible justifications have led a considerable number of Third-World countries to embark on planned resettlement programs that are viewed as a panacea to a host of socio-economic and political ills. Besides, such programs are considered as a means to the realization of modest goals associated with economic growth and development.

The driving force behind resettlement, and the outcomes of such endeavor, vary from place to place, and they are conditioned by factors specific to the politico-economic setting of a given country. Whereas resettlement is generally proclaimed as a venture aimed at attaining what is officially stated as the 'public good',[24] the underlying motives in initiating the exercise may not necessarily and always be congruent with the officially-stated primary goal. This is particularly true of those instances where

[24] See Kloos, 1989.

the lead is taken by unpopular and authoritarian political regimes.[25]

Ethiopia, like several other developing countries, has embarked on planned resettlement undertakings since the late 1960s. Resettlement programs launched in all instances were directed towards easing pressing problems relating to landlessness and unemployment and as a response to dislocations caused by such hazards as famine and conflict. However, it is worthy to note that the focus, scope and intensity of resettlement undertaken by different political regimes since the 1960s on the one hand, and the goals sought to be attained by such an undertaking on the other, vary significantly.

Planned land settlement in Ethiopia gained wider currency in the mid-1970s, beginning with the revolutionary process spearheaded by the *Dergue*. Prior to this, resettlement programs attempted through the intervention of institutional actors (governmental as well as non-governmental) were not significant and were mainly designed to address isolated local problems with limited objectives.

The major objective of this paper is to shed light on the various aspects of resettlement, in a manner that could be relevant and appropriate to issues relating to the lots of vulnerable groups in Ethiopia. A review of the Ethiopian experience in resettlement programs is presented in the light of the on-going debate pertaining to the viability/feasibility of resettlement as an option in solving pertinent problems. Moreover, the findings from a case study in two resettlement schemes in northwest Ethiopia is discussed along with an assessment of the resettlement program on the basis of replicability, predictability and feasibility in socio-economic and environmental terms.

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[25] See Alula Pankhurst (1992), p. 11.

Resettlement

Notwithstanding the broad range of issues that the term 'resettlement' covers,[26] the definition of the concept as used in this paper is limited to movement of people from areas where there do not exist factors that are suitable for the smooth maintenance of life to areas presumed to be endowed with potentials that could provide opportunities for the same end. According to the World Bank (1978: 14), the destination of resettlement is to areas with under-utilized agricultural potential, and movement could take place either as a result of planned intervention or spontaneously. Thus the driving force behind recourse to resettlement varies from case to case.

Resettlement undertaken by individuals, groups and communities on their own is mainly aimed at securing better opportunities in a new environment, whereas in the case of state-sponsored moves the underlying reasons could be a mix of attempts at realizing the 'public good' and/or implementing priorities laid down by political regimes. It is possible that priorities laid down by governments may, at times, have nothing to do with the desire of those to be affected by the venture. It is worth noting, however, that most resettlement undertakings that take place at present are organized by the state for various reasons.

Resettlement is distinguished from other schemes concerned with the reorganization of people's livelihood settings - such as villagization and sedentarization - by the fact that it inevitably entails movement from places of current domicile (Pankhurst 1992: 10-11). In most cases, resettlement is initiated to effect agricultural undertakings, except in the case of moving urban dwellers whose places of residence are annexed to give room for development projects of one kind or another. In the latter case, movement will be limited to other parts of urban centers designated as residential zones and assigned to those

[26] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

affected by way of compensation. When resettlement is undertaken with the objective of promoting agricultural undertakings, its basic rationale then becomes, from both theoretical and practical perspectives, changing the mode and manner of food production and distribution (Clay, Steingraber and Niggli 1988:15) and reducing human pressure and concentration on limited land in a given area (Alemneh 1990:99).

Resettlement is increasingly becoming attractive as a way out of pressing problems caused by food shortage, land fragmentation, population pressure, rampant unemployment, marginality of land and decline in land productivity. It is often planned for a broad category of people, such as the landless, the unemployed, refugees in the country-of-asylum and returnees to the country-of-origin. Thus settlement schemes can be examined as communities from the social point of view, as production units from the economic point of view and as interest groups from the political point of view (Chambers 1969:137).

Planned *versus* Spontaneous Settlement: The Debate

It should be noted that the issue of resettlement as a strategy for rehabilitating vulnerable groups and promoting different socio-economic objectives is increasingly becoming a contentious issue constituting the major component of the debate on the subject. The discussion presented in this section highlights the major lines of argument pertaining to two types of resettlement; namely, 'planned' and 'spontaneous', as presented by the key exponents of contending 'schools of thought'.[27] It is hoped that the discussion thus presented would help shed light on the issue and provide a more complete picture of the arguments regarding resettlement as a viable strategy for rehabilitation of vulnerable groups. The lines of argument are presented below as ***Case 1*** and ***Case 2***, reflecting the views of those who consider organized

[27] Advocates of either type of resettlement base their conclusions on findings from individual research undertakings conducted on a case-by-case basis. It seems that successes and/or failures witnessed in some organized settlements led to generalizations advanced by researchers and writers on the subject.

settlements as disadvantageous and those who think that it is useful, respectively. The positions of both 'schools of thought' are anchored on claims and counter-claims that their respective approaches could be instrumental in realizing efforts towards self-sufficiency.

Case 1

Tom Kuhlman appears to be one of the exponents of the line of thought opposed to organized settlements. In his article titled "Organized Versus Spontaneous Settlement" (1994a:122-135), Kuhlman extensively deals with the demerits inherent in settlements involving planned interventions. He attributes dispositions of governments favoring organized settlements to the lust for control and use of the settlements for the purpose of attracting easy funding and other forms of assistance. It is claimed that concentrated visibility of needs, and hence easy justification for soliciting support - both characteristic of organized settlements - rather than their feasibility in terms of meeting declared objectives are the underlying reasons for opting for this approach. Citing figures depicting that the number of refugees that have settled on their own in Africa is greater than those in planned schemes (*Ibid.*:124), Kuhlman asserts that organized settlements are doomed to failure, so that any argument in their favor cannot hold. Kuhlman advances another argument, albeit on the same line, that the cost for initiating and running planned settlements is so high that they become liabilities to both the international community and the country that hosts such projects (*Ibid.*:135).

In his other work (1994b:47), Kuhlman seems to be enthusiastic about Harrel-Bond's (1986) generalization that depicts organized settlements as highly artificial communities devoid of autonomy and subjected to the control of camp authorities. According to Kuhlman, it is possible to assist self-settled refugees with less cost, thereby enabling them to achieve the same standard of living as those in organized settlements whose maintenance is far more expensive.

Other proponents of spontaneous settlement (Gaim, 1985:100; Chambers, 1982:22) lament the dependency mentality observed in organized settlements while unplanned settlements are depicted as having better chances for developing self-management and self-reliance. While Mekuria (1987:33-34; 1988:195) views organized settlements as hotbeds of conflict and antagonism among the settlers themselves, on the one hand and between settlers and the host population on the other, and also argues that they are often designed to promote ulterior motives other than those openly stated, Scudder (1985:126) claims that spontaneously settled groups have fared better in terms of being productive. This position appears to be supported by Dieci and Viezzoli (1992:80), who claim to have identified disappointing performances in agriculture in organized settlements.

Case 2

At the same time, however, there are many proponents of organized settlements who view unplanned settlements as unrealistic. Rogge (1981:200-207) lists the advantages of organized schemes as being instrumental in providing the means to be self-sufficient, ensuring security of land tenure and enabling refugees to live in their own communities and under their own leaders, without facing the threat of alienation in a new environment. Mazur (1988:51) feels that those favoring self-settlement are either unaware of the existence of planned settlements or have opted for less useful alternatives, at best. He also explicitly dismisses the possibility of self-settlement itself under the prevalence of a situation in which 'no man's land' does not exist, since all private land is owned by individuals and companies, and public land is under the custody of governments. Implied in this argument also is the fact that self-settlement amounts to forfeiting leverages that could have been obtained as a result of intervention of organizational actors.

Clarke (1986:42) goes even further by affirming his belief that the advantages of planned settlements are not limited to those directly involved alone but could benefit the whole country by increasing production, decreasing the number of people in need of

assistance and, hence, diminishing relief-aid requirements. In his study on the subject conducted in the Sudan, Wijbrandi (1986) concludes that organized settlements have fared far better than spontaneous settlements.

Though qualified in most cases, there are also other propositions that are in favor of organized settlements. Oberai (1988:24-25) identifies definite potentials in organized settlements, which could be further developed by overcoming certain weaknesses, such as absence of coordination/cooperation between the different actors, thereby creating alternative employment opportunities in and around settlement areas. While Zetter (1995:51) envisages positive outcomes from organized settlements which are close to existing population centers, Pitterman (1984:136) anticipates possibilities for prosperity in organized settlements, provided that broader economic integration is fostered. Hinting at some misgivings of implementing agencies, Alemneh (*op. cit.*: 109) indicates the existence of legitimate causes for initiating planned settlements, and suggests that they should be carried out on the basis of imaginative planning and the willingness to resettle.

The Ethiopian Experience in Resettlement

Background

When undertaken by individuals, groups and communities resettlement is most often aimed at the furtherance of objectives revolving around the betterment of the socio-economic position of the beneficiaries. Governments undertake resettlement programs in order to address a wide variety of concerns apart from drives aimed at promoting the 'public good'. The driving force behind such an exercise by states could include strategic, demographic and politico-military interests.

As in many places in the rest of the world, population movements that assume different forms of organization have been taking place in Ethiopia since very early on in the past. Some writers (Wood 1977:47; Shiferaw 1986:127) claim that population

movements have been one of the major features of life in the country and that the practice has been observed since Axumite times. Since then population movements caused by different factors have been taking place without interruption. Resettlement of people took place continuously, and the one feature common to all such acts had been the urge to realize betterment of livelihood in new places of residence. Such movements take into account the existence of relatively better conditions at the destination point as compared to the original places of domicile. Population movements in Ethiopia have often taken place in response to famines and military conflicts (Clarke, *Op.Cit.*:40). Clay and Holcomb (1986:26) argue that population movements in Ethiopia that took place since the turn of the 19th Century were effected through resettlement in the south, the starting points being situated in the north.

Prior to the revolution of 1974 resettlement was mainly undertaken as a result of isolated and local actions by both voluntary and governmental agencies, without, however, figuring as major concerns in government plans (Pankhurst, 1989:319; 1992:14-15). In the 1960s and 1970s a number of settlement schemes run by pertinent government departments and non-governmental organizations had invariably been small-scale, *ad hoc* in nature and mainly designed for different beneficiaries to alleviate specific problems and fulfill limited objectives (RRC, 1985:157; Tegegne, 1988:82; Pankhurst, 1997: 540). It appears that, prior to 1974, spontaneous settlements by individuals and small groups took place more frequently than those sponsored by governments and other actors (Wood, *op. cit.*). The underlying reasons for this seem to be the non-availability of public land to be used for relatively larger settlement schemes as well as the resistance by the landed gentry against such undertakings. On the other hand, the following could account for the proliferation of spontaneous settlements during the three decades prior to the revolution:[28]

[28] Wood (1997), pp. 78-80.

a) stagnation of the Ethiopian economy in general and deterioration of quality of life for several urban-dwellers;
b) proliferation of mechanized-farms, which led to several instances of eviction, necessitating migration to other places;
c) availability of information on opportunities that abound in localities endowed with unutilized and under-utilized land;
d) population pressure and marginality of land in the highlands where intensive agricultural activity has been in place for several centuries.

Planned resettlement gained currency and gathered momentum only after the initiation of the revolutionary process in 1974. During this time, there had only been 20 settlement sites comprising some 7000 households and representing less than 0.2 per cent of all rural households in the country (Wood, 1985:92). The post-revolution period witnessed dramatic advances in the pace of resettlement over a ten-year period (1974-1984), when 46,000 households comprising about 180,000 people were resettled in over 80 sites in eleven regions.[29] This could be explained by such factors as the Land Reform of 1975, which made public land available for resettlement purposes, aimed at curbing the effects of famine recurrence at short intervals, and calling for durable solutions in the form of embarking on resettlement in areas with marked agricultural potential and proliferation of institutions and agencies that were responsible for implementing resettlement programs. The total cultivated area in all settlements in the decade following the revolutionary upsurge amounted to 40,000 hectares, representing 0.4 per cent of total cultivated land in the country.[30]

Institutional Development

One can argue that there was hardly any government department prior to the revolution that was responsible for dealing with resettlement as had been the case after 1974. During the

[29] Pankhurst, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 15-17.
[30] Dagnew Eshete, cited in Tenassie Nicola (1988), p. 114.

height of the 1973/74 famine, the Imperial Government established the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in March 1974 to act as a focal unit for all offers of assistance associated with the famine-propelled human disaster that unfolded in the northern regions of Wello and Tigrai. In the next couple of years since its establishment, the RRC participated in setting up seven settlement sites comprising over 17,000 households[31] and thus became the first government agency responsible for resettlement programs. Subsequently, government-sponsored resettlement was clearly articulated following the establishment of the Settlement Authority in 1976. This semi-autonomous body under the Ministry of Agriculture was empowered to resettle vulnerable persons from risk-prone areas by identifying suitable areas where ample public land could be made available. The Settlement Authority was also made responsible for preparing a general policy pertaining to land settlement, coordinating and supervising on-going and future settlement schemes and monitoring natural resources conservation ventures (PMAC 1976). The Authority took over about 28 already existing settlements with a population of 13,000 households when it began operating on the basis of the mandate accorded to it. Between 1976 and 1979, when its independent existence was terminated, the Authority resettled additional 30,000 households in more than 80 sites.[32]

In April 1979 the RRC, whose role was reduced to that of simply co-ordinating relief and rehabilitation undertakings following the establishment of the Settlement Authority, was reorganized with extended powers and responsibilities as stipulated in Proclamation No. 173 of 1979 (PMAC, 1979). The Proclamation necessitated the merger of the old RRC, the Settlement Authority and the Awash Valley Authority[33] into a single body (designated as the New RRC) accountable to the Council of Ministers. The New RRC was charged with such

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[31] RRC (1985b)), pp. 123-124.

[32] Ibid., pp. 123-124.

[33] The Awash Valley Authority was established by the Imperial Government in the early 1960s. Its responsibility was to effect sedentarization of the nomads of the Awash valley through the initiation of agricultural schemes.

responsibilities[34] as co-ordinating and distributing relief aid to affected citizens and resettling the landless, those displaced as a result of man-made and natural disasters, and the unemployed and nomads; it was also to undertake activities leading to the rehabilitation of both affected persons and natural resources. By 1984, the RRC had 46,000 resettled households with a total population of between 140,000-200,000 under its jurisdiction.[35]

Following the unfolding of the 1984/85 famine, the task of initiating and planning new settlements was taken over by the National Committee for Disaster Prevention (NCDP), accountable to the Politburo of the Workers Party of Ethiopia. RRC's role during this time was limited to implementing the decisions of the NCDP. In the face of the severity of the 1984/85 famine, the NCDP was preoccupied with coordinating and supervising the settlement of people from areas where drought and famine had become almost endemic to new places, with apparent potential for agricultural production, in the southern and south-western parts of the country.

The 1984/85 Famine and Resettlement

The decline in the availability of food that began gathering momentum in most regions of the country since the late 1970s assumed considerable magnitude and intensity in the risk-prone regions around 1984/85. Vulnerability caused by drought was further aggravated by the then prevalent conflict waged between various insurgent groups and the government, placing most affected localities in an extremely precarious situation. It is argued that, whereas the drought-induced famine of the early 1970s had affected only a few regions, the 1984/85 episode was by far more severe both in terms of its extent and the human toll it took. It has been established by various sources[36] that the famine encompassed, at varying levels, 12 of the 14 administrative

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[34] RRC (1985b), pp. 141-142.
[35] Pankhurst (1989), p. 322.
[36] See RRC, *Op.Cit.*, p. 43 and Jansson *et al.* (1987), p. 74 for figures mentioned.

regions of the country, resulting in the death of about half-a-million victims. It is also estimated that between October 1983 and 1985 about 2.5 million people were internally displaced and hundreds of thousands fled to neighboring countries as refugees.[37]

The government responded to the 1984/85 famine by launching a large-scale resettlement program that was officially declared in November 1984. Accordingly, it was intended to resettle 1.5 million people, of which about 800,000 were moved by March 1986 (Clay, Steingraber and Niggli (*Op.Cit.*:13). The pace of resettling famine victims from the drought-prone zones to fertile localities in the south and the south-west was accelerated, and the number of those relocated increased over and above the one stipulated in the Ten-Year Perspective plan adopted in September 1984. The move was rationalized by highlighting the fact that "it has become impossible in the original home-lands to satisfy the food needs of people and livestock."[38] As in the case of previous settlement programs, the 1984/85 resettlement focused on agricultural undertakings envisaged to improve in due course and enable the concerned to become self-sufficient. The government argued that, in the context of the realities of the time, there was no other alternative to resettlement that could be instrumental in withstanding famine and other related hazards.

Pursuant to the above justification, implementation of the 1985 resettlement program was to take place in two phases. The first phase was to effect the relocation of 200,000 people in the south-west regions of Illubabor and Wellega, while the second was planned to move 250,000 families from the drought-affected regions of Tigrai, Wello and Gonder to five regions in the south (RRC 1985b: 192). Estimates of financial requirements for the undertakings to be effected in the two phases mentioned above amounted to *Birr* 172,786,900, earmarked for covering expenses relating to agricultural services, machinery, farm inputs and implements and overhead cost (*Ibid.*:200).

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[37] RRC (December 1984), p. 63.
[38] RRC, *Op. Cit.*, p. 192.

Resource Mobilization Efforts

During the decade prior to 1983/1984, previous resettlement projects had attracted significant assistance from various governmental and non-governmental sources (Prunier cited in Pankhurst, 1989:330). However, the 1985 resettlement program became controversial and politically sensitive, as expressed in the vocal opposition tabled by the governments of USA and Germany. Such opposition induced some aid-agencies to follow suit for fear of losing their resource base.[39] On the other hand, the USSR and its allies provided most of the transport facilities that included trucks, trailers, buses, airplanes and helicopters along with the necessary fuel and some operators. At a later stage the European Economic Commission (EEC) and other Western donors provided food supplies through the WFP to reach people in the settlements.[40] Multi-lateral agencies like UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, FAO and WHO provided limited and indirect assistance as part of their country-wide programs (Pankhurst, 1989).

Internally, the government took a number of measures presumed to lead to the generation of resources for facilitating the smooth implementation of the resettlement program. These included mandatory reduction of seemingly unnecessary costs from budget allocated to government agencies, payment of surtax amounting to a month's salary by all employees (government and private) to be collected in twelve installments and earmarking a fixed budget for the undertaking from the government treasury. Proceeds from such and similar other internal sources covered costs related to the implementation of the venture. Further, labor and expertise was mobilized on a huge scale from peasant associations, students and instructors of higher institutions of learning[41] and line ministries like Agriculture, Health and Education. It is estimated that over 25,000 people from government and mass organizations were mobilized to take part in the exercise (Clarke cited in Pankhurst 1990:134).

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[39] Jansson *et al., Op. Cit.,* p. 67.
[40] Clay and Holcomb (1986), p. 34.
[41] Pankhurst (1990), p. 129.

Implementation of the Resettlement Program

It is argued that the adoption of resettlement as a panacea for the problem of famine recurrence in Ethiopia was based on three assumptions; namely, the exhaustion of resources in the home-villages of the settlers, the capacity of the settlement areas to sustain the insertion of thousands and thousands of new-comers, and the compatibility and appropriateness of already existing agricultural techniques and skills of the settlers for productive activities in the new areas.[42] Given that the resettlement undertaking initiated in connection with the 1984/85 famine was more of an emergency operation conducted in the middle of an on-going catastrophe, the planning of the whole enterprise was done in haste. The effort was, therefore, plagued by a series of setbacks. First, consultation among policy-makers, implementers, settlers and the host population was minimal, if any. Second, high-handedness in implementing plans entailed resentments often quelled through coercive methods and thus undermined the possibilities for program commitment leading to success. Third, the resources and socio-political support necessary for bolstering the chances of meeting stated targets were not actively sought; hence there was disorganization and confusion. The disarray in this regard had its costs in the form of a staggering rate of attrition expressed in deaths, separation of family members, escape to the Sudan and spontaneous and 'illegal' return to home- villages.[43]

Brune (1990: 27) indicates that the government acknowledged certain weaknesses in its program, weaknesses caused by poor planning and faulty implementation rooted in the haste with which the program was executed. This led to declaring a temporary moratorium on resettlement in March 1986, as expressed in the act of down-sizing the absolute number of the size of potential resettlers.

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[42] Clay *et al.* (1988), p. 304.
[43] Dawit (1989), p. 304.

Case Study of Two Resettlement Schemes in Humera

Background

The discussion in this section is based on findings from a study (Kassahun, 1998) relating to two planned resettlement schemes in the Humera area, Western Tigray Zone of Ethiopia. The settlers in the two schemes treated by this study are Ethiopian ex-refugees (or returnees) who were repatriated to their country of origin after a prolonged stay in the Sudan. It was decided by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) to resettle the returnees in the Humera area on a voluntary basis following their repatriation between June 1993 and June 1994. Once this decision was communicated to the potential settlers prior to their repatriation, the majority of the returnees opted to accept the offer, while a minority preferred to reintegrate in their original home villages in the highlands.

The government took the initiative by setting up a partnership with the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program, all of which expressed their willingness to involve themselves in efforts aimed at ensuring self-sufficiency for the beneficiaries through resettlement. In accordance with the terms of the agreement reached between the partner organizations, it was decided that each would contribute towards efforts presumed to lead to durable solutions in the form of achieving an acceptable level of self-sufficiency on the part of the target groups. Partner organizations agreed to provide *ad hoc* enabling-assistance, *ad-interim*, by making use of resources at their disposal and engaging in activities that are in line with their respective mandates. Enabling-assistance was to be provided for a period of 9 months, which was considered as sufficient duration, after which resettlers would cater for themselves without becoming dependent on external support for basic needs.

The following arrangements were made to implement the decision in this regard:

a) The Ethiopian Government would allocate farm plots and land for homesteads to returnee households by making use of available public land under its custody. It would also assist by clearing forests, providing tractor services for land clearing and ploughing, mobilizing the relevant units of its departments to extend the required services in line with their respective specialization and competence;
b) REST would contribute by extending transport facilities and warehouses for storing food items and would deploy its experienced staff to coordinate the resettlement efforts in general;
c) UNHCR would cover infrastructural costs relating to construction of schools, clinics, water-points and dry-weather feeder roads;
d) WFP, through the former Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), would provide food ration that could be used by settler households during the interim period.

Apart from conducting investigation on the situation of returnees affected by planned intervention, the study also made an in-depth examination of the situation of non-resettled returnee groups in the vicinity of the research location and the condition of other returnee groups reintegrated in their home villages within the Tigray Region. The following is a summary of the findings and an analysis of the major aspects of the resettlement program in the locality in question.

Feasibility/Viability of Planned Resettlement

An assessment of the merits of planned resettlement as a useful strategy in the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups could be made using a number of variables, which include the type and amount of assistance provided by institutional actors, the impacts of provided inputs on the drives made to realize the stated goals, the situation of other categories of returnees who are not embraced in the settlement program, and the implications of 'spontaneous' settlement for the lives of host-populations and rational use of environmental resources.

In general terms, the following observations have been made regarding resettlement in Ethiopia:

a) resettlement characterized by huge population movements has taken place in response to threats caused by famine and conflict;
b) 'spontaneous' settlement schemes were more frequent and far wider in scope than the ones that were institutionally sponsored prior to the 1974 revolution;
c) planned resettlement gained wider currency and gathered momentum after 1974 as a response to natural and man-made calamities often expressed in famine and population dislocation;
d) new developments experienced in the post-revolution years led to a number of basic assumptions anchored on availability of public land, which justified resettlement as an instrument for tackling a wide array of problems associated with landlessness and unemployment, food insecurity, rational and controlled use and conservation of natural resources.

Concerning both types of resettlement noted above, the empirical data collected and the analysis thereof on the situation of beneficiaries leads to the following conclusions:

a) it has been established that improvements in living conditions are much greater and markedly experienced as regards returnee settlers affected by planned intervention;
b) there appears to be considerable preference for resettlement programs assisted by institutional actors on the part of other groups of returnees that have either reintegrated in original home villages or attempted to earn livelihoods on their own. This seems to have been caused by marginality and diminished size of land, resulting in low-yield and, hence, reduced standard of living for those that are reintegrated in the highlands, and absence of dependable and unhampered means of livelihood through the use of land resources for other non-settler returnee groups;

c) planned resettlement is accompanied by institutionally organized assistance, lending added leverage to the endeavors of returnees in their effort to adjust to, and cope with, challenges in the new environments. The study has established that all the returnees that are not affected by planned resettlement have encountered various forms of deprivation, owing to the absence of satisfactory access to land resources and concerted institutional assistance which could have led to their rehabilitation in the long term;

d) trickling multiplier effects and incidental benefits accruing from planned settlement schemes in the localities in question have occurred due to the construction of physical/social infrastructure and increased attention of the government and donors, which proved advantageous to the receiving areas despite the constraints following the insertion of several thousands of 'illegal' settlers in the receiving areas;

e) planned intervention in resettlement programs in the location of the study is marked by low- level participation of settlers in important issues and decisions affecting them. The priorities of the major providers - the government and its partners - gave priority to their interests over the underlying concerns of the settlers. In like manner, the dispositions and preferences of providers were given more weight than the needs and aspirations of beneficiaries.

Notwithstanding some misgivings, such as diminished participation of target groups and the prevalent strong influence of providers in decision-making relating to major issues affecting the undertakings, planned intervention by institutional actors has been found to be more feasible in returnee rehabilitation. This is ascertained by comparing the situation of returnees who were not affected by assisted resettlement schemes with that of returnees that have benefited from assisted resettlement programs.

Attainment of Self-sufficiency by Settler Households

Appraisal of the overall condition and performance of the returnee settler households is made on the basis of the amount of

farm products obtained, income from sale of crops and other sources, satisfaction of household needs, and possession of cash savings and other assets. Analysis of the information on the subject has led to the following conclusions:

a) settler households managed to support themselves by meeting family food requirements and other needs through use of products obtained from their farms;
b) dependency on external support in the settlements has been effectively discontinued following the termination of assistance, provided *ad-interim,* in accordance with the terms of prior arrangements;
c) institutional assistance provided by involved actors in the form of service facilities, land resources, agricultural inputs and consumables was crucial in bringing about the ability to cater for oneself, and this could have been difficult (if not totally impossible) in the absence of organized support;
d) apart from meeting the basic requirements for maintaining adequate family life, institutional support has enabled settler households to finance community infrastructural development endeavors;
e) conditions of life in the settlements have been found to be better when compared to situations in both the original home villages (prior to flight) and in exile (the Sudan). This is explained by the fact that the returnee-settlers were provided with larger and more fertile plots, which accounted for increased yield and, hence, improved standard of living. This is considered as the necessary price paid for offsetting marginality and diminished size in holdings prior to flight on the one hand, and life characterized by stress and anxiety in the country-of-asylum on the other.

With respect to the attainment of self-sufficiency of settler households, the evidence at hand shows that the stated goal of realizing a modest level of self-sufficiency, as anticipated from the very start, has been more or less achieved. However, whether the attained level and capacity of catering for oneself on the part of the beneficiaries is a result of the impetus provided by initial

enabling- assistance, whose effects could diminish subsequently, or whether it is a logical outcome of settler efforts, which could progressively persist in the years to come, is difficult to tell at this stage. Nevertheless, there are already signs indicating that several factors are likely to pose serious challenges militating against probable opportunities towards progressively increasing the betterment of the existing situation.

Sustainability of Achieved Self-sufficiency

Our findings on the possibility of maintaining and/or broadening the achieved level of self-sufficiency warrant the following conclusions:

a) sustainability through maintaining and/or expanding a given level of self-sufficiency could be realized only under conditions where the variables that have led to the specific situation remain equal and constant;
b) sustainable self-sufficiency for those engaged in agricultural production could be adversely affected by such factors as unfavorable climatic conditions, poor communication, fluctuating demands, and prices of farm products, preferential treatment favoring some market forces on the basis of discriminatory official policy and practice;
c) organization of producers based on clearly articulated interests and access to market information (on demands and prices) could serve as a safe-guard against artificial fall in producer revenue.

In the light of what has been observed in the settlement localities in question, it seems that prospects for sustainable self-sufficiency are in the process of being negatively affected as a result of the surfacing of a host of unhealthy developments. These include: the fall in producer prices entailed by constrained market-outlets; administrative fiat limiting options for producers and aimed at entrenching the hegemonic position of favored syndicates; and the influx of several thousand non-resettled returnees, resulting in considerable pressure on forest resources

and existing services and facilities. Moreover, the commencement of the Ethio-Eritrean border conflict in the locality of research a few months after the completion of data collection for this study will undoubtedly affect the chances for sustained self-sufficiency. This is due to the fact that Eritrea, until then, had been the most important market for agricultural products from the study area.

In summary, maintenance and/or expansion of a given level of self-sufficiency is conditioned by the existence of a host of factors, such as favorable natural conditions (rainfall), existence of market information and outlets and communication infrastructure, avoidance of artificial tampering in the logical interplay of market forces and the prevalence of relative peace and stability allowing for normal productive activities and unhampered transaction in goods and services.

Predictability, Replicability and Feasibility of Resettlement

Most resettlement programs in Ethiopia that were initiated between the late 1960s and mid-1980s were beset with several problems that undermined efforts to build production capacities leading to self-sufficiency.[44] A combination of various factors such as faulty management, poor planning, cultural and environmental impediments are responsible for low production accompanied by a corresponding level of income;[45] hence the failure to achieve the desired goal of self-sufficiency as the intended outcome of past resettlement efforts. In spite of the fact that it has been relegated to the background in the post-1991 period, resettlement, as witnessed in the study location, has fared better in many ways compared to previous similar undertakings. This is evidenced by such facts as termination of outside assistance within the specified time limit, the ability of fulfilling family food-requirements, propensity to finance community infrastructure and the on-going disposition of creating assets which could serve as risk-buffers in time of need. It appears that such level of achievement as experienced in the settlement sites is

[44] See Abdulhamid Bedri *et al.* (1989), p. 67.
[45] See Alula Abate and Fekadu Gedamu (1988).

an outcome of a combination of factors which include: a) availability of relatively large and fertile land for household agricultural production, which the returnees have put to use; b) conducive climatic factors which led to obtaining commendable amount of yield throughout most harvest seasons since the initiation of the scheme; c) existence of favorable market out-let, as witnessed in the 1994/95 harvest year; and d) initial enabling institutional inputs that lent leverage to good performance during the take-off stage.

Another variable that could help in establishing replicability of such an undertaking relates to the cost component of the enterprise. The effort to obtain data on actual cost pertaining to the various aspects of the two resettlement schemes under consideration has failed to materialize owing to the paucity of reliable and well organized information that should have been at the disposal of concerned agencies. However, estimates from a study on the subject dealing with previous resettlement undertakings indicate that incurred expenses per settler household amount to about Birr 6000[46] (US$857 at the current exchange rate). This sum was used to cover a wide array of expenses, such as transportation, feeding-in-transit and enabling-assistance, *ad-interim*, in the form of food ration, household utensils and farm tools, infrastructural development works such as land clearing and paving roads, etc. It is worth noting that since land was declared public property, with the proviso that it is not subject to sale, the market value of land is not included in the estimate.

From the foregoing, it is possible to conclude that resettlement as a strategy for returnee rehabilitation is replicable in terms of ensuring a modest level of self-sufficiency, provided that the factors responsible for achievement in this regard remain constant. Besides, resettlement as a strategy for rehabilitation could be replicable when considering a total cost of US$857 as

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[46] See the study sponsored by UN/FAO on the Ethiopian Highland Reclamation Survey (EHRS) titled "Resettlement Strategy Proposals" (1985), pp. 39-44. This cost estimate is also cited in Tegegne Gebre Egziabher (1995), p. 33.

incurred expense is presumed to be more or less sufficient to establish a settler household. It could be argued that, by making use of available idle land and mobilizing domestic and international support, it is possible to resettle at least 5000 families every year, in the process expending a modest sum of less than US$5 million.

However, data obtained during the fieldwork on future trends of maintaining and/or broadening the achieved level of self-sufficiency do not warrant predictability in the long-run. The following could render such an assertion plausible:

a) since the returnee settlers engage in rain-fed agricultural production, there is a possibility of decline in yield during harvest seasons, owing to adverse natural conditions (poor and erratic rainfall, pests, e.g.);
b) compounded with limited market-outlet and policy drawbacks, price fluctuation relating to the value of primary products negatively affect producer revenue;
c) poor communication network depriving access to big market-centers and paucity of information on price and type of commodities in demand;
d) possible decline in production resulting from the entrenchment of traditional farming practices characterized by marginal use of improved inputs and techniques;

It could therefore be argued that predictability of self-sufficiency based on productive agricultural engagement in settlements depends on the existence of capabilities that could offset the vagaries of nature, implications of wrong policies and diminished and distorted market-outlets and structures.

Conclusion

In general, planned land settlement carried out with imaginative planning, foresight and feasible assessment of concrete conditions is bound to significantly solve Ethiopia's perennial problems associated with food insecurity and unemployment, but with considerable costs. According to one

study (Tegegne, 1995:25), the country has approximately 13 million hectares of expandable land suitable for rain-fed agriculture, which could double current production under the existing system of farming while at the same time absorbing a labor force of 16 million producers. If this information is authentic, outcomes from such a potential could be further augmented by making significant capital investment in farming techniques, agricultural inputs, human resource development and production infrastructure. Nevertheless, replication of resettlement on a wider scale is likely to lead to environmental hazards caused by ever increasing encroachments on the environment, by way, for instance, of clearing natural vegetation covers, in order to acquire farm plots, homesteads, energy needs as well as laying down of physical/social infrastructure.

When looking at the land settlement experiences of some countries, one finds a mix of both success and failure in the different aspects of the same undertaking. Whereas certain achievements glaringly feature in a given component, drawbacks and failure appear as hallmarks relating to other dimensions. For example, land settlement in Tanzania, undertaken by launching the Ujamaa scheme, has failed in bringing about the intended self-reliance and actual development. This appears to have been caused by defective and arbitrary site selection, faulty physical planning and intensive use of coercion rather than persuasion on settlers. Such misgivings led to the abandonment of several settlement villages and failure in attaining the expected level of agricultural production due to low productivity, inefficient marketing and poor transportation network (Tegegne, 1989:17; Maro, 1988:243-251; Lundqvist, 1981:338). On the other hand, Ujamaa settlements have registered commendable success in the field of social-service delivery, which was used by the Tanzanian Government for inducing people to voluntarily move to the villages (McHenry, 1979:128).

Planned land settlement in Malaysia has succeeded in bringing about a boom in agricultural production and transforming traditional farmers into cash-crop producers (Bahrin, 1988:109). In the Philippines, the expansion of agricultural land

to frontier areas has entailed increase in food production for a rapidly growing population (Paderanga, 1988:143), whereas the overwhelming majority of settlements in Indonesia experienced production levels that could not be justified as economically feasible (Oberai, 1988:16).

It is thus possible to conclude that the impact of planned settlement on agricultural production and employment generation is diverse, varying from place to place and conditioned by a host of factors, such as imaginative planning, voluntary participation of target groups, availability of communication networks, adequate market outlets, and economically feasible policy frameworks. In situations where performance appears to be dismal, it is necessary to probe into the circumstances that led to the proliferation of setbacks. Such an act could help in putting things right through the application of corrective measures.

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Science and Technology in Rural Development

Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission

1. Introduction

1.1. A reference or base line is a pre-requisite for any discussion on development. In the Ethiopian context, this development base line has not been established, especially with regard to rural development. One could be tempted to position this base line anywhere between absolute poverty and poverty. As can imagined, a community/nation in this band between the two lines leads a precarious life. So, the first task is to arrest this erratic base line. It is our belief that science and technology will play a key role in accomplishing this task.

1.2. Development is and has always been the major issue of concern, but it has never been addressed properly. It is even ironic that the subject of rural development appears to be the maintenance of rural poverty, sustainability of subsistence farming, human and livestock diseases, and the vulnerability of the peasant household to recurrent natural phenomena such as drought. Taking a step to break this vicious entanglement can be considered a leap indeed. In order to appreciate and methodically approach the problems of rural development, it is imperative that science and technology be gainfully employed, at least in influencing the physical variables.

2. Science and Technology in Rural Setting

2.1. Economic progress in 'advance' countries has been made possible on a continuum of three stages of development of science and technology, viz.:

- scientific discovery;
- useful inventions;
- profitable innovations.

However, in 'developing' countries, the principal need in economic progress is innovation, which can be drawn upon the world's existing stock of knowledge and inventions. For this to be realized, application of knowledge and technical methods which are appropriate to the socio-economic environment of the country is needed.

2.2. It is in this respect that the Ethiopian Science and Technology Policy and Strategy has been drawn as a component of the overall national development strategy as embodied in the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) The different approaches entertained by the Ethiopian Science and Technology Institute to make some inroads in rural development are:

a) emphasis on reinforcing inputs;
b) emphasis on development goals;
c) emphasis on project types.

(a) Emphasis on Inputs/Outputs: This approach includes:

- availability of affordable inputs (fertilizers, farm implements, etc.);
- appropriate extension packages, information and education for agricultural productivity;
- local verification trials;
- development of rural industries;
- rural public works and community construction projects;
- home life improvement extension services.

5.4.1.4. Support techniques that would help in the search and use of alternative and renewable sources of energy.

5.4.2. Encourage and support strategies for efficient and economical use of energy in all sectors;

5.4.3. Support research on the development of equipment for the generation and utilization of energy;

5.4.4. Encourage research on and development and utilization of energy technologies suitable to the rural population and their popularization and dissemination.

5.5. Industry

5.5.1. Encourage efforts to build and develop the capacity to produce essential inputs for the development of the agricultural sector;

5.5.2. Support measures and activities that would help produce basic consumer goods, implements and equipment;

5.5.3. Encourage research and development (R&D) activities that would help manufacture implements to promote small-scale and rural industries;

5.5.4. Support techniques for the local production of industrial raw materials and other inputs;

5.5.5. Support research to make traditional and handicrafts technology modern and productive;

5.5.6. Encourage technological activities that would help prevent environmental pollution arising from industrial processes and by-products, and also promote their appropriate utilization;

5.2.7. Strengthen technologies/methods that would help follow up changes in the environment and forecast, prevent and minimize the effects of natural disasters.

5.3. Water Resources Development

5.3.1. Support research that would help improve the quantity, quality, conservation and utilization of ground and surface water;

5.3.2. Support efforts towards a multi-purpose water resource development for an integrated provision of water for agriculture, energy, transport and private use;

5.3.3. Encourage appropriate techniques for the supply of reliable and clean water for urban and rural dwellers;

5.3.4. Support efforts to develop public awareness on the control of sedimentation, watershed management and use of rain water.

5.4. Energy

5.4.1. To promote activities that would facilitate the use of different and co-ordinated methods to ensure the supply of sustainable and reliable energy:

5.4.1.1. Support research on the development and utilization of fast-growing tree species and strengthen bio-mass energy development;

5.4.1.2. Facilitate conditions for the expansion and utilization of water as a source of energy;

5.4.1.3. Encourage research that would promote the supply and use of petroleum, natural gas, coal and geothermal energy sources;

5.1.4. Support and strengthen strategies that would promote the dissemination of appropriate rural technologies for integrated rural development by studying and developing long- standing cultural know-how and methodologies.

5.2. Natural Resources Development and Environmental Protection

5.2.1. Develop a system that would help map out the country's eco-system/ecology to identify and register the diverse biological resources and to collect, store, protect and utilize the plant and animal genetic resources contained therein;

5.2.2. Support studies that would help in designing and implementing appropriate land use and practical and sustainable soil conservation methods;

5.2.3. Encourage mechanisms that would help maintain the natural forest and, in general, control deforestation and ecological imbalance;

5.2.4. Facilitate research and development programmes that would help discover, popularize and develop fast-growing, drought-resistant and multi-purpose tree species so as to rehabilitate and develop degraded environments;

5.2.5. Facilitate studies and research to reduce and control the polluting effects of agricultural and chemicals on environmental air, soil and water;

5.2.6. Establish a system of educational and social programmes/methods to enhance the awareness, knowledge and participation of the public on environmental protection and rehabilitation;

5. Priority Sectors and Programmes

5.1. Agriculture:

5.1.1. To support activities for self-sufficiency through improved food supply:

5.1.1.1. Support and encourage research to raise the productivity of crops, animal resources and production implements in kind, quality and quantity, taking into account environmental protection as well as people's tradition and culture;

5.1.1.2. Encourage the use of irrigation schemes of different scales and forms to secure reliable production;

5.1.1.3. Encourage and support research on methods of reducing pre- and post-harvest loss during agricultural production, employing appropriate technologies for prevention, handling and processing;

5.1.1.4. Encourage and support techniques for the development of appropriate and productive fish species in rivers, lakes and artificial/man-made ponds, and encourage its wider and sustained availability for consumption;

5.1.1.5. Facilitate the application of technologies for large-scale food storage and conservation in all localities as far as it is feasible.

5.1.2. Promote and support science and technology (S&T) activities that would facilitate the supply of agricultural raw materials for industrial use in sufficient quantity and quality;

5.1.3. Develop and support S&T methods that upgrade the quality, quantity and variety of exportable agricultural products;

4.2. Establish and/or strengthen S&T institutes, research and development (R&D) centers and support services as may be found necessary and appropriate in the various administrative regions;

4.3. Establish responsible bodies/organs in every economic and service sector for the execution of S&T development activities;

4.4. Facilitate conditions for the wider participation of women in S&T activities;

4.5. Establish a system to encourage young scientists and technologists;

4.6. Establish a system for the popularization and proliferation of science and technology among the different nations and nationalities, utilizing their languages, in order to improve and enrich the S&T culture of the Ethiopian peoples;

4.7. Create a conducive environment to encourage scientists and researchers to work for better productivity;

4.8. Ensure the rapid dissemination and application of research and development (R&D) results;

4.9. Encourage the private sector and its capital to participate in the promotion and development of scientific and technological activities;

4.10. Build trained manpower in science and technology (S&T) both in quality and quantity;

4.11. Promote mutual support between S&T education, research and production;

4.12. Encourage the improvement, wider diffusion and application of traditional technologies.

(b) **Emphasis on Development goals:** This approach would deal with rural transformation via the introduction and application of programs, including changes in the methods of production and the various institutions which influence same, i.e. changes in economic, social and policy environment.

(c) **Emphasis on Project Types**: This target approach includes:

- commodity programs for production of export crops;
- programs focused on making an impact on a given area in a short period of time;
- project(s) on removing critical constraints on a case-by-case basis.

3. Objectives of the Policy

3.1. To build national capability to generate, select, import, develop, disseminate and apply appropriate technologies for the realization of the country's socio-economic objectives and to rationally conserve and utilize its natural and manpower resources;

3.2. To improve and develop the knowledge, culture and scientific and technological awareness of the peoples of Ethiopia and, thereby, promote the development of traditional, new and emerging technologies;

3.3. To make science and technology (S&T) activities more productive, efficient and development oriented.

4. Policy Directives

4.1. Build the capacity to search, select, negotiate, procure, exchange and introduce technologies suitable to Ethiopia's socio-economic conditions;

5.5.7. Encourage and facilitate ways and means to build capacity in basic design and manufacturing, project engineering and technology transfer.

5.6. Construction

5.6.1. Create conditions suitable for the production, use, and popularization of appropriate and local-specific construction materials, equipment and technology which do not aggravate the deterioration of the forest resources of the country;

5.6.2. Build the necessary capability in construction design, management, execution and follow-up in priority-accorded economic sectors, particularly in water works, dams, irrigation and transport and communication systems (roads, ports, airports, etc.) and industry;

5.6.3. Support research activities geared towards the generation and development of technologies for a labour-intensive and speedy overall development of the construction sector;

5.6.4. Encourage and support research activities leading to the improvement and wider application of traditional construction technologies.

5.7. Mineral Resources

5.7.1. Support the expansion of appropriate techniques and modern technologies that would help in prospecting and identifying the country's mineral resources;

5.7.2. Support the preparation and dissemination of simple techniques and strategies that promote the exploration, study and utilization of mineral resources through the involvement and participation of the rural community;

5.7.3. Support capacity building to study, explore and develop petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron and other industrially useful minerals;

5.7.4. Help strengthen science and technology (S&T) activities in the fields of hydrology and seismology.

5.8. Health and Population Planning

5.8.1. Support research and development (R&D) activities on the prevention and control of communicable and parasitic diseases;

5.8.2. Promote activities and techniques that would improve and help sustain maternal and child heath and family planning;

5.8.3. Encourage and support research and studies on the causes and solutions of urban and rural community health problems;

5.8.4. Promote and strengthen methods for essential food supply and appropriate nutrition;

5.8.5. Encourage and support research on traditional medicine and health-related beliefs and attitudes;

5.8.6. Support studies and research on environmental pollution and health problems associated with industry, agriculture, transport, etc.;

5.8.7. Strengthen research on clean water supply and environmental sanitation;

5.8.8. Support studies and research on the prevention of newly emerging diseases;

5.8.9. Encourage and support research on health services systems;

5.8.10. Support research on the dynamics of population control.

5.9. Education

5.9.1. Search for ways to strengthen science and technology (S&T) education at all levels of the educational establishment;

5.9.2. Support ways for the domestic production and maintenance of S&T educational equipment and materials;

5.9.3. Encourage ways whereby research results from higher educational institutions can be applied;

5.9.4. Encourage basic research and support the development of the appropriate professional manpower;

5.9.5. Encourage techniques whereby education can be linked to and made complementary with the day-to-day lives of the people.

6. Main Areas of Focus for the Immediate Future

The main areas of focus for science and technology in the Ethiopian rural setting will be:

- Agricultural productivity for food self-sufficiency and food security. This is to be realized by way of equitable and agro-ecologically based, decentralized research undertaking. This decentralized approach will empower the farming community in setting the research agenda. A program is already underway in the realization of this process.
- The establishment of priorities for health-related research undertakings through essential national health research networks established at the grass roots level.

- In the area of construction, utilization of non-wood local materials, such as sun-dried clay bricks, shall be encouraged and promoted. This will, to some extent, contribute to the conservation of forest resources and soil fertility. The rural household will also be a beneficiary of a habitable environment.
- As the source of fuel is one important and environmentally sensitive issue, alternative technology approaches will be promoted.

Feedback from Workshop Participants

A short discussion was held at the end of the workshop to give participants the chance to offer their suggestions regarding the future direction of FSS. The following are some of the main points raised:

- FSS should try to influence and convince the Government, and for this it should have easy access to Government officials.

- There is a gap between policy and social science research. FSS should establish links with relevant Government institutions to promote debate.

- To influence public policy it is important to determine when to intervene in the debate. There is a better chance of influencing policy if FSS intervenes before policies are finalized, i.e. at the time policies are being drawn up or formulated. It will be too late to intervene after that.

- While it is important to intervene in the debate before policies are enacted, FSS should not give up even after that. FSS should continue the dialogue and try to change the policies.

A question was asked about membership in FSS: how does one become a member?

- FSS will draw its strength by keeping its independence. FSS should maintain and prove its independent status.

- FSS should play an important role in creating a culture of dialogue. It should avoid polarized views and debates. The culture of hardline arguments and rejectionist attitudes should be replaced by respect for diversity of views and dialogue.

WORKSHOP PROGRAM

Red Cross Training Centre
Addis Ababa

Morning Session

9:00 - 9: 25	Registration
9:25 - 9:30	Welcoming Statement *Prof. Bahru Zewde* *Chairman of the Board* *Forum for Social Studies*
9:30 - 9:45	Opening Address **H. E. Ato Girmal Birru,** **Minister, MEDAC**
9:45 - 10:00	Introducing the Forum for Social Studies *Dessalegn Rahmato* *Manager* *Forum for Social Studies*
10:00 - 10:20	**Coffee Break**
Chairperson	**Berhanu Nega** **Businessman and** **Chairperson, EEA**
10:20 - 10:45	Revisiting Rural Development Through A Gender Lens *Zenebework Tadesse* *Forum for Social Studies*

10:45 - 11:10	Land Tenure Issues in Rural Development *Gebru Mersha* *Addis Ababa University*
11:10 - 11:35	Rural Institutions and Rural Development *Yigremew Adal* *IDR, AAU*
11:35 - 12:25	**General Discussion**
12:30 - 1:30	**Lunch**

Afternoon Session

Chairperson	**Zemedu Worku** **Agricultural Research Expert & FSS Board Member**
1:30 - 1:55	Resettlement: A Strategy for Vulnerable Groups? *Kassahun Berhanu, AAU*
1:55 - 2:20	Fertility Change in Ethiopia? *Aklilu Kidanu* *Miz-HasabResearch Center*
2:20 - 3:00	**General Discussion**
3:00 - 3:20	**Coffee Break**

Chairperson	**Konjit Fekade** **Faculty of Technology** **Addis Ababa University**
3:20 - 3:45	Role of Science and Technology in Rural Development *Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission*
3:45 - 4:10	Indigenous Knowledge Systems & Agricultural Development *Belay Tegene* *Addis Ababa University*
4:10 - 4:50	**General Discussion**
Closing Session	
4:50 - 5:10	Reflections on Future Activities of FSS *Management Committee of FSS*
5:15	Closing Remarks **H. E. Ato Asrat Bulbula** **Commissioner** **Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission**
5:20	**End of Workshop**

List of Participants

No.	PARTICIPANT NAME	ORGANIZATION
1	Sirak Alemu	MOA
2	Messele Endalew	CRS
3	Yigremew Adal	IDR
4	Abebe Demissie	BCRI
5	Gemechu Degefa	ILRI
6	Shimelis Bosa	AAU
7	Tilahun Lakew	Radio Fana
8	TayeAssefa	Unity College
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10	Karin Goesing	GIZ – LUPO
11	Kebed Ayele	GIZ –LUPO
12	Tamrat Mekonnen	SCF/UK
13	Fekade Azeze	AAU
14	Etalem Mengestu	Private Consultant
15	Paulos Chanie	EMPA
16	Meheret Ayenew	AAU
17	Tegene Teka	OSSREA
18	Dessalegne Rahmato	FSS
19	Gunter Schroider	LWF
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21	Ghristian Graefin	GIZ
22	Gizachew Abegaz	MOA
23	Amere Worku	MOA
24	Yeraswork Admassie	AAU
25	Mekonnen Manyazewal	MEDaC
26	Aklilu Kidanu	Miz-Hasab
27	Gebru Mersha	AAU
28	Ruth Abraham	UNDP
29	Shu-Shu Tekle-Haimanot	ECA
30	Meaza Ashenafi	EWLA
31	Meg Brown	USAID
32	Shiferaw Bekele	AAU
33	Worknesh Kassie	UNICEF
34	Berhanu Tareke	RLDS

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35	Berhanu Nega	EEA
36	Paola Henonen	CERTWID (AAU)
37	Adey Abebe	CRDA
38	Abi Masefield	CISP
39	Konjit Fekade	AAU
40	Eshetu Dababu	MOA
41	Aster Birke	GTZ
42	Kassahun Berhanu	AAU
43	Belay Tegene	AAU
44	Shiferaw Jamo	AAU
45	Hailu Habtu	CFEE
46	Zinash Tsegaye	SDC (Irish Aid)
47	Amare Teklu	ILRI
48	Lealem Berhau	SDC (Irish Aid)
49	Orginal W. Giorgis	EWLA
50	Kifle Lemma	Oxfam GB
51	Alula Pankhurst	AAU
52	Taye Belachew	AKPAC
53	Tegist Alemu	AKAPAC
54	Helen Bekle	Austrian Embassy
55	Alemayehu Geda	AAU (Econ.)
56	Yeshi Habte-Mariam	CERTWID (AAU)
57	Befekadu Belew	Reporter Newspaper/Reporter N.L.
58	Dawit Berhanu	ENA
59	Degne Abera	Eth. Press
60	Belainesh Tefera	Eth. Press
61	Gizachew	ESTC
62	Feyera Abdi	SOS Sahel
63	Dr. Eyasu Elias	SOS Sahel
64	Heikiki Haili	Embassy of Finland
65	Mulugojjam ASSAYE	UNEPA
66	Yikanu Tewolde	WAO
67	Tringo W/Mikael	MOA
68	Franco Conzato	EC Delegation
69	Wim Olthof	EC Delegation

No.	PARTICIPANT NAME	ORGANIZATION
70	Roberto ???	Italian Cooperation
71	Zerihun Bogale	ETU
72	Solomon Kassaye	GSA
73	Behru Zewde	FSS
74	Biruk H/Mariam	ESTC
75	Nardos W.G.	GSA
76	Ephrem Tesfu	ESTC
77	Zemedu Worku	Private
78	Zenebework Tadesse	FSS
79	Commissioner Asrat Bulbula	ESTC